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Abstract 
Cambodia is a predominantly rural country with only 20 per cent of the population (3.2 
million), living in urban areas. Of this 3.2 million however, over 50 per cent live in 
overcrowded, poorly constructed dwellings lacking basic infrastructure such as running 
water, electricity or sanitation. However due to the dominance of aid and assistance to rural 
areas and the expectation that those living in urban areas share in the wealth of the city, 
urban poverty is overlooked in Cambodia. This belief is reinforced as agricultural produce 
has been over taken by the services and manufacturing industries in the Cambodian 
economy; industries concentrated in urban areas. This thesis addresses the deficit in urban 
poverty research by using a political economy perspective to investigate livelihoods and 
housing concerns of the urban poor, in the context of neoliberal development. Research 
undertaken for this thesis was guided by two research questions; first, who are the urban 
poor and what resources do they rely upon? And second, does development policy address 
the needs of the urban poor? Doctoral fieldwork was conducted in Phnom Penh 2011- 
2012. Key informant interviews with tuktuk drivers and stakeholders were conducted 
alongside life history interviews and a household survey in three urban poor settlements 
facing forced eviction and four resettlement sites. Assumptions concerning the informal 
economy underpinning urban poverty and urban poor livelihoods are deconstructed. 
Following mixed methods analysis; a more nuanced understanding of urban poor 
livelihoods is argued for and reinforced through two new terms, the urban poor economy 
and horizontal regulation. It is proposed that policy makers have failed to recognise the 
reality of urban poverty in which the relationship between where one lives and where one 
works is of the utmost importance. This failure exposes development plans as little more 
than rhetoric to attract foreign aid and investment. Combined with the exploitation of the 
urban poor by corrupt government officials more concerned with the accumulation of 
personal wealth, urban poverty alleviation efforts are undermined from their conception 
through to implementation.  
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis identifies the specific characteristics of urban poverty and addresses the 
failures of development efforts to alleviate poverty in Phnom Penh, Cambodia from a 
political economy perspective. The thesis is structured around two broad research 
questions. First, who are the urban poor and what resources and networks do they rely 
upon? Second, how does existing development policy address the needs of the urban 
poor? Two central chapters, each focusing on one of these research questions, present 
an analysis of seven case study sites of residents facing eviction and in resettlement 
sites. Within these chapters, two main themes of livelihoods and housing are identified 
and investigated. Broader contextual research including interviews with tuktuk 
(motorised rickshaw) and motodop (motorbike taxi) drivers and local NGOs will be 
included where appropriate to add further evidence and to help triangulate findings from 
the primary interviews. Assumptions held regarding urban poverty, development and 
poverty alleviation policy will be challenged through empirical analysis of these case 
study sites and interviews. 
 
During the process of this research the author found it important to explain and at times 
justify her presence in urban poor areas of Phnom Penh, areas normally avoided by 
Cambodians and certainly not visited by foreigners. The author, a white British female, 
was often met with suspicion and asked to explain her presence and present official 
personal identification documents to those she encountered, particularly to local village 
chiefs and settlement representatives. This became an important process of validation as 
it either enabled or denied her access to people, settlements and information. The author 
explained that she was not there to influence people, monitor them for the government, 
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or provide financial or developmental assistance; rather that she was a student and was 
there to speak to people and to listen. Through this shift in the relationship-dynamic, the 
emphasis was placed not the questions asked, but the responses given by respondents, 
as people were free to talk about what was important to them, interesting or worrying. 
This also allowed people to ask questions of the author, to better understand her 
circumstances. Questions commonly began with interest into her marital status, age and 
income. Because of the importance of this process during fieldwork, the author has 
included this excerpt from her fieldwork diary, explaining how she found herself 
conducting research on urban poverty in Phnom Penh:  
 
I first came to Cambodia in 2010 for an internship with the United Nations 
Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials‘ (UNAKRT) Victims Support Section. 
I had recently completed my Masters in Human Rights and was keen to put 
into practice all that I had learned. However, my daily interaction with 
members of the public threw the historic atrocity at the centre of millions of 
dollars of international aid and support into stark relief with another, 
heightening atrocity: widespread poverty and deepening inequality in 
contemporary Cambodia. Millions of dollars are being spent to bring a 
handful of aged individuals to justice whilst millions of people struggle daily 
to make ends meet. Having to justify the expense of the Tribunal against 
building roads and houses, educating children, supporting farmers or 
providing healthcare to the sick was an impossible task. I decided to 
volunteer alongside my internship with a local non-government 
organisation (NGO), Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development 
(CVCD), which specialised in providing education to urban poor children. 
Through CVCD I was introduced to residents who had recently been 
resettled or were facing eviction as a result of the railway rehabilitation 
project, supported by AusAID and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Their circumstances varied greatly. Some communities were living in very 
poor conditions whilst others had seen great improvements. CVCD focused 
their efforts largely on supporting these communities through building 
schools and implementing the Royal Government of Cambodia‘s non-formal 
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education programme.
1
 It was through my experiences with UNAKRT and 
CVCD, as well as increasing global media coverage of controversial land 
conflict in the city that I began to formulate a research agenda. The 
disparity in circumstances of those being resettled made me question the 
circumstances of their resettlement, and how a city with such visible wealth, 
could be home to such poverty and inequality. 
 
The following thesis builds upon this initial introduction to Cambodia and the 
contemporary inequalities being lived out in Phnom Penh. This chapter begins with an 
overview of the research agenda and structure, before introducing the theories and 
theoretical approaches that were used to shape and inform this thesis. 
  
                                                 
1
 The different education programmes organized by the government, formal and non-
formal, are explained in detail in section 4.1.ii 
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1.1 Overview  
Since 1989, Cambodia has officially received more than $10bn USD in aid
2
 yet was 
listed 136th out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index in 2014
3
 and is 
considered to be a fragile state by the OECD 2013 Fragile States report. Of the $1bn 
USD aid budgeted for in 2015 by the Royal Government of Cambodia, $174m USD had 
been allocated to agriculture and rural development, whereas $19.4m USD had been 
allocated for urban development and management (Royal Government of Cambodia 
Development Cooperation Trends Report, 2014). With 80 per cent of the population 
officially residing in rural areas,
4
 the bias in terms of aid and development for rural 
areas is easily justified. However, problems arise as it is assumed that those living in the 
cities and urban areas are wealthier. This is reinforced with a shift in the Cambodian 
economy from an agricultural base to a services and industry base: a shift from a „rural‟ 
economy to an „urban‟ one. Whereas agricultural produce traditionally dominated the 
Cambodian economy, services and industry have risen to overtake agriculture in recent 
years (see Figure 1). Agricultural produce is still a large portion of the economy 
accounting for 32.7 per cent, however services have over taken at 41.8 per cent and 
industry is not far behind at 25.5 per cent.
5
 This is due to growth in the tourism industry, 
the increase in garment factories and extensive construction projects. These lucrative 
industries are concentrated in urban areas such as Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and 
Battambong.  
 
                                                 
2
 World Bank Data available here: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?page=1 
3
 Human Development Index 2014 List: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/events/2014/july/HDR2014.ht
ml 
4
 Urban population 20 per cent http://kff.org/global-indicator/urban-population/ 
5
 US Central Intelligence Agency data available here: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html 
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Fig. 1 Cambodian GDP percentage by Sector, 2006-2014 
 
 
However, not all urban residents share in the new wealth and opportunities offered with 
the growth of these industries, as 51 per cent of the Cambodian urban population in 
2014 lived in „slums‟6 (see Figure 2). 
Fig. 2 Cambodian urban population living in UN definition of slums 1990-2014 
Year Cambodia 
total pop. 
Cambodia 
urban pop. 
Urban % 
total pop 
% Urban 
pop in slums 
Total 
slum pop  
1990 9,690,107 1,220,953.50 12.60 71.72 1,702,389 
2005 13,866,051 2,731,612.00 19.70 78.91 3,461,680 
2014 15,408,270 3,235,737 21 51.1 1,650,225 
 
This research aims to understand why development has failed in Cambodia; specifically 
it‟s urban areas. Whereas the majority of aid and scholarship concentrate on rural 
Cambodia and rural poverty, this research will focus on the urban environment and the 
lesser understood or researched, urban poor (Fallavier, 2007). This thesis will attempt to 
bridge the gap between theory and policy and in doing so, contribute to academia but 
also be of use to urban poverty alleviation and development policy makers. 
                                                 
6
 The term „slum‟ is used by the UN however the author explains why this is 
problematic through discussion of urban poor housing in Chapter Four.  
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The thesis begins with a Cambodian historical background chapter to highlight different 
pivotal moments in Cambodia‟s history where political and economic manipulations 
have influenced the trajectory of development. By identifying different events and 
themes including historical violence and neglect, the chapter sets the scene for 
understanding the nature of urban poor life and development-induced displacement. A 
more focused investigation into Phnom Penh‟s recent history follows to outline and 
highlight how the city has evolved over time and what broader challenges the city, and 
Cambodian civil society, face today.  
 
From this historical context, the methodology and two main chapters of this thesis focus 
on two guiding research questions:  
1. Who are the urban poor and what resources, networks and mechanisms do they rely 
upon? 
2. Does existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor issues? If not, 
why not and how can this be addressed? 
 
With these two broad research questions in mind, the methodology undertaken for this 
research will be outlined in chapter three, emphasising the increased utility and 
versatility of a mixed methods approach to data collection. Fieldwork for this thesis 
took place in Phnom Penh from August 2011 to May 2012. This chapter will present the 
seven case study sites visited, including maps and photographs, to detail why each site 
was chosen and the varying circumstances between them. Ethical considerations, field 
assistants and problems faced during fieldwork will also be explained. Through a 
detailed methodology, the author hopes the reader will be able to contextualise not only 
the complexity of conducting fieldwork on urban poverty, but also the importance and 
relevance of a mixed methods approach that enabled the author to be adaptable and 
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respond to events that arose during fieldwork and the impact these had on this piece of 
work. 
 
Chapter Four addresses the first of these research questions and begins by outlining 
demographic and general observations from household data. After these preliminary 
observations, the first part of this chapter looks in-depth at household income, 
expenditure and what kind of income generating roles people undertake. Lines of 
comparison will be drawn from both sets of case study sites, those facing eviction and 
those in resettlement sites, to illustrate how development-induced resettlement impacts 
upon every aspect of people‟s lives, negatively for the most part.  
 
This section will present data on labour opportunities and economic coping practices of 
the urban poor, disaggregated to challenge and critically assess the informal economy 
approach to urban labour markets and poverty. Existing informal economy literature 
will be discussed and the lack of consideration a specific context addressed. The chapter 
demonstrates the importance of understanding the vulnerability and insecurity of urban 
poor labour opportunities, and challenges the assumption that increased informality of 
the workplace is required for development to take root. The term urban poor economy is 
proposed as a more accurate way in which to frame urban poor livelihood strategies and 
economic coping practices rather than the misleadingly dualistic term informal 
economy, highlighting the specific challenges of the urban context. 
 
Further, the term horizontal regulation presented forward first in the introduction, is 
detailed and expanded to challenge the notion of the urban poor economy as lacking 
regulation. Fieldwork uncovered extensive self-created and maintained regulation 
amongst people with common goods to sell or income generating initiatives. The many 
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forms of regulation are not always „informal‟. The definition of this term will be 
contextualised and developed further using academic literature, qualitative data and 
explanations offered by the people themselves. 
 
Following the focus on livelihoods and household income, the second part to this 
chapter focuses on the housing conditions and land ownership status of households. As 
at the beginning of the chapter, the first section will be dedicated to outlining fieldwork 
findings relating to the housing situation of those who took part in the household 
survey. Information will include whether they rent or own their homes, how big their 
homes are, what structural materials they are made of and what utilities they do or do 
not have. Comparisons will be again drawn between sites facing eviction and those in 
resettlement sites, to gauge what the housing needs of the urban poor are. 
 
The issue of insecurity emerges again as all sites included in this research are either 
facing eviction or are resettlement sites themselves. The violent nature of evictions has 
been well documented by the media and local NGOs. However it was not just those 
living in sites in central Phnom Penh marked for development that lived under threat of 
eviction, but those in government resettlement sites as well. This section will give space 
to the residents‟ experiences of resettlement, both positive and negative. 
 
The arguments for increased private property rights as key to poverty alleviation will be 
investigated and challenged. Instead an inclusive form of tenure security provision will 
be advocated for, whilst recognising that for the urban poor, work and proximity to 
work is their primary concern: in other words, the spatial dimension of the interaction 
between housing/accommodation and labour markets matters more than is often 
acknowledged. Chapter Four will conclude with a summary of issues facing urban poor 
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residents relating to livelihoods and living conditions, to be taken forward into Chapter 
Five. 
 
Chapter Five will use the findings of Chapter Four to address the second research 
question, Does existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor 
issues? If not, why not and how can this be addressed?. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of neoliberal development („actually existing‟ as well as in theory) to set the 
context of the trajectory taken by Cambodian development. Particularly relevant here 
will be the historical context set in Chapter Two, and therefore historical references will 
be made accordingly. 
 
Moving on from this theoretical discussion, relevant development policy documents, 
domestic laws and international rights will be investigated. This will begin with the 
Cambodian National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) and the Phnom Penh 
Development Strategy (PPDS) in more general terms and how these relate to livelihood 
and housing issues of the urban poor. Following this, Cambodian labour law and the 
role of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) will be examined, drawing on the 
findings of the household survey and interviews. The different Cambodian land laws 
and the right to adequate housing will be addressed and the government‟s 
implementation of these laws and rights analysed using data from the household 
surveys. 
 
The analysis of the findings from this research supports a conclusion that developmental 
efforts thus far have failed to alleviate poverty and have instead condemned the lives of 
urban poor residents to subsistence living. Development initiatives aimed at improving 
the lives of the urban poor failed at their conception to recognise and understand the 
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lives, jobs and coping mechanisms of the urban poor. The intrinsic relationship between 
where one works and where one lives is entirely overlooked. This has been facilitated 
through a failure to tailor development programmes to the urban environment in favour 
of applying rural development policy to urban space. 
 
The research suggests that insecurity is a defining feature of urban poverty and that it 
can be used to characterise labour and land issues. If land and labour are to be effective 
tools of development, this insecurity must be tackled. However, the insecurity of the 
urban poor is not so much a consequence of their circumstances as a result of deliberate 
misapplication of policy. Rather than the poor benefitting from development assistance 
it is in fact the State, individuals and private corporations who benefit from the 
perpetual mobility of the poor. This perpetual mobility is a result of labour and land 
insecurity and is compounded by development projects, which serve both to marginalise 
the poor in terms of land and housing, and depend upon their continued presence as a 
cheap, casual workforce. 
 
 
1.2 Analytical framework 
This thesis uses a political economy approach to unpack and analyse residents from 
seven urban case study sites who are either facing eviction or residing in resettlement 
sites, with the aim of investigating the shortcomings of development efforts aimed at 
tackling urban poverty. The case studies will be approached from two angles: 
livelihoods and the informal economy, and land and displacement. Recognising that 
individually these two perspectives cannot encompass the complexity of urban poverty, 
this research offers an integrated understanding of livelihoods and housing to address 
the shortcomings of existing literature and poverty alleviation policy. In doing so, this 
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research draws out and identifies a recurring theme of insecurity. More commonly seen 
as distinct, this research begins with the broader themes of livelihoods, housing and 
insecurity, critically engaging to demonstrate that trying to understand urban poverty is 
incomplete without an appreciation of all three of these elements. 
 
There is seldom agreement on exact definitions within academia and the case for 
political economy is no different. Whereas early political economy was defined as „the 
investigation of wealth, production, exchange and distribution‟ (Garret Fawcett, 1876) 
taking into account historical and social contexts, the „politics‟ was dropped from 
definitions in the early 20
th
 century in favour of emphasising the „economic‟ (Mosco, 
2009, p.21). For example, the 1948 Dictionary of Modern Economics defined political 
economy as „the theory and practice of economic affairs‟ (Mosco, 2009, p.23). This 
heightened emphasis of the „economic‟ over the „political‟ is addressed at length in 
Dimitris Milonakis and Ben Fine‟s 2009 publication, From Political Economy to 
Economics: Method, the social and the historical in the evolution of economic theory. 
The authors take the reader on a journey through Smith, Ricardo, Mills and Marx, to the 
emergence and domination of contemporary neoclassical economics and economic 
imperialism.
7
 Milonakis and Fine lament the amnesia of contemporary economists who 
readily forget the importance of the historical and social in the roots of economics, in 
favour of advancing only the economic mainstream (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, pp.3-5). 
 
Whilst neoclassical mainstream economists forgo their historical and social roots, other 
scholars have not followed suit. The aforementioned work by Milonakis and Fine 
fervently tries to re-socialise economics through revisiting it‟s historical and social 
                                                 
7
 Milonakis and Fine outline the foundations, expansions and schisms within the history 
of political economy and the emergence of economics as a separate discipline in much 
more detail than is appropriate here.  
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science origins. Vincent Mosco in his book titled The Political Economy of 
Communication
8
 offers a definition more akin to the political economy approach taken 
in this research: 
The study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually 
constitutes the production, distribution and consumption of resources  
(Mosco, 2009, p. 24) 
 
This more versatile theoretical political economy perspective, taking into account the 
social context of production, distribution and consumption of resources, has been used 
to understand inter alia migration, conflict, public policy, health, environmental change, 
gender and development. Important for this research, political economy acknowledges 
the relationship between political and economic policy and how each intrinsically 
affects the other and vice versa, in a particular context. Politics and economics may at 
the same time have competing and mutually beneficial interests. Theirs is a relationship 
of power and the dynamics of power. A political economy approach can offer a macro 
level understanding of how domestic and international economic and political policies 
interact, as well as the micro level of how an individual operates within their available 
political space and within their economic opportunities. It is an investigation of this 
relationship, the power dynamic between politics and economics, taking into account a 
particular historical and societal context, that can reveal more than simply economics or 
politics can alone. 
 
Towards understanding the societal and historical context of this research, literature 
from outside of political economy will be evaluated and incorporated where appropriate 
including geography, migration, urban planning and human rights scholarship. For 
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 1
st
 edition published in 1996, 2
nd
 edition revised and published in 2009 is referenced 
here however quote present in 1996 original edition. 
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example, the historical context of Cambodia cannot be understood without having an 
appreciation for the mass loss of life, displacement and migration that took place under 
the Khmer Rouge (KR). Conflict and migration literature are therefore important for 
understanding contemporary Cambodian society and development, as decades of 
conflict have left their mark in terms of societal upheaval, massive loss of life, lack of 
infrastructure and organisations and corrupt judicial and public administrative systems. 
Migration in particular post KR is significant as a displaced population attempted to 
resettle and forge new homes, however contemporary migration is also important as 
bustling urban centres draw in those hoping to find work. At present, urban areas are 
growing annually at 2.7 per cent, exceeding the population growth of 1.8 per cent 
(data.un.org). 
 
Similarly, urban planning and development literature will be addressed to highlight and 
contextualise the different development initiatives taking place in the city. Large scale 
urban development plans, foreign investment, highly desirable real estate and the 
process of „beautification‟ will be discussed through the urban development lens to 
complement data analysis. Alan Gilbert has written extensively on urban poverty from a 
geographical perspective, identifying four key elements of urban life: poverty, 
employment, gender roles and the urban environment (1994). These general elements he 
argues are not distinct but interact with each other. Gilbert provides a foundation for 
scholars interested in the urban environment, however this research offers a political 
economy perspective that exposes the role of politic and pursuit of economic 
development that may not be apparent from Gilberts four key elements. This thesis 
addresses the complexity of urban poverty through a focus on how development affects 
the lives of the urban poor by offering an understanding based on the political economy 
of urban poor life, livelihoods and housing. However, Gilbert‟s urban specific work 
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provides a starting point for approaching poverty and development in Cambodia that is 
otherwise dominated by rural orientated research and policy.  
 
It will also be prudent to incorporate human rights literature when discussing labour 
rights and land and housing rights. The discourse of human rights is growing in 
popularity in Cambodia, yet is provocative and at times controversial. This thesis 
examines how residents and different actors use the human rights discourse to access, 
engage or criticise the government and each other. Understanding how the obligations 
and duties associated with human rights are fulfilled (or not) through policy, and 
practice, as well as the culture surrounding this relationship is important.  
 
Whilst this thesis draws from different bodies of literature, it is understood that these 
literatures do not necessarily neatly fall into place with one another. However, different 
academic perspectives are useful at highlighting shortcomings of other literatures, 
contextualising events, and unpacking decision-making processes. The political 
economy framework adopted for this thesis is supported by a mixed methods approach 
to fieldwork. This was chosen as a mixed methods methodology offers the most 
inclusive methodology for understanding the complexity of urban poverty. It is hoped 
that by approaching the issues of labour and land from qualitative as well as quantitative 
perspectives, that a picture as close to reality as possible can be portrayed. 
 
1.2.i The political economy of livelihoods 
Deeply rooted in economics and law, the depth and breadth of labour literature can 
leave a non-economist or non-legal specialist feeling isolated. However, from a political 
economy perspective, the high, impenetrable walls of labour economics and labour law 
are broken down to reveal a more accessible understanding of labour relations, labour 
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markets and livelihoods. This is because political economy allows the researcher to go 
beyond the restraints of economics, the dichotomies of waged and unwaged, employed 
or unemployed, and account for other actions, relationships, opportunities and 
behaviours that are present and contribute to the livelihoods and everyday wellbeing of 
people. This is particularly the case when trying to understand the informal economy. 
Neoclassical economists and legal scholars conceptualise the informal economy as 
unregulated and external to the state. In doing so, and combined with the 
methodological difficulties of researching something that is unregulated, neoclassical 
economy and law limit the potential for further investigation of the informal economy. 
 
Traditionally, neoclassical economic theory stresses a single, mutually beneficial labour 
market. And a neoclassical interpretation of labour treats it the same as any other 
commodity on the market, broccoli for example. However, not even the adaptations of 
neo-classical labour economics to account for „segmented‟ labour markets can 
effectively account for the plurality of formal and informal economies, why labour 
markets of similar characteristics do not result in the same level of production and 
ultimately, why labour markets have not reached equilibrium and cleared (Cramer, Oya 
& Sender, 2008). The work of economist Robert M. Solow has tried to add variation 
and depth to neoclassical economy by characterising labour markets as social 
institutions and therefore influenced by society, culture and beliefs, which change over 
time (Solow, 1985, p. 328). J. E. King however argues that labour markets are unlike 
markets for other commodities as they far more complex. Labour is an abstract concept 
it is not an item to be exchanged. As such it is not fixed to a physical place and involves 
relationships between the employer and employee, which do not take place in the 
commodity market. Other distinguishing characteristics of the labour market are fixed 
wages, the presence of trade unions, large numbers of employees and fewer employers. 
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Unlike markets for other commodities, there is a lack of mobility and therefore labour 
markets are essentially imperfect (King, 1990). 
 
Fine (1998) and more recently Fields (2010) have built upon the theory of labour 
markets as social institutions, offering a theoretical model of a segmented labour market 
for analysing economies in developing countries (Fine, 1998; Fields, 2010), though they 
do this from radically different analytical perspectives, Fine‟s being rooted in Marxist 
political economy and Fields‟ in neo-classical economics. Segmentation of the labour 
market is defined as the instance whereby those who want jobs and are able to work are 
not able to find employment and that some jobs are „better‟ than others. Fields 
acknowledges that the labour market does not unilaterally function the same way. 
However, whilst Fields‟ work demonstrates attempts by economists to theorise 
developing economies and labour markets, and makes progress in recognising that the 
labour market functions differently for different parts of society, his work is based upon 
an incorrect assumption. Fields supposes that regular wage jobs are more desirable than 
casual wage jobs and therefore „everybody‟ wants a regular waged job. This is not the 
case. Working for oneself and choosing your own hours, being your own boss, making 
higher and lower earnings at different times of the year: these factors may not seem 
desirable to an economist modelling the labour market, but may in fact be highly 
desirable to many workers.
9
 
 
A core assumption of mainstream economics is that labour, as a commodity, is no 
different from any other commodity and is therefore exposed to the same theory of 
                                                 
9
 This research frequently came across individuals who had left regular waged 
employment for self-employment, despite the insecurities and wage fluctuations 
attached. This was particularly prevalent in the tuktuk drivers interviewed in Phnom 
Penh. See Chapter Four, section 4.2.ii. 
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supply and demand (Prasch, 2004). A political economy approach, as opposed to a 
neoclassical analysis, is able to explain market variation and plurality by identifying 
labour as distinct from other commodities. Human labour power is as complex, 
habitual, diverse and variable as the people who sell their labour. Prasch, in his work 
distinguishing labour from broccoli identifies four key qualities to labour (Figure 3). 
Fig. 3 Prasch’s four qualities of labour (2004, p. 146) 
1) Labour cannot be separated from its providers 
2) Labour cannot be stored 
3). Labour embodies the quality of self-consciousness 
4). Labour Is the one “factor of production” that most of us wish, in the end, to see 
well compensated 
 
By acknowledging the special characteristics of labour, political economy emphasises 
the relationship between the capitalist who employs and mobilises the labour power 
provider. This relationship, although mutually beneficial in some respects, is essentially 
exploitative, as the capitalist is able to derive surplus value from the labourer (Cramer, 
2008, pp. 124-125). 
 
However both political economy and neoclassical economics focus primarily on the 
formal economy. The formal economy can be defined nationally and internationally as 
the regulation of resources, production, distribution and consumption of goods within a 
state or global market. Traditionally scholarship accounts for those outside of this 
formal economy as unemployed. This dichotomy leads to the assumption that those 
outside of the formal work force are unproductive and therefore do not contributing to 
the formal economy. However, this employed/unemployed dichotomy has been 
challenged by a number of scholars from different disciplines. For example Josef 
Gugler, a sociologist, in his work „Overurbanization Reconsidered‟ (1997) investigates 
the economic implications of rapid urban growth and the consequences of this for 
developing countries. In doing so he outlines three kinds of unproductive labour, the 
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unemployed, underemployed and misemployed. For Gugler, unemployment is 
problematic, particularly in urban areas, as data relating to urban populations is vastly 
inaccurate. Equally problematic, he argues, is the definition of „unemployed‟ used to 
collect this data. For example, can we consider those who work regular 35-hour 
contracts and those who work causal or zero hour contracts on an equal employment 
status? Regardless of the problems of this definition, Gugler characterises the 
unemployed as unproductive. Further, he supports the hypothesis put forward by his 
contemporary Gilbert, a geographer, that unemployment is a luxury of the relatively 
well off (1994). In other words, those who are truly poor cannot afford to be idle. It 
follows that those who are unemployed must have means of support, be it savings, 
reasonable mid-term prospects of employment or a family able to provide for them. 
However, both Gugler and Gilbert see those who enter employment as entering the 
formal sector. They view the informal sector as „beneath‟ the formal sector and as 
largely negative. 
 
Underemployment is offered by Gugler to account for the underutilisation of labour: 
labour that is temporarily idle. This may be due to the seasonal nature of a particular 
job, such as farming or those employed in tourism, for example. He also includes in his 
definition conditions whereby labourers are so plentiful that at any given time a 
percentage are not fully employed, or when solidary groups continue to employ them 
despite inadequate work quotas rather than release them. Finally, Gugler outlines 
misemployment: labour that could be considered full time but contributes little to 
society, e.g. begging or sex workers. Gugler associates „free riders‟, those who benefit 
from the more powerful or economically successful, as misemployed also. He relates 
this back to Adam Smith‟s „mercantilist state‟ in which the elite, political, religious, 
intellectual and cultural, are essentially parasitic to the productive classes. Extending 
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this analysis, he portrays three main activities that make up this form of unemployment; 
the „army of domestics‟ who clean and make nice the environment for the elite, the 
prostitute who is subservient to the demands of the elite and risks exposure to disease 
and the scavenger who survives on the crumbs fallen from the table of the elite. 
However Gugler‟s jump from Smith‟s parasitic intellectual classes to cleaners, 
prostitutes and beggars is less than convincing in that he turns society upside down. In 
Smith‟s work the elite, essential to society, are parasitic of the productive classes 
whereas Gugler argues the opposite, that the elite create non-essential employment due 
to desire, such as the desire for cleanliness, beautification or intimacy. However, this 
fails to acknowledge the middle classes at all, many of who employ domestic workers 
without formal contracts. The inclusion of begging with the provision of non-essential 
services also projects a negative depiction of those „misemployed‟.  
 
Despite breaking down unemployment into three distinct groups, Gugler (1997) and 
Gilbert (1994) work upon the assumption that all employment is formal and that 
anything outside of this is negative and „beneath‟ that of the formal. Work outside of the 
formal economy, otherwise known as the informal economy, is the subject of this thesis. 
This thesis will challenge this conception of the informal economy as „beneath‟ that of 
the formal by challenging the assumption that one falls out of the desirable formal 
economy into the depths of the undesirable informal economy, not by choice, but as a 
result of disastrous circumstances.  This thesis will offer the argument, grounded in 
empirical evidence that the informal economy is not „beneath‟ that of the formal or 
undesirable but is diverse, with its own particular formalities and is in fact highly 
desirable to some. More than this, informal activities often sustain and are inseparable 
from, rather than categorically different from or above or below, formal sector 
activities. That regulation, whilst not from the state or „top down‟ in nature, exists 
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within groups with common interests. The context of the informal economy is also of 
vital importance, as a rural and urban informal economy face different challenges and 
obstacles.  
 
First, however, we must acknowledge the origins of the term „informal economy‟, 
contextualise this term and understand how its meaning has changed over time and 
continues to adapt. Martha Chen‟s 2012 working paper for Women in Informal 
Employment Globalizing and Organizing, succinctly outlines the emergence of the term 
in the mid- late twentieth century. Chen begins with W. A. Lewis‟ Nobel Prize winning 
1954 essay, which outlined the assumption of a dualistic society whereby the capitalist 
(formal) sector would, through the process of modernisation, technology and 
development, absorb the subsistence (informal) sector (Lewis, 1954). Subsistence in 
this instance refers to small, traditional trades and casual work. This absorption would 
take the form of wage increases, leading to a turning point whereby workers are lifted 
out of subsistence and into the capitalist sector until the subsistence sector no longer 
existed. This came to be known as the Lewis Turning Point and was founded upon the 
following assumptions: 
1. A developing economy has a surplus of unproductive labour in the agricultural 
sector 
2. Workers are attracted to the growing manufacturing sector where higher wages 
are paid 
3. Wages in the manufacturing sector are more or less fixed 
4. Entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector make profit because they charge a 
price above the fixed wage rate 
5. Profits will be reinvested in the business in the form of fixed capital 
6. An advanced manufacturing sector suggests that an economy has moved from 
subsistence to an industrialised economy (Lewis, 1954) 
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The Lewis Turning point was a reflection of the widely held belief post-WWII that the 
correct mix of state building, economic policies, expansion of mass production and 
assistance could transform the lives of subsistence workers. The declining global 
importance of agriculture in the 1960s led to increased numbers of surplus agricultural 
workers migrating to urban areas with the expectation that jobs in the city were more 
easily accessible, secure and higher paid (Breman, 2004, p. 232). The belief that the 
shrinking agricultural sector would be followed shortly by an expanding formal sector 
qualified the presence of an informal reservoir of labour waiting to transition into the 
formal sector. However, by the late 1960s, there was little sign of such a turning point 
as poverty and subsistence economies persisted in their existence across the globe 
(Chen, 2012). The resilience of subsistence economies and small-scale industries, or the 
failure of the capitalist economy to absorb them, led to a different mode of thinking and 
a new term, the „informal economy‟. 
 
The 1970s witnessed the introduction of the concept of the „informal economy‟ by 
Keith Hart (1973) and the ILO Kenyan employment and inequality report (1972). In this 
report, Hart contrasted the „informal‟ surplus workers in African cities who worked 
erratically and for low wages, with the „formal‟ government regulated and more 
organised modes of employment. Whilst the „informal‟ had previously been 
conceptualised as negative, Hart redirected discourse to suggest that informality may 
have positive, dynamic nuances and in some cases be crucial for transformation (Hart, 
thememorybank.co.uk). 
 
The term informal economy became popular through the wide distribution and 
readership of ILO reports, however its popularity has not led to precision in its use. Hart 
derived his conceptualisation of the informal economy from Weber‟s theory of 
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rationalisation, relating the social organisation of the informal qualitatively with that of 
the formal. However the term has been used to describe size in terms of scale or 
numbers of employees, productivity, visibility and wages. What began as a term to 
describe work outside of the regulated corporate private and public sectors has been 
used instead as an acronym for deindustrialisation: criminal, black, underground 
economies etc. (Hart, thememorybank.co.uk). 
 
Whilst Hart‟s term did not originate as a term for measurement, many have tried to 
quantify the informal economy. Unofficial and unrecorded, the size of informal 
economies has been estimated as being anything from less than 10 per cent of a 
country‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), mostly in developed countries, to over 75 per 
cent in developing countries (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Pil Choi & Thum, 2005; 
Charmes, 2012). Unpacking the activities of the informal economy is challenging due to 
the unregulated nature of the economy. Difficult to measure and so difficult to test, the 
methodological challenges of understanding the informal economy have no doubt 
contributed to the vague definitions utilised by both academics and practitioners. 
 
Williams and Round (2007) identify the negative, marginalised interpretation of the 
informal economy and use Derrida‟s „binary hierarchy‟ (1967) to understand the 
formal/informal dichotomy. Derrida‟s binary hierarchy essentially identified Western 
thought as a dualistic mode of thinking creating a binary structure that differentiates the 
positive attributes of the superordinate from the negative attributes of the subordinate. 
The outcome of this is an othering process, rather than one whereby similarities and 
commonalities are identified. As such the formal economy is the positive superordinate, 
and preferable over the subordinate, the informal economy, leading to the 
characterisation of the informal economy as negative, residual, discrete and wholly 
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separate from the formal economy (Derrida, 1967; Williams & Round, 2007). As a 
consequence the informal economy is considered to be a hindrance to development and 
economic progress (Castells & Portes, 1989; Gallin, 2001; Lyons & Snoxell, 2005; 
Williams and Round, 2007). However, Williams and Round limit their analysis of the 
informal economy to the unregistered paid, production and distribution of good and 
services. They include economic activity hidden from the state for benefit, tax or labour 
avoidance but exclude illegal trade such as drug trafficking. They also exclude unpaid 
exchanges and gift giving. Chapter Four of this thesis challenges the distinction 
between the formal and the informal sector empirically, highlighting nuances within the 
informal sector. One element of this is the importance of non-monetary exchanges.  
 
Breman (2004; 1996) identifies three important misconceptions of the informal sector. 
He begins by identifying that the informal economy is not simply an issue for urban 
areas, but for rural also (Breman, 1996, p. 3). Describing in detail the flux that workers 
in both rural and urban environments become caught in as both sectors decline, Breman 
stresses that it is incorrect to assume that non-agrarian activities are limited to urban 
environments (Breman, 1996). 80 per cent of the Cambodian population lives in rural 
areas and therefore rural informal economic activity will undoubtedly influence urban 
informal economy and vice versa. 
 
However, as Breman argues, the envisaged temporary „waiting room‟ between the 
agricultural and the industrial sectors, in fact has become a permanent state of informal 
labour. Yet just as the „waiting room‟ is not temporary nor are the workers a 
homogeneous group (Breman, 1996, pp. 6-7). For example, the informal sector may 
include casual construction workers, cleaners and maids, street sellers, motor-taxi and 
tuktuk drivers, seasonal workers and so forth. The regularity of work, job security, 
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income levels, hours and conditions vary and differ to such an extent that grouping them 
for analysis would be too general to be of any substantive use as the reality is far too 
complex to be considered in terms of this simple duality (Breman, 2004, p. 259). Third, 
connected to Breman‟s dismissal of employment duality is his critique of the 
assumption that self-employment is the principle mode of employment in the informal 
sector (1996, pp. 8-11). Workers that may appear to be self-employed may in fact be 
part of a broader organised workforce responsible to an employer who takes a portion of 
the income generated (Rizzo, 2002; 2011): for example, street sellers who rent their 
carts or do not produce the goods they sell. At specified intervals the seller will report 
back to the owner of the cart or producer to deposit a percentage of his or her earnings 
or a flat fee. 
 
This section has thus far introduced the term informal economy, and explored and 
critiqued different interpretations of the term. Chapter Four returns to the theme of the 
informal economy picking up where this introduction ends, to discuss current 
definitions of informal economy for quantitative analysis and what informal economy 
means in the Cambodian context. In particular changes in definitions in ILO 
terminology will be outlined and the ILO‟s Cambodian „Decent Work‟ campaign. 
However for this thesis the continued ambiguity of informal economy renders the term 
unfit for purpose. The term too easily implies a formal/informal division when in reality 
the distinctions are not so clear. Whilst the heterogeneous nature of the informal 
economy has come to be recognised, the issues remain with the expansion of the term 
and its continued acronymic use for hidden, criminal or underground economies. 
Further, this thesis argues the specific nature of livelihood generating practices in urban 
areas is distinct to that of rural areas and this must be reflected in our terminology. 
Therefore, this section offers an integrated alternative to the informal/formal dichotomy, 
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for a term appropriate for the context of this research: An „urban poor economy.‟ This 
has been defined as follows:  
The livelihood generating and coping practices of individual residents and households 
in urban areas living close to a city-specific poverty line.  
 
The words livelihood generating and coping practices have been used to accommodate 
the variety of means of sustaining a household, to include both financial income but 
other practices essential to the maintenance of a household such as cleaning, cooking 
and caring for other young, old or persons with a disability. Therefore, the urban poor 
economy encapsulates much more than simply the self-employed and can shed the bind 
of the formal/informal divide instead focusing on livelihood accumulating procedures 
and customs, contracted or otherwise, undertaken by those living on and below the 
poverty line in urban areas. Close to a city specific poverty line has been selected so as 
to accommodate the increased living costs experienced in Phnom Penh. A city-specific 
poverty line is important, as national poverty statistics in a country such as Cambodia, 
which is 80 per cent rural, do not adequately portray the required income to provide for 
a family living in the capital and the inflated prices of goods. Living on $2 USD may be 
an adequate poverty line in rural areas but as will be discussed in Chapter Four, due to 
the inflated cost of basic goods in Phnom Penh $2 USD would simply not cover even 
the basic needs of an individual. This also accounts for wage variation that may be 
higher, or lower, in urban areas due to the aforementioned issue of surplus labour. 
 
Individuals and households are used as points of reference for the urban poor economy 
in recognition of the influx of individual migrants who live and work alone in the city, 
as well as the complexity of households. The term family has deliberately avoided as 
groups living together are not necessarily related. However it is true to say the vast 
majority of Cambodians live with their immediate family or distant relatives, for groups 
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of couples or individuals to live together, or for adults with no children or grown up 
children to provide for orphaned children. 
 
Chapter Four will further situate the term urban poor economy within the context of 
academic debate and evidence the term using data collected during fieldwork. 
Therefore, hereafter when referring to this research, case studies and context, the term 
urban poor economy will be used. The term informal economy will be used when 
discussing relevant literature and policy. Furthermore, essential to an understanding of 
the urban poor economy is another term presented by this thesis, that of horizontal 
regulation. 
 
The commonly formal nature of informal economies has been raised as a contradiction 
in terms. The author conceptualised this formality within the urban poor economy after 
evidence emerged from interviews and household respondents discussing their 
livelihood generating practices. In many cases respondents described working together 
to generate collective buying opportunities at lower costs, set agreed prices for goods, 
agreed geographic areas within which to work and established repercussions for those 
that broke the agreements. These peer-to-peer regulatory behaviours have been 
characterised as horizontal regulation by the author as regulations are created, 
reproduced and reinforced by individuals rather than a high authority or employer. 
Horizontal regulation is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, illustrated and 
supported with qualitative analysis from interviews. 
 
The discussion of informality in urban poverty is not limited to employment or the work 
place. Informality is a word commonly used when referring to the living conditions of 
the urban poor. The next section outlines academic debate and theory relating to urban 
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poor housing, displacement and resettlement. The intrinsic relationship between where 
one lives and works is often overlooked due to disengagement between academic 
disciplines. This thesis attempts to reengage this relationship emphasising the 
fundamental relationship between where we live and the livelihood generating 
opportunities available to us, and the importance of this in the context of forced 
displacement and resettlement in the name of development. 
 
1.2.ii The political economy of development induced displacement and resettlement 
Political economy has been chosen again as a framework for understanding 
development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), as it allows the researcher 
to approach DIDR from multiple angles, so as to understand the historical context and 
how this affects the tension between economic and political ambitions for development. 
A political economy approach facilitates the consideration of local, national and 
international political and economic agendas and how the interplay between them 
influences development institutions, organisations, policies and their implementation. 
On a local level political economy can be useful to expose the resources, networks and 
relationships both political and economic, but also social, to understand how people live 
from day to day or in the case of this research, how they cope through the process of 
DIDR. The cost of the pursuit of development, or the appearance of development, has 
been born by the poorest, in the context of a city undergoing unprecedented 
development. Development for many of the urban poor equates to coerced, violent 
evictions orchestrated by the government and powerful corporations.  
 
DIDR traditionally falls under the scope of anthropologists and sociologists. However, 
this research uses a political economy lens to investigate the subject of land through a 
focus on DIDR. Involuntary population displacement has long existed, but it first 
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became a significant subject of academic research and analysis in the 1960s (Cernea, 
1999). Emerging in both developing and developed countries, Herbert Gans‟ research 
into development in the Boston area (Gans, 1968) is considered to be a seminal piece, 
laying the foundation and tools required for further research. DIDR has traditionally 
been approached through an anthropological or sociological perspective and analysis 
(Cernea, 1999). Coldon and Scudder‟s work on the Gwembe in Tonga (Colson, 1971; 
Scydder, 1962, 1973) and Roy-Burman‟s work in India for example set the scene for 
anthropology‟s dominance of DIDR research throughout the second half of the 20th 
century. DIDR research didn‟t transcend the academic sphere into the public policy 
sphere until the late 1970s, after which the World Bank created an operational policy for 
resettlement (Cernea, 1999; World Bank, OMS, 2.33 1980). This coincided with the rise 
of major infrastructure projects across the globe including dam construction in China 
and India. The World Commission on Dams 2000 report estimated that in China alone 
10.2million people were displaced 1950-1990. In India, for the same period, an 
estimated 16-38million people were displaced. A global overall total of displacement is 
estimated between 40 and 80 million people (WCD, 2000: 104). 
 
On a much smaller scale, when compared to China and India, yet proportionally vast, an 
estimated 10 per cent of the total population of Phnom Penh were evicted from their 
homes 1990 – 2009 (LICADHO, 2009). The urban population is a minority in 
Cambodia, just 20% of the total population in 2005, however it is reported that a further 
150,000 Cambodians were at risk of forced eviction in 2009 (Amnesty International, 
2009). However, since this report, hundreds of people have been evicted in the city 
(STT, 2014). 
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It was during the mid 1990s that the first forced evictions took place in Phnom Penh. 
However, the turn of the millennium and the now infamous Tonle Bassac fire serve as a 
watershed for the wave of violent abhorrent evictions. The Tonle Bassac fire left 2,500 
families homeless and was widely believed to be an act of arson despite police reports 
of an accidental fire (Phnom Penh Post, 2008). Since the Tonle Bassac fire in 2001 a 
number of other evictions have caught the attention of the media: The Borei Keila 
community eviction by the government in conjunction with the company Phan Imex in 
2003. This site has been particularly controversial due to the on-site social land 
concession included in the contracts signed by Phan Imex. However, at the time of 
writing the Borei Keila community continues to make the headlines as Phan Imex have 
built only eight of the ten contracted residential buildings, refused to build the 
remaining two buildings and have since sold the remaining land. In 2007 the residents 
of Dey Krahom hit the headlines as video footage of armed military police and 
construction workers demolishing homes and assaulting residents emerged resulting in 
an estimated 1,400 displaced persons. Amnesty International recorded the use of water 
cannons, rubber bullets and electrified batons used by privately hired security forces to 
force the people out of their homes (Amnesty International, 2012). In 2008 Phnom Penh 
witnessed the largest urban displacement since the KR with the forced eviction of over 
10,000 families in the Boeung Kak Lake area. This development has been by a large 
margin both in terms of media coverage and numbers displaced, the most controversial 
forced eviction to have taken place. These cases are discussed in more detail in the 
history chapter following. 
 
In his 1999 edited volume, „The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and 
Challenges‟, Cernea exposes the lack of economic theory and methodology in DIDR, 
which he regards as essential. Cernea recognises that in practice DIDR does not 
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improve the livelihoods of resettlers but diminishes them and pushes them further 
towards and into poverty (Cernea, 1999, p.6). Therefore, having not tailored economic 
theory to conceptualise DIDR, economists‟ theories and practices have fallen short and 
thus failed in improving the lives of the resettlers (Cernea, 1999). Cernea laments the 
lack of interaction between economics and sociology, which as a sociologist, he 
attributes to the absence of a tailored economic conceptualisation of DIDR and 
appropriate methodology. His work identified seven key areas that lacked investigation: 
1. The undervaluation of individual losses. 
2. The decapitalisation and impoverishment of resettlers. 
3. The absence or design of safety nets for the resettled. 
4.The lack of research into patterns of displacements and recovery costs. 
5. Further information regarding different financing options for resettlement projects is 
required. 
6. Inequalities within the resettlement projects requires further research. 
7. Productivity of resettlers is diminished and not capitalised upon. 
(Cernea, 1999, p. 25) 
 
Since Cernea‟s 1999 work and the renewed efforts of the World Bank to raise DIDR on 
the international agenda, calls for increased economic research in theory and in practice 
have been made (Cernea, 1999; Pearce, 1999). This has materialised in the form of 
resettlement compensation and remuneration research (Caspary, 2007). Monetary 
compensation analysis, although important, does not alone address an individual‟s 
valuation of their assets and goods, or the many different unfavourable outcomes of 
resettlement. For example, the focus on resettlers can lead one to neglect the host 
community‟s willingness and ability to accommodate the new settlers (Pearce, 1999).  
The way in which Cernea bridges the divide between theory and practice, sociologists 
and economics, is through his identification of the „risks‟ of DIDR: landlessness; 
joblessness; homelessness; marginalization; food insecurity; increased morbidity and 
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mortality; loss of access to common property; social disarticulation (Cernea, 1999, pp. 
17-18). He argues that either sociologists or economists alone cannot answer these risks. 
That, if resettlement, of which the primary aim should be to improve the lives of those 
being resettled, understanding the risks facing evictees is essential if the process is to 
meet its objectives of improving their lives.
10
 
 
This research, however, goes beyond analysing the sociological or economic dimension 
of DIDR. Through a political economy approach, this research will unravel the complex 
relationships between the urban poor facing resettlement and their lives in the city with 
the processes of development. In this instance, development concerns the eviction and 
resettlement of the urban poor. Political economy is a particularly relevant approach, as 
it can encompass the economic driving forces behind development and simultaneously 
be used to analyse impact of resettlement on a household level. These economic 
components are inherently related to the role of politics at an international level that 
drives development, and therefore influence the interactions of those being evicted and 
local and municipal authorities. The history and ever-present threat of violence against 
those who do not comply plays an important part in understanding how the urban poor 
experience development. It also raises the point that development aimed at assisting the 
urban poor does not prioritise them and fails to understand their lived circumstances. 
This is evidenced through the establishment of resettlement sites, which are later 
abandoned as they lack livelihood generating opportunities and are virtually 
uninhabitable. 
 
                                                 
10
 Amanda Hammar has recently responded to this gap in the literature in her book 
(2014) „Displacement Economies in Africa: Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity‟. 
Hammar‟s work and is addressed in Chapter Five, section 5.4 
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DIDR scholarship has in the past theoretically approached urban development, forced 
eviction and resettlement via a human rights discourse (Hammar, 20134; Leckie & 
Huggins, 2011) or development policy and management discourse (Dwivedi, 2002; 
Perera, 2011; Rajagopol, 2000). The human rights discourse emphasises the fulfilment 
of the human right to adequate housing as outlined in The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Cambodian government‟s own constitution. This avenue has 
been advanced by human rights organisations in Cambodia such as Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions, Amnesty International and LICADHO to monitor, organise and 
mobilise communities against forced evictions (Amnesty, 2008; COHRE, 2009; 
LICADHO 2009). These organisations advocate for the government to its obligations to 
provide adequate housing for its population and in legitimate circumstances of eviction, 
deliver adequate compensation. These obligations are reinforced by Cambodia‟s 
ratification of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, The 
Convention on all forms of Discrimination against Women and The Convention on the 
Rights of a Child. 
11
  
 
Further, UN guiding principles on internal displacement (1998) state explicitly the right 
of individuals to be protected from arbitrary displacement from their home (Principle 6). 
These principles challenge large-scale development projects that are seen to be 
unjustifiably incompatible with public interest. Rajagopol (2000) has built upon these 
international treaties, declarations and principles to identify five legal mechanisms that 
could be used to challenge the legality of evictions should they be denied: 
 
                                                 
11
 See the following for a detailed analysis of the legal obligation for the provision of 
adequate housing rights under Cambodian domestic and international law: Leckie, 1992; 
Williams, 2008; Mgbako et al., 2010. 
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1. The right to development and self-determination: Autonomy, culture and land 
2. The right to participation at every stage of the development process 
3. The right to life, relating to livelihoods and the environment 
4. The rights of vulnerable groups, particular indigenous groups and women 
5. The right to remedy through appeal and timely resolution. 
 
This approach may be more pragmatic than simply demanding a right to an adequate 
home from the government, as it outlines the different stages and processes that should 
include the consultation and contribution of the home owner. However despite this 
theoretical breakdown, these processes have yet to be translated into policy (STT, 2012; 
LICADHO, 2008). 
 
Human rights are internationally recognised and advocated for globally. They involve a 
relationship of rights, duties and obligations between the state and its population. Yet 
human rights lack an effective enforcement mechanism (Collingsworth, 2002; Hafner-
Burton,2008; Harris-Short, 2003). Human rights may be violated when a state may be 
unable to meet the duties placed upon them through the ratification of human rights 
treaties due to a lack of resources or conflict. Alternatively, a state may violate the 
human rights of its citizens in targeted deliberate attacks. Whereas the former may be 
met with foreign assistance, the latter calls for punishment. Punishment for violation of 
human rights principles requires political will, however there are innumerable cases of 
human rights violations taking place across the globe that are not addressed, ranging 
from the criminalisation of homosexuality to the detainment of prisoners of conscience, 
the abuse of children to the forced displacement of populations.
12
 Action to counter 
human rights abuses require political will from the international community. However, 
                                                 
12
 These violations of human rights were a sample taken from Amnesty International‟s 
„Issues‟ section of their website, www.amnesty.org.uk accessed 23 September 2014. 
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profitable economic and trade interests, access to resources and political alliances often 
trump the call to action (Collingwood, 2002; Harris-Short, 2003). 
 
The violent inclinations of the Cambodian government are well documented and do not 
portray a government concerned with human rights abuses.
13
 This failure of human 
rights discourse to either halt existing evictions or prevent future evictions is further 
compacted by the failure of the government to award adequate compensation to evictees 
in any systematic or comprehensive manner. In fact, active international human rights 
NGOs and have served to exacerbate the strained relationship between state and 
society,
14
 resulted in incitement charges and imprisonment for activists (Phnom Penh 
Post, 2014). 
 
An alternative to a human rights narrative of housing rights is the developmental policy 
discourse through which one can conceptualise resettlement as an inherent part of the 
development process that requires controlled planning, monitoring, execution and 
evaluation (Dwivedi 2002). Therefore, displacement can be viewed as not in itself 
undermining development but as a necessary part of the development process (Penz et 
al., 2011). Interviews with various NGO workers revealed a chasm in their approaches 
to evictions. The human rights NGOs largely confronted and challenged the RGC for 
their failures to meet adhere to the Cambodian constitution and international human 
rights principles. However a separate small group of local NGOs worked with the 
government to implement their resettlement policy in the hope of applying the policy 
fairly and effectively. By shifting their strategies and working with the authorities rather 
                                                 
13
 Violence used by the state will be discussed throughout the thesis however the history 
chapter will summarise the different ways in which violence is used by the against the 
Cambodian people in the name of development. 
14
 Civil society and social movements are discussed in section 2.2  
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than against them, the smaller group of NGOs believed they would develop credibility 
and relationships with the authorities and be able to help people at the same time. A 
consequence of this approach however, has been that NGOs working alongside the 
government have been heavily criticised and labelled assailants, perpetuating the 
exploitation of the poor by effectively becoming vehicles for human rights abuses. 
These NGOs have been ostracised and excluded from land and housing conferences, 
consortiums and forums.  
 
The RGC views Human Rights NGOs‟ constant criticism and persistent challenging of 
their policy as negative, undermining and disloyal. The local urban NGO Sahmakum 
Teang Tnaut (STT), which published reports evidencing the exploitation of the urban 
poor through development-induced evictions,
15
 was met with hostility by the 
government and suspended from operations for one year in 2011. STT‟s offices were 
raided, their bank accounts closed and individual staff were bombarded with harassment 
and emails insulting them and questioning their loyalty to Cambodia and their identity 
as Khmer.
16
 Many staff left and their offices were shut down. However as a result of 
international support and the lack of legal basis for their suspension, STT was able to 
continue its work assisting the urban poor in 2012.  
 
A recent book edited by Amanda Hammar (2014) identifies and addresses paradoxes of 
displacement, making important new contributions to DIDR scholarship. Hammar et. al 
identify and investigate displacement paradoxes such as the opening and closing of 
opportunities; movement and displacement running parallel to confinement and 
                                                 
15
 STT report that prompted their suspension criticized the development of the railways. 
Available here: http://teangtnaut.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/20110703_DMS-
analysis_FINAL.pdf 
16
 The details given here are from personal account as the author worked for STT during 
this time. 
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restriction;  extreme wealth and extreme poverty (Hammar, 2014, p. 2). Hammar‟s own 
chapter focuses on displacement economies, building on Cernea‟s critiques (1999)17 
highlighting the failure of different academic literatures to work together and 
strengthening the linkages between disciplines. For example, despite well-developed 
literatures on migration and refugees, there have been few progressions in creating a 
relevant or robust theoretical framework to encompass the complexity of displacement 
(Hammar, 2014). 
 
Hammar identifies the persistent destructive characterisation of DIDR, which leads to 
the perpetual victimisation of those facing displacement. This negative characterisation 
prohibits the creation of a space in which to discuss the generative and productive 
outcomes and processes of displacement (Hammar, 20140). Whilst these products and 
outcomes may themselves be negative, this re-figuration of DIDR allows for the study 
of displacement to move away from persistent „backwards facing‟ research focusing on 
how things were and how they have been destroyed, to facilitate a forward facing theory 
building upon the positive notion of what DIDR can produce, rather than simply obsess 
with that it destroys.
18
 
 
A recent body of literature focusing on land rights, land titles and security of tenure as a 
key mechanism of development and poverty alleviation has emerged (de Soto, 2000; 
Leckie, 1992; Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002; Banerjee, 2002; Saule Jr; 2002; 
Shatkin, 2007). In response to rising urban poverty, the work of de Soto has resonated 
loudly, as he offers what appears to be a quick simple fix to alleviating urban poverty. 
De Soto argues that developing countries are not starved of investment or jobs, but 
                                                 
17
 See Introduction for discussion of Cernea‟s critiques of DIDR. 
18
 Hammar‟s work and this re-configuration of DIDR will be discussed further in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
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suffer a shortage of property rights. All that is required for the poor to access their 
wealth are property titles (de Soto, 2000, pp. 300-301). Titling, de Soto claims, will 
instantly create massive equity with little or no cost to government. Thus the poor, in 
turn, would become micro entrepreneurs able to use their property as collateral to 
release wealth and transform their lives. Formal property titles, argues de Soto, are more 
than just a system for recording and mapping assets, but are instrumental in the human 
psyche for generating surplus value. Because of this, property titles must be universally 
accessible to everyone and this will have a binding social contract effect, as individuals 
cooperate to raise a society‟s productivity (de Soto, 2000, p. 199-200). In fact de Soto 
argues that not only will private property rights tackle poverty, they will prevent 
revolution and rebellion (Gilbert, 2002). De Soto‟s answer to urban poverty has been 
popular amongst policy makers and providers of international aid, being adopted most 
enthusiastically by USAID (Gilbert, 2002). His model has provided a starting point for 
case study analysis by various authors whose emphasis on the simplicity of land titling 
ultimately blames the government for being unprepared to make even the smallest of 
efforts towards the simple transforming procedure of land titling (Durand-Lasserve & 
Royston, 2002; Banerjee, 2002; Saule Jr; 2002; Shatkin, 2007). 
 
De Soto‟s theory, however, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it assumes an 
accountable and transparent government that recognises and respects the property rights 
of its citizens. This however is often absent in a developing country. Second, evidence 
shows that establishing land rights for slum dwellers has increased rents and property 
costs in slums. This is due to the inclusion of the poor into a state‟s tax formal base, by 
inviting costly state regulation of previously informal businesses and by opening up 
land to the real estate market which results in even former basic, unsanitary slum 
dwellings being put out of a slum resident‟s reach (Gilbert & Varley, 1991; Gilbert & 
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Ward, 1985; Davis, 2006) Third, evidence shows that property rights and capitalism 
have served to divide communities rather than unite them by initiating economic 
competition that undermines community solidarity by individualising the struggle, and 
provoking conflict over uncertain property boundaries. Fourth, de Soto has not 
accounted for the circumstance in which land that has been titled is undesirable and fails 
to sell on the market (Gilbert, 2002). Finally, the attempt at titling land and property in 
the Cambodian context has created new avenues for corruption and opportunities to 
accumulate immense personal wealth, whilst leading to the abuse and exploitation of 
thousands of poor Cambodians by government officials. 
 
Responsibility for the process of land titling in Cambodia fell to the World Bank‟s Land 
Management and Administration Project (LMAP), established in 2002. LMAP was 
mandated to enforce the 2001 land law over a period of 8 years with the objective of 
preventing and resolving land disputes, issuing land titles, managing natural resources 
and strengthening legal and management frameworks (Bugalski & Pred, 2010). The 
Wolrd Bank, GTZ, the government of Finland and Canadian International Development 
Agency initially funded LMAP, the World Bank footing the majority of the bill, 
pledging $28.83million. LMAP was successful in developing legal frameworks and 
building the capacity of the RGC to tackle land registration, as well as relative successes 
in titling undisputed rural areas of Cambodia. However in it‟s enhanced review, the 
World Bank acknowledged major failures of the project, particular in urban and 
indigenous areas (LMAP Enhanced Review, 2009). LMAP admitted contributing to 
tenure insecurity of the urban poor as a result of the design of LMAP components, 
implementation, delay and rapid evolutions in the land market (LMAP Enhanced 
Review, 2009, p.2). Further flaws are identified in the report: LMAP‟s exclusion of 
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disputed areas, which were supposed to be resolved as part of the core objectives and 
the lack of transparency in procedures and implementation of State land classification. 
 
The process of land titling in Cambodia has therefore not been the swift cure to poverty 
predicted by de Soto. This is due to poor planning, design and implementation of 
LMAP as well as broader issues of corruption. Chapter Four will outline a more 
relevant typology of tenure that reflects the varied living conditions, informality and 
insecurity of the urban poor. This typology for example will include pavement dwellers, 
social housing, unauthorised occupations of land and so on (Khemro & Payne, 2004). 
The nuanced typology ultimately adds detail to the complexity of housing issues that is 
essential if the right of adequate housing and poverty alleviation efforts are to be 
realised. 
 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
This introduction has thus far outlined the structure of this thesis, which has been 
constructed around the two central research questions. Firstly, Who are the urban poor 
and what resources, networks and mechanisms do they rely upon? Second, does 
existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor issues? If not, why not 
and how can this be addressed? The response to these questions uses a political 
economy theoretical framework that combines two, interrelated perspectives that 
reverberate throughout the thesis: livelihoods and housing. These perspectives emerged 
through the process of fieldwork, the household survey, interviews with tuktuk drivers 
and other stakeholders, as essential for answering the research questions and 
understanding urban poverty and development. 
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Enabled through a mixed methodology and the political economy framework, this thesis 
offers two new terms to better recognise and characterise the livelihood generating 
practices of the urban poor, the urban poor economy and horizontal regulation. This 
nuanced understanding of the everyday lives of the urban poor contributes to our 
understanding of why residents migrated to the city and live in the circumstances they 
find themselves in. The relationship between urban livelihoods and urban housing are 
inseparable when trying to understand urban poverty as the very reason people are 
living in the city in often dire, unsanitary, overcrowded conditions is because of the 
livelihood generating opportunities, perceived or not, that the city offers. Therefore, to 
understand the housing needs of the urban poor, one must understand how they generate 
and maintain their livelihoods. 
 
It is from a combination of political economy and the re-configured DIDR perspective 
of development policy and management that this thesis precedes, allowing space for 
what is created and produced by resettlement rather than focusing solely on the 
destructive outcomes. Data presented in Chapter Four will show that resettlement has 
been (and continues to be) a vehemently negative, violent experience for the majority of 
those affected. Yet, whilst development necessarily includes destruction before new 
spaces are built, it is not an inherently negative or violent process. This thesis argues 
that development has failed in Phnom Penh, however this is not inevitable and does not 
have to continue. With careful planning and working with the residents facing eviction 
to understand their tenure status through an expanded typology and, fundamentally, 
their livelihood generating practices and needs, development can produce beneficial 
outcomes for residents, the city and investors. 
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2. Historical Background 
 
 
2.1 Cambodia: a brief history, 1950s - present 
Historical context is essential for understanding contemporary Cambodia whether in 
relation to family structures, cultural traditions, economic and political tensions and 
particularly land conflict and the majority young population due to the infamous 
genocide committed under the KR. However whereas the KR had intended to return to 
„Year Zero‟, they could not erase Cambodian history. Colonialism and regional rivalries 
that were established long before the KR still resonate today. This section will begin in 
the 1950s to highlight some of the important events and long-standing tensions that 
have resonated through the recent decades. The United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) will be discussed in more detail as peacebuilding initiatives that 
went on in the late 1908s – early 1990s set the political and economic trajectory for 
contemporary governance and development. The following section will focus on Phnom 
Penh and the residents of the city in recent history to contextualise how urban poverty 
emerged and why development historically fails to address the needs of the urban poor. 
 
Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953 however; this did not herald peace 
for the Khmer kingdom as internal political divisions deepened. By the 1960s 
Cambodians were suffering from the spill over of conflict taking place neighbouring 
Vietnam. Cambodia was officially politically neutral but acknowledged on all sides as 
being used as a safe haven by the Vietnamese who hid, recuperated and mounted fresh 
attacks from the rainforest and mountainous terrain along the Cambodia-Vietnam 
border. The borderlands were subsequently bombarded by US forces‟ secret carpet-
bombing campaigns, Operation Menu, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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Cambodians were paying the price for a neighbouring conflict in secret, as Nixon and 
Kissinger went to great lengths to cover up Operation Menu; only in 2002 were details 
of the extent of the campaign released, under the Clinton administration (Hanhimaki, 
2004).  
 
A coup d‟état in 1970 by Prime Minister Lon Nol, former Army Chief of Staff, whilst 
King Father Sihanouk was in Beijing, failed to pacify the country and only served to 
exacerbate allegations of corruption and nepotism as he consolidated personal power 
(Osborne, 2008, pp. 135-138). Civil war ensued and the KR seized the capital and 
power on 17
th
 April 1975. The KR were able to use the fear of US bombing campaigns 
to successfully evacuate Phnom Penh and urban areas forcing city dwellers, including 
hospital patients, the young, old and vulnerable into the countryside. The entire 
population of Phnom Penh, over 2 million people, were evacuated in just three days. 
The city became a ghost town, abandoned entirely but for a couple of secret prisons and 
torture centres, the most notorious of them all site S-21 or Tuol Sleng, taking up 
residency in a former high school. Over 17,000 men women and children are believed 
to have been tortured at Tuol Sleng sentenced to death and killed in near by Choeung 
Ek (a mass grave site commonly referred to as „The Killing Fields‟) under the guidance 
of it‟s leader Kang Guek Eav, alias Comrade Duch.19 The following three years, eight 
months and 20 days saw Cambodian society turned upside down and inside out. 
Secretive and xenophobic, the KR regime worked tirelessly to destroy Khmer 
contemporary culture banning individual freedoms, religion and traditional Khmer arts 
as well foreign impure influences such as money and medicines. From their rise to 
                                                 
19
 Kang Guek Eav, alias Comrade Duch was sentenced at the ECCC to life 
imprisonment after an initial appeal on a 19-year sentence. The Court‟s hybrid structure, 
cases, documents, events, timelines and publications can be accessed here: 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en 
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power, Year Zero, the KR aimed to reconstruct an extreme communist agrarian society. 
Those who had held positions within the government or public sector positions were 
executed. Anyone who had received an education or worked in a profession deemed 
unsuitable could be executed. Mechanics, architects, singers, actors, actresses and 
filmmakers were executed. Executions of particular ethnic groups such as Vietnamese 
or Cham Muslim Khmer were ordered. People simply accused of being KGB, 
Vietnamese or CIA spies were executed. Even an uncorroborated accusation of 
sympathy towards the Vietnamese or other enemy of the State could result in death. 
Executions became so frequent that they ceased to have substantiated meaning, as 
everyone and anyone could become a suspect. The population was further decimated 
through intensive labour camps and widespread malnutrition, disease and famine. Rice 
provisions as small as 150gm per person per day were recorded (Kiernan, 2014, p.193). 
A death sentence waited for anyone who broke the rules for example, by secretly 
sharing, storing or foraging for food. The KR controlled every aspect of a person‟s life 
from their family structure, who they married and where they lived to what they wore, 
their hair cuts and even what they ate and when.
20
  
 
The KR regime finally collapsed on the 7
th
 January 1979 following a Vietnamese 
invasion in 1978. The Vietnamese installed Hun Sen, a former KR Cadre and Head of 
the Kampuchean People‟s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) as Prime Minister, who 
governed the newly named People‟s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) from 1979-1989. 
Widely considered to have initially been a puppet of the Vietnamese, Hun Sen has 
consolidated an extraordinary level of power in Cambodia, having held the position of 
                                                 
20
 This information comes from the author first hand reading, translating and editing 
victim testimonies, witness statements and Civil Party applications for the ECCC for 
Case 002 and 003 in 2010 during an internship with the Victims Support Section of the 
ECCC. 
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Prime Minister virtually continuously since 1979. Yet despite the new regime, the KR 
continued to occupy its seat at the United Nations and gained the support of the 
international community until 1981. Widyono (2007) argues that this was down to the 
international community fearing the regional power and ambitions of the Vietnamese, 
who from their perspective had violated the sovereignty of the KR government through 
their 1979 invasion (Widyono, 2007). The power struggle between the USA, Chinese, 
Soviets and Vietnamese was a more pressing concern internationally than what the 
Cambodian government was or was not doing to it‟s own people (Widyono, 2007, p. 
28). 
 
The removal of the KR government did not bring peace to the PRK, instead civil war 
broke out between KR remnants, non-communist groups opposed to the Vietnamese 
presence, and the PRK regime. Civil conflict continued throughout the 1980s, fuelled 
by regional power struggles between Vietnam and China, and the international interests 
of the USA and the Soviet Union (Hughes, 2003). The „K5‟ plan implemented by the 
PRK, instructed by the Vietnamese, focused on integrating Cambodia into the 
Indochinese Socialist Block. Labelled as a „new genocide‟, Cambodians were once 
again forced into manual labour camps along the Cambodia-Thai border and literally 
worked to death. Cambodians were also used by the Vietnamese to clear land mines by 
being marched into suspected areas containing mines and in the event of detonation, 
being killed and mutilated by the devices they stumbled upon. If they tried to escape, 
they were shot (OHCHR, 2010; Martin, 1986). 
 
In 1982 an alternative coalition government formed in exile between FUNCINPEC, the 
KR and the Khmer People‟s National Liberation Front called the Coalition of 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea. United in opposition to the Vietnamese backed 
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KPRP, the Coalition of Government of Democratic Kampuchea took over the KR‟s seat 
at the UN after 1981. The Vietnamese largely withdrew from Cambodia in 1989 upon 
which the KPRP regime changed its name to the Cambodian People‟s Party (CPP), and 
PRK took the less ideologically burdened name of the State of Cambodia (Heder, 2003).  
 
After over a decade of civil war and failed peace negotiations, a set of peace agreements 
was finally brokered in Paris on the 23
rd
 October 1991. Immediately after the Peace 
Accords, The United Nations Advance Mission In Cambodia (UNAMIC) was 
established the same month. UNAMIC was responsible for the maintenance of the 
ceasefire and establish mine awareness and later mine clearance programmes. In March 
1992 UNTAC subsumed UNAMIC. UNTAC was established and mandated in 
February 1992 by UN Security Council resolution 745, to oversee implementation of 
the Paris Peace Accords. The most ambitious peacebuilding mission to date, UNTAC 
effectively took over the administration of the state and pushed the boundaries of 
traditional peacekeeping models.  
 
UNTAC conducted operations between February 1992 and September 1993 in clear 
pursuit of a liberal peace model (Paris, 2004). UNTAC was mandated to: 
1. Organise free and fair general elections 
2. Organise military arrangements 
3. Organise the repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced 
persons 
4. Organise the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure and civil 
administration  
To achieve this mandate 15,991 military troops, 893 military observers, 1,149 
international civilian staff and 465 UN volunteers poured into Cambodia from across 
the world including Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, France, Germany, the 
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Netherlands, Russia, Thailand, the UK and the USA to join with 3,359 civilian police 
(UN website for UNTAC mission). Considering the fact that entire country had been 
experiencing conflict for decades and the broad, ambitious UNTAC mandate, the small 
numbers deployed by UNTAC comes as a surprise and has been characterised as „not 
enough actors for the play‟ by Widyono (2007, p. 137). 
 
Evidenced through the continued military threat of the KR throughout the mission, 
UNTAC failed to disarm the various factions caught up in civil war. The KR‟s strength 
was in the discipline of its military capabilities and it was unwilling to demobilise. In 
retaliation and perhaps out of distrust and insecurity, other political parties also refused 
to demilitarise. Unable to convince political parties otherwise, UNTAC acknowledged 
its failure to disarm, cut its losses and shifted its efforts towards the elections. In doing 
so, they exacerbated tensions between the armed political parties and as a result, the KR 
withdrew from the elections and returned to militant tactics, as threatened, for political 
gains. This failure to disarm contributed to the persistent military threat of the KR 
Cambodia, estimated as having a combat strength of between 5,000-10,000 in 1995 
(Brown, & Zasloff, 1998, p. 257).  
 
Whereas UNTAC‟s attempts at disarmament were ineffective, they enjoyed relative 
success with repatriation of internally displaced people and estimates of 350,000 
refugees returning to Cambodia from camps along the Thai border (Peou, 2000, p. 239). 
However, this relative success will come into question in the discussion of the World 
Bank‟s management of land titling through LMAP in the following section and in 
Chapter Five section 5.2.iv. 
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The Paris Agreements provided for the establishment of a free market economy and 
mandated UNTAC to help promote its emergence by overseeing economic reforms and 
the provision of relief and reconstruction aid. However, UNTAC has been heavily 
criticized as deliberately avoiding economic policy in favour of political stability (Paris, 
2004; Hughes, 2003; Williams 2008). Less has been written about UNTAC‟s economic 
impact although it has received criticism for the sudden influx of relatively highly-paid 
UN personnel exploiting their positions. Hughes and Un characterise the period 
immediately following as a period of short-term projects and short-sighted wealth 
extraction (Hughes & Un, 2011, p. 6). However UNTAC‟s long-term economic legacy 
is the reliance on international assistance and aid (Smoke & Taliercio Jr, 2007) which 
influenced the trajectory of economic policies pursued throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
(Hughes & Un, 2011). Economic activity conducted outside of state regulation 
continues to be commonplace, ranging from bribing local authority officials and forging 
fake documents, to land grabbing and forced evictions making way for big businesses. It 
is this unregulated economic activity amongst the urban poor that makes up part of the 
focus of this thesis.  
 
Historically, the Cambodian system of patronage predates French colonisation of 
Southeast Asia in the mid-nineteenth century to the various dynastic lines of the 
expanded and contracted medieval Khmer kingdom (Williams, 2008; Hughes, 2003). 
However nepotism and corruption are commonly found in Cambodian civil service 
(Springer, 2010; Williams, 2008; Smoke & Taliercio Jr, 2007). Despite being part of its 
mandate, UNTAC did not address civil service reform (Doyle, 2008) The system of 
civil administration in Cambodia, established by the Vietnamese in 1979, did not 
change and has not been reformed since. Dominated by the CPP, civil servants are 
appointed not on merit but used to place relatives or reward members of the CPP. The 
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Cambodian civil administration is therefore tasked with supporting the CPP and CPP 
officials, acting as a facilitator of patronage rather than concerned with public service 
(Smoke & Taliercio Jr, 2007, p. 67). Governance is further compromised through the 
lack of clarity and allocation of responsibility within the RGC. Whereas local provincial 
and municipal authorities are part of the Ministry of Interior, the connection between 
decision-making, implementation and accountability on a local level to central 
government remains unclear (p. 65 World Bank, „Private Solutions for Infrastructure in 
Cambodia: A country framework report, 2002). 
 
Elections are a key milestone in credible peacebuilding efforts, as it is an established 
assumption that peace derives from free and fair elections (Lappin, 2009; Paris, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the name change of the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea to the National Government of Cambodia in 1991, the coalition was not 
recognised as legitimate was forced to separate for the 1993 elections. The 1993 
elections drew an unexpected 90 per cent of eligible registered voters regardless of with 
the KR‟s withdrawal from the electoral process and continued acts of aggression (Peou, 
2002: p. 510). Furthermore, despite the elections being acknowledged internationally as 
having been conducted in a free and fair manner, the result of these elections was not 
fully implemented. 
The new political framework of Cambodia, named the Royal Government of Cambodia 
(RGC) was as a constitutional monarchy with the Monarch maintaining state power and 
a prime minister holding executive power. The National Constitution was enacted in 
1993 creating a parliamentary, representative democracy. Two chambers of Parliament 
hold legislative power: the National Assembly and the Senate. 
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However this framework was not fully realised. The RGC arrangement that evolved 
comprised of two Prime Ministers: a First Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh, head of 
FUNCINPEC, and Hun Sen of the CPP as Second Prime Minister. FUNCINPEC,
 
 the 
party with the clear electoral majority, had been forced into coalition with the CPP. The 
coalition was facilitated by UNTAC in response to Hun Sen and the CPP‟s assertion 
that the KR posed a continued security threat and that only the CPP had the military 
power and technology to counter them. FUNCINPEC may have been legitimate but 
they were militarily weak, whereas the CPP lost the election but were powerful (Heder, 
2003).  
 
The coalition never functioned effectively as the two parties grappled for power and 
attempted assassinations were carried out on both sides. Internal CPP splits led to an 
attempted coup by CPP dissidents in 1994, and disputes within FUNCINPEC resulted 
in the expulsion of Sam Rainsy from the Party, the leading advocate for a liberal 
democratic state. Subsequent competition for power and economic interests between 
CPP and FUNCINPEC politicians and military men resulted in a coup in 1997 against 
FUNCINPEC led by Hun Sen and a CPP faction personally loyal to him. While the 
coup was mainly aimed at exterminating FUNCINPEC‟s military leadership, it also 
involved an expropriation of FUNCINPEC business assets, further skewing the market 
to benefit those entrepreneurs who had previously backed or now threw in their political 
lot with Hun Sen. However, once the elections had taken place, the international 
community had satisfied its conscience and donor objectives, and moved swiftly on.  
 
Paris‟s observations of the Cambodian peacebuilding mission come into line with the 
argument of this research as he highlights Freedom House‟s downgrading of Cambodia 
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from „free‟ to „not free‟, accrediting the relative stability of Cambodia in the late 1990s 
to illiberal manoeuvrings to the extent that, „it is unclear to what degree Cambodia‟s 
relative stability can be attributed to the internationally sponsored democratization 
process, or instead to Hun Sen‟s efforts to suppress political opposition in the country‟ 
(Paris, 2004, pp.88-89). UNTAC neither addressed the underlying causes of conflict nor 
resolved the conditions that led to or exacerbated the conflict. These points would 
substantiate the argument that this research presents, namely that UNTAC failed to 
pacify the country and address the historical and contextual factors that fuelled the 
conflict and the negligent indifference of the international community towards 
Cambodia. To be established peace necessitates more than elections; democratisation is 
only part of the process. Genuine political contestation within the rule of law, respect 
for political and civil liberties, constitutional limitations on the exercise of 
governmental power and the maximisation of individual freedoms are as essential. 
However steadfast political will and the full commitment of the international 
community are both indispensable elements for successful peacebuilding that were 
absent in the 1990s. The repercussions of the political manoeuvring that took place, 
contrary to democratic principles, are still being played out today. 
 
UNTAC failed in its mandate and did little more than prescribe democracy to 
Cambodia. That the swift departure of the UN after elections set the course for the 
inevitable failure of democracy, as UNTAC‟s military commander later publically 
acknowledged (Sanderson, 2001, Sanderson and Maley 1998). However further to the 
point, democracy was never overthrown, as it was never successfully established as the 
event of one election taking place does not constitute a democracy (Hughes, 2003). 
Cambodia throughout the 1990s remained one of the poorest countries in the world with 
a per capita GDP of $350 USD and an annual growth rate of less than 3 per cent. Three 
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quarters of the population were subsistence farmers and less than 35 per cent of 
Cambodians over 15 years of age were literate. The government relied heavily upon aid, 
which accounted for 60-70 per cent of public expenditure in the 1990s (Smoke & 
Taliercio, 2007). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight and drawing from the successes and failures of other UN 
peace missions (Paris, 2004; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006), the limited time frame of 
UNTAC and the small personnel available limited the ability of the mission to achieve 
its vague mandate. That in just 18 months UNTAC was expected to entrench 
democratic principles, establish and encourage the fair application of law, demobilise 
troops after decades of civil conflict, and resettle an entire displaced population, is 
unimaginably naive. Thus, at a pivotal moment in Cambodia‟s history, the commitment 
of the international community to the recovery and development of Cambodia failed. 
The UN failed to create a realistic mandate for UNTAC, failed to recognise that a post-
conflict country does not become democratic over night, and failed to commit time and 
resources to peacebuilding efforts, monitor the implementation and establish electoral 
results. 
 
It is clear from the failure of UNTAC to create a government based on the result of the 
democratic elections held in 1993 that UNTAC was more concerned with political 
stability than legitimacy. Obedience is not held due to a positive choice in Cambodia, 
but enforced through state aggression and violent oppression of Cambodian civil 
society. Hughes and Springer identify this as a time where the corruption, nepotism and 
patronage were reinvigorated (Hughes, 2003; Springer, 2010). In the years since 
UNTAC, the CPP have virtually restored Cambodia to an authoritarian one-party state 
through violent systematic suppression of the opposition (Springer, 2010).  
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Figure 4 outlines the coup d‟état, assassinations, attacks of protesters and other episodes 
that have taken place against government that have led to arrests and imprisonment. The 
Cambodian people do not positively obey the authority of the government, but have 
little means of resistance and opposition as a result of the government‟s continued use 
of violence, intimidation techniques and assassination, Hun Sen and the CPP remain in 
power today. Hun Sen‟s continued presence in power over three-decades leads us to 
question Cambodia‟s political transition as well as the quality of Cambodian 
democracy. Political manipulation and oppression have been felt in Cambodia as the 
CPP have worked to neutralise their opponents in the run up to the following 1998 and 
2003 elections; elections which have been described as representing ‗little more than a 
tool to provide legitimacy for a government that has, in various ideological 
manifestations, enjoyed unbroken rule over Cambodians for nearly three decades‟ 
(Williams, 2008: p.23). Whilst Cambodia has not returned to war, the country has by no 
means been transformed into a peaceful state, with a virtually complete reconsolidation 
of de facto one-party rule and large-scale perversion of market freedom by powerful 
political interest associated with the ruling party (Heder, 2003). The indifference of the 
international community to Hun Sen‟s prolonged violent oppression of civil society and 
political opponents suggest that economic interests trump those of democracy and good 
governance (Springer, 2010). 
Fig. 4. Instances of state coordinated violence (OHCHR, 2010; HRW, 2012) 
1. S-91 and Chhoeu Khmao, 1992-94 2. Son Sann grenade attack, 1995 
3. Killing of Thun Bun Ly, May 1996 4. Grenade Attack on Opposition Party 
Rally, March 30, 1997 
5. The July 1997 Coup and Post-Coup 
Killings, 1997-1998 
6. Execution of Soy Sophea, February 
1998 
7. Acid Attack on Tat Marina, 16, December 
1999 
8. Killing of Om Radsady, February 
2003 
9. Killings of Labour Union Leaders Chea 
Vichea and Ros Sovannareth, 2004, and 
Hy Vuthy, 2007 
10. Killing of Khmer Krom Monk Eang 
Sok Thoeun, February 2007  
 
11.  Killing of Journalist Khim Sambo, July 
2008 
12. Killing of Environmental Activist, 
Chut Wutty, April 2012 
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2.2 A history of Phnom Penh: development and beautification 
Cambodia‟s unique history of colonisation, proxy war and civil conflict, an extreme 
communist regime and failed development initiatives left a country in ruins. Detailed at 
length in the section above from the 1950s to present, an understanding of the 
circumstances of war, mass displacement, torn apart families, missing generations, the 
absence of any form of property rights, the absence of justice and the absence of rule of 
law are essential for understanding contemporary Cambodian society. However 
Cambodia‟s capital Phnom Penh has had a particularly vibrant history. A place home to 
the confluence of four rivers, home to royalty and the poor, the centre of politics and 
commerce, film, music and the arts; Phnom Penh has been both densely populated and 
entirely abandoned, a stage of political oppression, liberation, protest and genocide. 
This section will look at how Phnom Penh has changed, from its desirable location and 
growth, to its abandonment under the KR and the subsequent redevelopment. The MPP, 
local authorities and civil society movements will be engaged with through this 
examination of the development of Phnom Penh. 
 
The capital of Cambodia has moved with the centuries. Formerly situated in Siem Reap 
province (see Map 1) home of the famous Angkor Wat complex, the capital relocated 
south to the area of Phnom Penh in the mid 15th century. The site of Phnom Penh is a 
natural centre of trade and business for the country as it sits on the banks of four rivers: 
the Tonle Bassac, Tonle Sap, the Upper Mekong and the Lower Mekong. These rivers 
are the arteries of the country not only facilitating trade but also seasonally flooding the 
low lands and the Tonle Sap Lake, enriching paddy fields and crops with fresh water 
and nutrients. However the capital did not stay in Phnom Penh for long. With the rise 
and fall of different regional powers, the centre of Khmer influence and culture changed 
location from Phnom Penh north to Longvek on close to the Tonle Sap and later south 
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to Oudong, amongst other sites, before finally settling permanently in Phnom Penh in 
the 1860s.  
 
In the 20
th
 Century Phnom Penh was known as the „Pearl of Asia‟ due to its riverside 
location and French style promenade, period architecture and public parks. This epithet 
holds colonial connotations, as at this time Cambodia was part of French Indochina. 
France invested heavily in Phnom Penh, planning the city‟s expansion and expected 
industrialization (Fallavier, 2007, p. 70). A bustling metropolis, not even the Great 
Depression affected the growth of Phnom Penh (Osborne, 2008, p.79). French funded 
urbanisation in Southeast Asia, including the development of Phnom Penh, came to a 
stand still during the World War II. Global political turmoil and internal divisions led to 
little growth, construction or maintenance of the city throughout the 1930-1940s 
(Osbourne, 2008). However with independence came Cambodia‟s „Golden Age‟ and the 
iconic architecture of Vann Molyvann, a talented young architect, educated in France, 
who designed some of the most iconic buildings in Phnom Penh including the State 
Palace, National Theatre, Olympic Stadium and the Independence Monument amongst 
others.
21
 
 
Nevertheless the „Golden Age‟ did not last and whilst Cambodia had remained neutral 
in the neighbouring conflict in Vietnam, the spill over of violence and bombing 
campaigns served to heighten political dissatisfaction with the King and the right wing 
government of the time. A coup led by Lon Nol and his subsequent authoritarian reign 
incensed and invigorated rebel groups. The KR emerged as a disciplined military force 
                                                 
21
 Vann Molyvann fled to Switzerland during the KR and now lives in Siem Reap. His 
work combined modern architectural shapes and structures with Khmer culture, 
working in harmony with the environment and seasonal change. Demolition and decay 
threaten many of Molyvann‟s buildings however an initiative has begun to lobby for the 
preservation of his work: http://www.vannmolyvannproject.org/ 
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and on the 17
th
 April 1975, over threw Lon Nol and marched victorious into Phnom 
Penh. 
 
In just four days the capital was evacuated almost entirely under the guise of an 
imminent American bombing campaign. The KR fed upon legitimate fear of an 
American bombing raid, exploiting fear to fabricate an emergency situation whereby 
even the hospitals were emptied. The bedridden were forced to walk, be carried, or were 
left to die by the roadside. Urban Cambodians were largely considered to be undesirable 
to the new regime, part of the group the KR referred to as New People. Educated, 
fashionable and worldly, they embodied everything that the KR considered to be evil 
and impure. Whereas the Old People, the farmers, fishermen and labourers, who were 
for the most part uneducated and living in rural areas, were glorified. 
 
This simplistic binary distinction led to the slaughter of thousands of New People and 
the loss of technical skills, art, history and culture that efforts are still trying to restore 
today. The KR annihilated urban life by forcing the entire Cambodian population into 
labour camps in the countryside. It wasn‟t until the KR fell in 1979 that people dared 
return to the cities. Images and footage of houses, apartment buildings, shops and 
schools looted and abandoned reveal haunting similarities with the famous „lost‟ 
kingdom of Angkor Wat in Siem Reap province preserved in the jungle for hundreds of 
years.
22
  
 
It is from this abandoned capital that a unique form of urbanisation and labour markets 
emerged in the early 1980s as Cambodians flowed back into the cities. It was reported 
that an estimated 90 per cent of some 750,000 Cambodian refugees from border camps 
                                                 
22
 See DC-CAM‟s archive: http://www.dccam.org/ 
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had wanted to return to their provincial homes, however due to the proliferation of 
undetonated land mines and uncultivable farmland, the majority were directed to urban 
centres (Fallavier, 2007, p. 71). Around Phnom Penh, holding centres were established 
by the Vietnamese to filter the large numbers of people trying to gain access to the 
capital. These centres were designed to identify people who were employable, had 
desirable skills and the potential to become part of the new public administration. This 
was no easy task as only 15 per cent of New People were estimated to have survived 
(Osborne, 2008, p. 182). Those selected underwent „re-education‟ before being allowed 
into the city.  
 
By definition, everyone returning to Phnom Penh initially squatted (UN-HABITAT, 
2007, Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements, p. 
122). Immediately desirable property was claimed or „grabbed‟ by those in positions of 
power. The rest of the population were left to lay claim to former residences or take up 
homes in empty buildings, old cinemas, abandoned shops, restaurants, rooftops and 
roadsides. Informal dwellings
23
 mushroomed around areas of work in Phnom Penh, 
namely the riverside, railway station, close to markets and the city centre. Trade crept 
back into the city. Local markets were reopened and slowly businesses grew up from 
beneath the rubble. Hughes describes a „pool‟ of migrants drawn to the city searching 
for unskilled labour opportunities such as petty trade, manufacturing, construction, 
prostitution (2003, p. 177).  
 
In1981 the official estimate of Phnom Penh‟s population was 300,000 however NGOs 
reported numbers of over 400,000 (Osborne, 2008 p.186). By 1992 this number had 
                                                 
23
 The use of the word „slum‟ is contested in this thesis here and in more detail in 
section 4.3 
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risen to 700,000 with over 200,000 seasonal workers, living in a city that had been built 
to home half a million (Fallavier, 2008, p. 72). In 1985 the MPP recognised the 
informal living circumstances of long-term residents of Phnom Penh by issuing Family 
Books. These books served as legal records of family members in residence and 
recognised occupancy, however they were not land or property titles. Rather Family 
Books are used to confirm an identity, enable access to public utilities or by family 
members to claim compensation in the event of an eviction (Fallavier, 2008, p. 72). By 
1998 Phnom Penh was estimated to have a permanent residential population of one 
million indicated by the census, however this did not include seasonal workers and 
those without Family Books which has been estimated to be another 22 per cent 
(Fallaiver, 2007, p. 73). 
 
The 1992 Land Law enabled residents who had occupied land for five years or more to 
ownership however mismanagement, corruption and nepotism were in reality more 
influential factors. In the mid 1990s there was virtually no dialogue between the MPP 
and the urban poor, who distrusted the authorities. The failure to implement the 1992 
Land Law and the lack of awareness of the law amongst residents of Phnom Penh 
enabled brutal evictions and the raising of entire villages in the 1990s. Whether down to 
deliberate mismanagement, a lack of personnel or political will to implement the law, 
land disputes were the largest category of complaint received by UNTAC 1992-1993 
and by NGOs today (Hughes, 2003, p. 48). 
 
In 2001 a new Land Law was enacted and to ensure its fair implementation, World 
Bank established LMAP at a cost of $28.8m USD. In 2005 the city had only seven 
khans: four central khans, Doun Penh, Tuol Kork, 7 Makara and Chamkarmon; and 
three outer khans, Russei Keo, Dangkao and Meanchey (Map 3). In 2008 this number 
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had risen to eight as khan Russei Keo was divided to create khan Sensok (Map 4). In 
2011 a ninth khan was created when Dangkao was split into Por Senchey and Dangkao 
(Map 5). By 2015 Phnom Penh had expanded further into surrounding Provinces and 
amassed three new khans, Chrouy Changvar, Preaek Pnov and Chbar Ampov, taking 
the number up to 12 (see Map 6). 
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Map 3. 2005, Phnom Penh: 7 Khans 
Image: White paper for the development and management of 
Phnom Penh 
Map 4. 2009 Phnom Penh: 8 Khans 
Image: STT, The 8 Khan Survey 
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Map 5. 2011: Phnom Penh, 9 Khans 
Image: MPP website: www.phnompenh.gov.kh/district.php 
Map 6. 2015: Phnom Penh, 12 Khans 
Image: http://www.primetrustproperty.com/ 
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Map 7 shows the expansion that took place in 2011. The inner black line indicates the 
2008, eight khan city boundary, whereas the coloured areas beyond this line indicate 
the expansion that took place in 2011. The area total area of Phnom Penh increased 
from 380.760km2 to 693.552km2 (M. Pellerin, LICADHO, 2012). However, whilst 
the city boundaries have changed, satellite images of the city in Map 8, show that 
urban settlements remain most densely concentrated in the central four khans while 
much of the outer khans remain rural farmland. Therefore, contemporary Phnom Penh 
is both a dense urban landscape and rural farmland. This is important for 
understanding the relocation process as residents are promised they will be relocated 
within Phnom Penh, believing this to mean metropolitan Phnom Penh. However, as a 
result of khan boundary changes and the expansion of Phnom Penh, this is no longer 
the case. The outer boundaries of the outer eight khans are over 30km away from 
central Phnom Penh. These areas are little more than disused rice paddies with few 
 
Map 7. The expansion of Phnom Penh, 2011. (M. Pellerin, LICAHDO, 2012) 
 76 
roads and virtually no water or electricity connections. Household respondents 
expressed their dismay at being misled during the relocation process. Many were told 
they would be relocated close to the city and be able to keep their jobs but following 
relocation, found themselves living in exposed, empty fields down dirt tracks, miles 
away from even a main road never mind the city centre. 
 
Map 8. Satellite image of Phnom Penh (Google, 2014). 
 
Violent, coerced evictions continue today, not only in Phnom Penh but also across the 
country. Forced evictions and resettlement remain a major human rights atrocity 
committed under the current CPP government (Amnesty International, 2009: p. 2; 
LICADHO, 2009: p. 27; COHRE, 2009: p. 7). The reports from 2009 offer the most 
comprehensive picture of the violence and devastation brought about by the evictions 
taking place across Cambodia. However a 2011 report from Amnesty brings a more 
human face to evictions, usually characterised by images of houses and bulldozers, 
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„Eviction and Resistance in Cambodia: Five women tell their stories‟. This report puts 
the struggle of five women at the forefront of land conflict in Cambodia. Tep Vanny, 
who offers her story from the Boeung Kak Lake development was arrested and 
sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment following the publication of the 
report and her persistent protests against the government.
24
 
 
It was the Boeung Kak Lake development that forced LMAP and the violent evictions 
into the spotlight. Boeung Kak Lake is likely the most famous and controversial 
forced eviction that has taken place in Phnom Penh. The lake was formerly over 90-
hectares and natural floodplain in the north of Phnom Penh. The Boeung Kak area 
was home to hotels, small businesses and homes; a bustling tourist spot in Phnom 
Penh. Residents used the lake itself for fishing and growing vegetables. However the 
RGC changed the status of the lake from public to private and leased the area for 99 
years to Shukaku Ltd. a company owned by Senator Lao Meng Khin, a close 
associate of Hun Sen and supporter of the CPP. 
 
Despite the lake being an essential floodplain and home to thousands of residents, 
businesses and wildlife, Shukaku Ltd began pumping the lake full of sand and silt to 
fill the lake and set the foundations for a satellite city in 2008.
25
  The land registration 
process in the area was flawed from the beginning as land adjudication was not 
conducted according to the law. Many of the homes and businesses that had 
legitimate claims to their land, were denied land titles (Bugalski & Pred, 2010). 
                                                 
24
 See wordpress blog „Free the 15‟ for up to date information regarding the detention 
and imprisonment of BK lake activists http://freethe15.wordpress.com 
25
 See the Inclusive Development website for full details of the BK resident‟s 
struggle: http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/bkl/ 
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Shortly after the erroneous land titling process, Boeung Kak Lake was designated by 
the government to be a „development zone‟, thus preventing further land titles from 
being issued. Private security and the police used threats and intimidation to scare 
away residents (A Tale of Two Cities, STT, 2012; Amnesty, 2009). Figure 5 shows the 
how the lake looked three years after Shukaku began filling in the lake, and 
afterwards. The lake now is entirely dried up, a giant sand dune in the heart of the 
city, erased from maps and awaiting further development. 
Fig. 5 Boeung Kak Lake before and after Shukaku Inc. development
26
 
 
 
 
Those who were brave enough to stay were offered meagre compensation, which was 
rejected. Following the rejection, vicious forced evictions took place often taking 
place at night (Amnesty International, 2009). Video footage of bulldozers destroying 
houses while residents were still inside circulated via the Internet documenting the 
                                                 
26
 Photos taken by Nicolas Axelrod, 2008:  
http://blog.thecauseofprogress.com/2011/08/03/before-and-after-3-years-apart/ 
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atrocious acts (LICADHO, „The Impact of “Development” and Forced Evictions in 
Cambodia‟ video, YouTube, uploaded 24th October 2011). 
 
Events came to a head when the World Bank, having indirectly funded the 
development project through LMAP, took the landmark move of freezing all loans to 
Cambodia based upon the media coverage of human rights abuses (Guardian, 2011; 
Bretton Wood Project, 2011; Carmichael, 2008). Further investigation revealed that 
the World Bank was found to have breached its own operational policy by failing to 
design and supervise LMAP appropriately. This has resulted in the exclusion and 
denial of titling rights to thousands of residents, arrests, protests and violent forced 
evictions (Mgbako et al., 2010: p. 52; The Guardian, 2011). The loss of Boeung Kak 
Lake was not only an environmental disaster, but also a scene of grave violations of 
the rights of residents to tenure security and adequate compensation, overseen by the 
international media (The Guardian, 2011; The BBC, 2011;The New York Times, 
2012; Voice of America, 2013) The World Bank was forced to admit that it had 
funded a corrupt and illegal process of land grabbing. 
 
Following the withholding of World Bank loans, Hun Sen became personally 
involved in the Boeung Kak Lake dispute and agreed to 12.4 hectares of land to be 
allocated as compensation to residents after a stand off. However the 12.4 hectares 
disappeared from development plans soon after the promise was made and 15 female 
residents protesting peacefully were forcibly detained, sentenced and imprisoned. 
After an international campaign the women‟s sentences were reduced and they were 
freed however they did not receive a pardon  (Amnesty, 2012). More recently, 
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Shukaku Ltd has been praised by the government for their poverty alleviation work in 
the area.
27
 
 
Boeung Kak Lake not only demonstrates the inadequacies of Cambodian 
development, but Cambodian civil society‟s struggle against the arbitrary nature of 
judicial processes and the virtual absence of accountability (Transparency 
International, 2014). Hun Sen separates himself from the authorities and positions 
himself as the merciful father who, despite having created the circumstances of 
exploitation behind closed doors, emerges publically on the side of the victims gifting 
them promises of compensation, of which he has no intention of fulfilling. Boeung 
Kak Lake however is not an exception, rather it typifies the disconnect between elite 
relationships, developmental objectives and the lives of ordinary Phnom Penh 
residents.
28
 
 
Fallavier has related the absence of a functioning and accountable local authority in 
his 2007 PhD thesis, to the prevalence of short-term, emergency interventions by 
international assistance programmes and the readiness of recipients to receive them. 
The unique political and economic circumstances of Cambodia in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s resulted in civil society organisations and NGOs filling in the space 
traditionally occupied by a functioning government such as the provision of social 
                                                 
27
 Phnom Penh Post article, „Minister Praises Boeung Kak fill-in‟ published 27th 
February 2013. (Kim Yuthana and Shane Worrell). Available: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/minister-praises-boeung-kak-fill 
28
 Hughes 2003 IIAS newsletter offers an earlier example whereby large residential 
slum areas were cleared to improve and beautify the city, only for the area to be 
portioned off by the CPP and sold privately to investors (2003, p. 49). The on-going 
dispute over the Borei Keila development is a further example of contractors with ties 
to the CPP, promising compensation and upon winning the contract, retracting the 
compensation agreement. For more information on Borei Keila see section 1.2.ii. 
 81 
services, education, construction and infrastructure. This detachment between a 
government‟s public administration and the population is discussed in section 5.1 of 
this thesis as a version of the rentier state model. A rentier state is one that functions 
without accountability to the electorate as it is financially supported by means other 
than a tax base, most commonly through profits extracted from a country‟s natural 
resource wealth. In the instance of Cambodia however the government does invest in 
a functioning public administration or social services as NGOs readily assume this 
mantle. International donors and private investors rather than taxes sustain the RGC 
and therefore the government acts in the best interests of its business partners rather 
than the electorate. 
 
However it is important that we do not make the mistake of white washing 
Cambodian governance with a portrait of Hun Sen. His longevity has certainly served 
to establish a network of loyal allegiances whom he rewards, from the senate down to 
village level (Fallavier, 2008, p. 69) however the MPP, provincial and local 
authorities do act with a degree of autonomy. 
 
Below central government are 24 provincial and municipal administrations, which 
form part of the Ministry of the Interior. Phnom Penh is governed by the MPP and 
administratively divided into khans (districts), which contain a number of sangkats 
(communes), which are made up of poums (villages). These administrative zones are 
often blurry and function at varying levels of effectiveness, particularly at the poum 
level. One poum chief may be particularly politically active whereas another may 
 82 
simply hold the title and perform few duties at all.
29
 However an active poum chief 
may not indicative of an active sangkat or khan chief. This variation becomes 
important when for example, facing forced eviction. An active, well-connected poum 
chief may be able to prevent the development or secure good compensation for their 
residents, whereas an inactive chief may do nothing at all, or even profit themselves at 
the expense of their residents.
30
 The most common complaint that emerged during 
fieldwork by household respondents was that raising concerns with the local 
authorities, protesting an eviction or challenging the authorities was not just 
ineffective but futile. If you were lucky and had a poum chief that raised your 
concerns with the sangkat chief in the first instance, there was little hope of the 
complaint reaching beyond sangkat or khan level to anyone of influence. To influence 
anything, multiple respondents said, one must lobby Hun Sen himself: he holds the all 
power. 
 
Cambodian civil society has been long characterised as weak and lacking in capacity 
as kinship ties are prioritised and any action undertaken otherwise is occasional and 
short-term (Hughes & Conway, 2003). The Uppsala Research Report in Cultural 
Anthropology (no. 15), Where Every Household is an Island: Social Organisation 
and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia, legitimised and reinforced this long-
standing assumption academically when it was published in 1996. Despite being 
based primarily on literary resources and a short three to four weeks fieldwork, Jan 
Ovesen, Ing-Britt Trankell and JoaKim Öjendal‟s Uppsala Research Report remains a 
                                                 
29
 Over the course of fieldwork the author came across both dedicated, selfless local 
authority figures and an exploitative, violently oppressive figure who is discussed in 
section 3.3 
30
 See section 5.2.iv for example taken from CDRI report relating the influence of 
local authorities in land management processes. 
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prominent work on Cambodian civil society. However evidence uncovered during 
fieldwork, particularly when taking life history interviews, revealed Cambodians 
helping and assisting each other without kinship ties underpinning their actions.
31
 
These actions contradict the established conjecture of Cambodians as individualistic, 
self-preserving and self-promoting. 
 
This thesis does not take up the responsibility of delving deeper into the historic 
reasons for the inaccurate portrayal of Cambodian civil society, however the evidence 
that emerged from fieldwork suggests that Cambodians, as is the norm for most 
people, exist within a complex network of relationships including kinship, social and 
professional networks. 
 
How this translates into the ability individuals to organise is affected by the political 
economy of their circumstances. There is evidence of organisation across the country 
including farmer cooperatives
32
 and the presence of strong trade unions in the 
garment sector. Civil society have been disputing the land management and titling 
process since it began, with varying levels of success however. This is likely due to a 
variety of factors and variation in circumstances, such as land ownership status and 
level of tenure security for example, or how well connected the individual behind the 
land appropriation is. Civil society and public freedoms through the 1990s were 
oppressed by Hun Sen and the CPP in the name of security (HRW, Three reasons that 
emerged from the household survey as affecting the respondents ability to organise 
                                                 
31
 See section 4.2.ii for the life history examples of Tep and Lin, which contract the 
1996 Every House is an Island report. 
32
 See Heifer Cambodia 2011 report: 
http://www.heifercambodia.org/Cooperative%20in%20Cambodia%20report.pdf 
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however, were ineffective local leadership, the coercive individualisation of the 
dispute by the local authorities and the short period of time between eviction notice 
and demolition. The first point relates to discussion above regarding effective and 
ineffective local authority figures. Some respondents spoke about the inaction of their 
sangkat chief as a betrayal, whereas others accepted that neither they nor their leaders 
had little agency in the bigger scheme of things. A small number of households did 
protest,
33
 however nothing happened as a result of it.  
 
More widespread was the threatening nature of the eviction notice and the divisions 
created by the compensation mechanism. A family might have their compensation 
reduced or be dropped from the compensation register all together if they were seen to 
be trouble making or incompliant. Compensation mechanisms lacked transparency 
and led to inexplicable variation in compensation levels, further individualising the 
dispute.  
 
A trend emerged in how eviction notices were issued and compensation accepted: the 
authorities waited until family members were at work, leaving elderly or adolescent 
relatives at home. The eviction notice was then issued and the elderly or adolescent 
relative was informed that if they did not accept the compensation claim immediately, 
they would receive no compensation at all. No time was given for the household 
member to seek advice or at times, even read the eviction notice. Should they hesitate, 
the officers serving the eviction notice threatened the household member with the 
imminent demolition of their home. 
                                                 
33
 Data and analysis relating to whether or not household respondents protested their 
eviction is in section 4.4. 
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As a result of these tactics, the MPP successfully limits the motivation, political space 
and time to organise. Nevertheless whether due to increased international attention 
and media coverage, advocacy or NGO support, a small number of residents (such as 
those discussed in the Boeung Kak Lake area) are mobilising and protesting their 
evictions (Hughes & Conway, 2003). 
 
Local NGO support for residents facing eviction has been an influential factor in 
organising and mobilising protests (UN-Habitat, 2007; Hughes & Conway, 2003). 
NGO staff have been criticised however as avoiding political campaigns, a lead 
usually taken by the larger international NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW). Amnesty and HRW are less active at the grassroots 
level but are better situated to criticise the government by publishing media 
statements and thematic reports, and are present in the country to monitor and observe 
the political and economic climate and any protests (UN-Habitat, 2007, p. 313). UN 
agencies and international embassies, particularly the US embassy are also lobbied for 
assistance. They are not immune from protest either; protestors from Boeung Kak 
Lake and Borei Keila who demanded the Bank leave Cambodia as a result of LMAP 
failings recently threw eggs at the World Bank Phnom Penh office.
34
 
 
NGO staff operating at grassroots level are vulnerable however, as are the people 
protesting themselves. The example of local urban NGO STT is given in the 
following Methodology Chapter section 3.2.ii. STT was suspended from operations in 
                                                 
34
 See Cambodia Daily article, „Protestors Hurl Eggs at World Bank Office, Promise 
to Return‟, dated 16th February 2016 available: 
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/protesters-hurl-eggs-at-world-bank-office-
promise-to-return-108550/ 
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2011 for a year following the publication the report Rehabilitation of the Railways: A 
Comparison of Field Data that clearly demonstrated the MPP‟s systematic 
downgrading of buildings and infrastructure in their compensation calculations. 
Following the suspension staff were threatened and intimidated at the office and in 
their homes. They received thousands of emails threatening insulting them and even 
questioning their Khmer identity. Many staff left the NGO as a result. The suspension 
was the first step towards a proposed NGO law widely regarded as an attempt by the 
RGC to regulate and control the number and work of NGOs in Cambodia, which it 
argued had spiralled out of control
35
  
 
Despite only nine per cent of people having access to the Internet in Cambodia 
(Freedom House, 2015), in all likelihood this percentage is higher in Phnom Penh due 
to the increasing number of Internet cafes sprouting up across the city. The Internet 
and social media have provided an alternative virtual space for civil society to 
communicate, organise and mobilise. Whilst some Internet content is blocked by the 
RGC a recent report by Freedom House Freedom on the Net rates Cambodian Internet 
access as „partly free‟ scoring the Kingdom 47.5/100 (100 being least free). Blogs, 
websites, Twitter accounts and Facebook are all used to voice opinions, share news 
and different media. Crucial to this has been the development of search engines and 
computer operating systems that can process Khmer Unicode. The blog Sahrika 
(sahrika.com) for example, collects, records and translates Cambodian media 
coverage of land and housing rights issues. Urban Voice Cambodia 
                                                 
35
 See Cambodia Daily article by Phorn Bopha and Zsombor Peter, December 2013, 
„Government pushes ahead with NGO law‟, 
http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/government-pushes-ahead-with-ngo-law-
48245/ 
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(www.urbanvoicecambodia.net) uses crowdmapping software to receive reports from 
the public regarding events and issues in Phnom Penh, for example black outs or 
flooding, allowing the user to pinpoint the exact places affected by the event. 
However draft cybercrime and telecommunications laws were leaked in 2014 that 
pointed towards the RGC‟s intentions to heavily monitor and censor the mobile 
phones and the Internet, following the example set by their regional neighbours 
Thailand, Vietnam and China, all of whom were rated „not free‟ by Freedom House.36 
The RGC‟s lack of technical knowledge and expertise means that for the time being at 
least, that the Internet remains a potentially powerful civil society resource. 
 
In the mid 20
th
 Century Phnom Penh was known as the „Peal of Asia‟. In recent years 
the slogan, „Phnom Penh: The Charming City‟ has been promoted by the MPP in an 
attempts to „re brand‟ the city as a delightful, clean, charming, safe and attractive 
destination. The MPP have gone as far as to print banners and hang them around 
popular areas and tourist attractions including the Independence Monument and Wat 
Phnom as though through repetition, this will permeate the consciousness of Phnom 
Penh‟s residents and guests. 
 
The process of „beautification‟ in Phnom Penh began back in 1996 under Mayor Chea 
Sophara (Hughes, 2003 IIAS). His vision for a beautiful, clean and prosperous city 
aimed to raise Phnom Penh to its former glory as the go to destination in Southeast 
Asia. The process has been reinvigorated in recent years guided by the 2005-15 
Phnom Penh Development Strategy (PPDS). The PPDS addresses the development of 
the city through five main visions: land use and housing; environment and natural 
                                                 
36
 Laos did not appear in the Freedom House 2015 report Freedom on the Net 
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resources; infrastructure and transportation; social service; and economic 
development.
37
 The pursuit of these visions can be seen around the city as public 
spaces are being rebuilt and landscaped along the riverside and boulevards, roads are 
being widened and bridges built. Waste disposal is now compulsory for households in 
an attempt to clean up the city‟s streets, tied into payments made for electricity. Even 
cars, dusty and dirty from driving through the provinces, must be cleaned as they 
enter the city, or be subjected to fines.  
 
The urban poor however are an obstacle to the realisation of this vision. Chea Sophara 
was clear that his vision of Phnom Penh did not include the urban poor when he 
remarked in an interview in 2001, we want to keep a high standard of living by not 
encouraging the poor to live in the city (Hughes, 2003, IIAS) 
 
Rather than engage in poverty alleviation programmes or encourage equitable and 
inclusive development Chea Sophara and the MPP pursued forced evictions and 
relocations as discussed above, and when deemed necessary the quick, albeit 
temporary, fix of „street sweeping‟ (Cambodia Daily, 2009; Next City, 2014; Phnom 
Penh Post, 2012; Hughes, 2003, IIAS). „Street sweeping‟ involves vehicles driving 
around Phnom Penh arbitrarily detaining homeless adults and children, drunks, drug 
users, sex workers and anyone deemed to be undesirable. Much like a stray dog is 
impounded, people are literally picked off the street and incarcerated. The period of 
detention ranges from a few days to a few years. Their presence does not fit in line 
with the image the MPP are trying to portray and so they are detained and taken to 
Prey Sor or Prey Speu, „vocational‟ centres for „re-education‟ (Cambodia Daily, 2009; 
                                                 
37
 The PPDS is investigated at length in section 5.2ii 
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Next City, 2014; Phnom Penh Post, 2012). Former inmates have reported that there 
are no toilets, no running water and no electricity in the cells. They are given basic 
rations of food, medicines, including antiretroviral drugs are confiscated and inmates 
are abused at the hands of the guards (Cambodia Daily, 2009). An interviewee 
compared Prey Sor to S-21, the KR site of torture and imprisonment.  
 
Street sweeping happens most often when dignitaries or important events are hosted 
in the city, such in preparation for the ASEAN conferences from as early as 2002 and 
most recently in 2014 (Straingo, 2010; Phnom Penh Post, 2002). The homeless and 
other undesirables are considered to be an embarrassment and a stain on the image of 
the city and the country. The continued process of street sweeping has been 
condemned by local NGOs for over a decade and more recently by UNICEF and the 
UNOHCHR following reports of children as young as one year old being taken to 
Prey Speu (Cuddy, 2014). 
 
In her short piece for the IIAS Newsletter, Hughes discusses the process of 
beautification in the context of the MPP‟s attempts to control public spaces. In her 
article beautification runs parallel to the MPPs violent clampdowns on political 
protests and marches, the grenade attack and manipulation of fear. By dominating 
public spaces, the MPP undermines and closes in on the limited resources and 
strategies of the urban poor to organise and challenge the authorities (2003). Springer 
develops upon this theory of political geo-spatial control, relating the oppression of 
protests in public spaces to Cambodia‟s violent neoliberalism and patron-clientelism 
(2010). This runs hand in hand with corruption and bribery and is central to the 2007 
UN-HABITAT report Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on 
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Human Settlements. This report provides evidence of corruption and patron-
clientelism in Phnom Penh through case studies showing how companies owned by 
prominent local and national politicians, were given leases to land privately owned on 
the grounds of beautification (pp. 312-313).  
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
This background history chapter began by outlining important events in Cambodia‟s 
recent history. Historical context is useful in most instances to understand how 
institutions and organisations came about and what were influencing factors in the 
decision making process. In the first part of this chapter, the internal political 
divisions, regional conflict and the preoccupation of the international community with 
an ideological war and indifference to Cambodia, created the circumstances that led to 
the KR seizing power. No one could have imagined the horrors that would take place 
in the following years however the repercussions of the KR regime, ensuing civil war 
and peacebuilding project are still being felt today. This is not only in regard to the 
missing generations of Cambodians, forced marriages, land mine littered countryside 
and the failed land titling process, but evident in the institutions and organisations that 
govern Cambodia today. 
 
The historic rise and fall of Phnom Penh and its on-going mismanaged development 
present a distilled version of the corrupt politics and deliberate exploitation of the 
poor that plagues Cambodia nationwide. An understanding of the city and its 
changing boundaries is essential to addressing the process of DIDR as changes made 
to city boundaries are politically and economically motivated. The MPP is openly 
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forcing the poor out of the city centre to the margins of society through eviction and 
street sweeping. However the MPP‟s chokehold of residents is not absolute and 
despite their best efforts to dominate public spaces and contain protests, civil society 
is creating spaces for action with the assistance of local and international NGOs. 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An essential component of this thesis is the contribution of data collected during 
fieldwork. Fieldwork was undertaken from August 2011 to May 2012, in and around 
Phnom Penh. During this time data was collected on 122 households across seven 
sites, three sites facing eviction (45 households) and four resettlement sites (77 
households). As a result information was collected on 693 household members 
relating to education, income, expenditure and wellbeing. This detailed body of data 
has not been replicated elsewhere in regard to the urban poor in Cambodia. 
 
3.1.i Objectives 
80 per cent of the Cambodian population live in the rural provinces and therefore, 
rural livelihoods and rural development are the dominant narratives for Cambodian 
scholarship, international donors and development policy. Development policy 
however, has not caught up with changes in Cambodian society or economy, as the 
services industry and garment manufacturing has taken over from rice as Cambodia‟s 
main export, shifting the economy from its tradition agricultural base to a reliance on 
the industrial sector (Godfrey, et al., 2001; Slocomb, 2010). Cambodia‟s urban areas 
are home to the majority of the garment factories and are therefore increasingly 
important industrial sectors as well as centres of power and governance. However, in 
a country experiencing rapid inequitable development, particularly in the urban 
environment, an increased understanding and appreciation of urban poor lives and 
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labour opportunities is missing and has become an obstacle to meaningful efforts to 
alleviate poverty for a growing urban population. This research fills this space in 
existing scholarship by providing detailed mixed methods research and analysis. 
 
3.1.ii Research questions 
This research is guided by two related research questions:
38
  
1. Who are the urban poor and what resources, networks and mechanisms do they  
rely upon? 
2. Does existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor issues? If  
not, why not and how can this be addressed? 
 
The first question was intended to create a better understanding of contemporary 
urban poverty. Although a single question, it opens up the possibility of a myriad of 
questions and allows for a fresh investigation unbounded by pre-existing assumptions 
of urban poverty; who are the urban poor? How did they find themselves in these 
circumstances? What jobs do they do? How to they survive? What are their 
experiences of development? Having understood the circumstances of the urban poor; 
captured the livelihood strategies and the daily challenges they face, the second 
question arises: fundamentally, does development policy address these challenges? If 
yes, how? And if no, why not and how can this be remedied. 
 
The two research questions inform the structure of this thesis as Chapter Four and 
Five address the questions respectively. However the previous, outlining the historical 
context for this research, sets the tone for the rest of the thesis. The historical 
                                                 
38
 See introduction for how these research questions came about 
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background chapter offered an initially broad historical perspective drawing out and 
highlighting important events, policies and laws that have shaped contemporary 
Cambodia. After this a more focused history of Phnom Penh was established. In 
addition the section contains an investigation the relationship between the government 
and the urban poor that will be continued in Chapter Five. The section explored the 
characteristics of the relationship between government and urban poor including the 
lengths the government goes to „beautify‟ the city, if only to give an appearance of 
prosperity and development. This section begins the argument that the Cambodian 
government has failed to fully commit to equitable development in the country. This 
failure will be evidenced empirically in relation to the urban context in Chapter Four 
and in terms of development policy in Chapter Five. Development plans and policy 
are identified as being misguided from the very beginning due to the lack of 
understanding and recognition of the complexity of urban poverty, urban labour 
markets and urban land issues. This research argues that this in turn has led to the 
increased insecurity and vulnerability of the urban poor. Whether this failure is 
accidental or calculated will be discussed at length, before the argument that the urban 
poor are deliberately being kept poor, insecure and vulnerable is presented.  
 
This methodology chapter unpacks the research techniques used in fieldwork and the 
ensuing analysis. Ensuring that the fieldwork speaks to the research questions was 
important yet equally was the flexibility to respond to events taking place on the 
ground. To best respond to the set research agenda as well as versatility to adapt to the 
emerging situations in Phnom Penh, a mixed methodology was assumed. This will be 
discussed at more length in the following section. 
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As outlined, Chapter Four speaks to the first research question. Beginning with a 
discussion of primary data from the case studies, the investigation will unpick existing 
assumptions of who the urban poor are and lay bare the reality through life histories 
and statistical analysis. With an understanding of who the urban poor are and where in 
the Cambodian context they come from, the second half of the question examines 
what resources; mechanisms and networks relationships the urban poor rely upon. 
This is achieved by dividing the analysis along the lines of livelihoods and housing, 
combining empirical data with discourse analysis to portray the nuances, and what 
determines those nuances, in everyday life for the urban poor. The purpose of this 
structure is to give equal importance to livelihoods and housing conditions, whilst 
emphasising their inherent nature. This intrinsic relationship is reinforced through the 
discussion of experiences of development, where those respondents in resettlement 
sites voice demonstrate the negative impact resettlement has had on their livelihood 
generating opportunities. This impact is demonstrated empirically using a „before‟ 
and „after‟ analysis of household income and expenditure and compensation. Life 
histories, statistical and discourse analysis will be infused with analysis of the media 
and news reports to create a narrative of urban development from the urban poor 
perspective. Finally Chapter Four concludes by raising issues identified through data 
analysis and discussion, of concern to the urban poor and what from their perspective, 
would be beneficial in terms of alleviating poverty. 
 
Having addressed the first question in Chapter Four, Chapter Five begins with a 
theoretical discussion of development before introducing the different development 
policies adopted by the RGC. Broader Cambodian development policy will be 
situated within academic debate concerning development before the chapter turns to 
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the urban poor issues identified in the previous chapter. These will be addressed again 
through livelihoods and housing lenses, using labour law and the human rights 
discourse to illustrate the inadequacies of the existing approach to urban poverty 
alleviation through development. In particular this chapter scrutinises existing theory 
and policy relating to the provision of private property rights as a means of poverty 
alleviation, offering tenure security as an alternative, to reinforce the argument 
presented in this thesis, that where one lives matters for the livelihood opportunities 
one has. Owning a land title or renting a home makes little difference when you can 
be evicted regardless, inadequately compensated and resettled kilometres away from 
your source of income. 
 
The thesis concludes with a summary of findings responding to the two research 
questions, illustrating how this research has answered the questions posed. The 
contributions this thesis makes to the understanding of urban poverty, political 
economy of livelihoods and DIDR will be set out, followed by the identification of 
areas of potential further research uncovered by this thesis. 
 
 
3.2 Methods of inquiry and analysis  
Traditionally research methods have been divided into two camps, quantitative and 
qualitative. The robust statistical nature of quantitative data analysis is attractive to 
many researchers of economics, political science and many other disciplines, whereas 
anthropologists and psychologists use the illustrative detail drawn from observation 
and discourse analysis regularly. Both are able to make invaluable contributions to 
scholarship, provided they are conducted carefully and ethically. 
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3.2.i Mixed methods: The best of both 
„Treating qualitative and quantitative approaches to research as incompatible is 
neither helpful nor realistic when it comes to research activity‟ (Denscombe, 2010, 
p.138). The false dichotomy of quantitative or qualitative research methodologies 
only restricts the range of research tools available for researchers to use. This research 
argues that the researcher should be free to engage with the full methodological tool 
kit and utilise whatever methodologies he or she decides are appropriate to the 
research question and context. A mixed methodology, otherwise known as „integrated 
research methods‟, is the combination of both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods in a single research project. This approach offers improved accuracy by 
using different methods to understand the same subject. When similar results occur, 
the researcher can be more confident. When they don‟t, he or she can investigate as to 
why not. And as Narag and Maxwell point out from their „lessons learned‟ article 
from their field research in slum areas of the Philippines, what is planned in the build 
up to fieldwork, rarely materialises once in the field due to unforeseen circumstances 
and unanticipated challenges (Narag & Maxwell, 2013). Whilst guidelines and 
preparation are important, so is the ability of the researcher to be creative, responsive 
and flexible in the face of difficult circumstances (Narag & Maxwell, 2013, p. 312). 
The researcher, once in the field, can „learn by doing‟, build on experiences and 
therefore adapt their methodological approach to respond to challenges and solve 
problems. 
 
Triangulation between the two methods, understanding the relationship between the 
different results, can enhance findings by adding detail and alternative perspectives. 
For what quantitative lacks in detail, qualitative can compensate for and vice versa. 
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By using a mixed methodology the researcher is able to capitalise on the strength of 
different methodologies e.g. survey with fixed and open-ended questions 
(Denscombe, 2010; Laws, Harper & Marcus, 2003). 
 
With these research objectives in mind a mixed methodological approach was decided 
upon when designing my research objectives and analysis. I pursued a mixed research 
methodology and ran both quantitative and qualitative analysis to unravel, reveal and 
illustrate the intricacy of urban poverty. By doing so I was able to draw conclusions 
as to the relevance, appropriateness and effectiveness of development strategies, to 
make recommendations for improvements based upon my research findings. 
 
In acknowledgement of the complex, dense, diverse and dynamic character of urban 
development (Beall et al. 2012) and in particular urban poverty, a mixed methods 
approach emerged as the most appropriate research methodology. The flexibility of 
the mixed methods approach, the ability to observe, ask questions outside of the 
household survey and conversation with respondents, enabled the researcher to 
navigate difficult or controversial subjects, such as household debt or interactions 
with local authorities. Therefore, fieldwork included elements of quantitative and 
qualitative data collection including a household survey, life history interviews, semi-
structured respondent interviews and key informant interviews, as well as archival 
research. By illustrating statistical analysis from the household survey with discourse 
analysis from life histories and interviews, the complex reality of urban poverty is 
revealed.  
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Figure 6 shows the relevant questions, methodologies employed and respondents 
contacted where appropriate. Each of the different methodologies will be addressed in 
turn in this section, followed section 3.3 explaining the problems and practicalities of 
fieldwork, concluding with an ethical considerations section. 
 
 
3.2.ii Case study selection 
The use of case studies enables the researcher to understand the complex relationship 
between factors as they operate within a particular social setting (Denscombe, 2010). 
Case study selection therefore was important as this would set the tone for the entire 
research project as well as set the variables for comparison. During initial preparation 
Fig. 6 Research questions, methodology and respondents 
Questions Methodology Respondent 
1.Who are the 
urban poor and 
hat resources, 
networks and 
mechanisms do 
they rely upon 
to survive? 
 
Household survey  
 
 
 
Life history in depth interview 
 
Archival research  
 
Statistical analysis from household survey 
 
Discourse analysis from life histories 
 
Discourse analysis from semi-structured 
informant interviews 
Household 
respondents and 
household members 
 
Selected respondents 
 
2. Does existing 
theory and 
policy respond 
appropriately to 
urban poor 
issues? If not, 
why not and 
how can this be 
improved? 
Archival research 
 
 
 
Semi-structured key informant interviews 
with: 
 
 
 
 
Key informants: 
Journalists 
NGOs / IOs 
Local Authorities 
Government 
Ministers 
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for fieldwork, former colleagues were contacted at CVCD, a local education NGO, to 
establish the possibility of utilising this network for fieldwork. However, the NGO 
had found itself in precarious circumstances and it was decided that this would not be 
the most effective access point to the urban poor settlements. Further, the research 
being conducted was critical of the government and therefore was not received well 
by CVCD who have historic ties with the government and implement the 
government‟s non-formal education programme.  
 
As a result alternative contacts were sought and after a period of scoping, meetings 
with NGOs, other PhD students, journalists and former colleagues, the local urban 
poor NGO STT emerged as an organisation with a strong community connection. 
However, the government in July had suspended STT. For a couple of years prior to 
this research, the RGC had been preparing to enact a controversial NGO law
39
 and 
had taken the first steps towards this with the suspension of STT. Despite recent 
events, STT were contacted and despite their circumstances, afforded access to their 
extensive data on urban poverty, urban poor communities and relocation sites as well 
as other resources. Through the generosity of STT, this research was able to gather 
information on urban poor settlements including their location, number of households, 
contact with NGOs and land registration status. With this foundational data, this 
research was able to make informed decisions, contact and select potential case study 
sites. However upon contacting case studies, it was made explicitly clear that this 
                                                 
39
 NGO law widely regarded as limiting autonomy and an attempt by the government 
to regulate and control NGOs. See Cambodia Daily article by Phorn Bopha and 
Zsombor Peter, December 2013, „Government pushes ahead with NGO law‟, 
http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/government-pushes-ahead-with-ngo-law-
48245/ 
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research was towards a doctoral thesis in the UK, not part of an STT project and that 
the researcher was a student, not an STT representative. 
 
Two sites quickly excluded from the case study selection were that of Boeung Kak 
Lake
40
 and Borei Keila.
41
 These two sites were gaining daily media coverage and 
were particularly controversial. As a consequence they were potentially dangerous 
areas to enter as demonstrators were being attacked by public and private police 
forces and illegal detentions and imprisonments were taking place. The decision not 
to contact these sites was made, however their progress was followed closely in the 
media. Instead this research decided to focus sites that had received little or no media 
attention, apart from one: ADB Railway Rehabilitation Project (RRP). The RRP site 
was contacted because of its presentation as a „model‟ resettlement site that others 
may aspire towards. In total three settlements that were facing eviction and four 
resettlement sites were contacted. These sites were selected for their accessibility, 
size, current locations and original locations from the central Khans of Phnom Penh, 
as well as the date of their resettlement. In total 10 sites were contacted but three sites 
could not be distinguished and/or located from surrounding settlement areas. This can 
be a common problem in informal sites, as their growth and population are 
unrestricted and the name either non-existent or not widely known. 
 
Research for this thesis was limited by both time and funding. Therefore rather than 
take random samples or attempt to contact every site, this research recognises that a 
                                                 
40
 Boeung Kak Lake see sections 4.2, 4.3, 5.2 and 5.5. 
41
 For more information on Borei Keila see section 1.2ii; Cambodian Human Rights 
and Development Association ADHOC website: http://www.adhoc-
cambodia.org/?p=1136 
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bias emerged as only settlements identified by STT were contacted, although their 
data set was the most comprehensive in the city. Further, the accessibility of sites, as 
well as the selection of sites with differing criteria could be argued to be problematic. 
However after three failed attempts at identifying and contacting sites, resulting in 
weeks being lost, it was decided that sites would be selected that were known to STT 
staff as accessible and experiencing different degrees of assistance. Further, sites were 
only visited during the mornings and early afternoons and therefore resettlement sites 
in the provinces surrounding Phnom Penh were discarded. This choice was a safety 
precaution as roads were particularly dangerous after dark, but on the advice of STT 
staff that stated that alcohol and drug abuse and domestic violence were a big problem 
amongst the poor, particularly in the late afternoons and evenings. 
 
3.2.iii Presentation of case studies 
Map 9 and Figures 7 - 13 outline the settlements included in the household survey. As 
explained above, due to the complexity and variation of each informal settlement and 
resettlement site, a varied selection was made to gain an understanding of the breadth 
of experience of urban poverty and forced resettlement. Sites CH1, RK1 and RK2 are 
in central Phnom Penh and were contacted due to their being located in desirable parts 
of the city undergoing vast developments. All three sites are facing eviction. R_TK1 
site was chosen as a case study as the residents of this site actively and regularly 
engage with NGOs and the media, as their resettlement was overseen by ADB and 
AusAID through the RRP (ADB website; STT, 2011). Although it should be noted 
that this resettlement site was one of numerous sites created by the ADB‟s RRP. This 
resettlement is portrayed as the model resettlement as families are offered sites with 
state provided sanitation infrastructure in place, water and electricity. However, the 
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project is highly controversial as criticism of the compensation allocations in a report 
by local urban poor NGO STT resulted in their suspension in mid 2011 (STT, 2011). 
R_ME1 resettlement site is the oldest site at over a decade old, whereas the R_ME2 
site was forcibly resettled in 2009, R_ME3 2008-2010 and R_TK1 in 2011. R_ME1 is 
a „forgotten site‟ in the sense that promises of water, sanitation and public electricity 
made by the government have never been fulfilled. As a result, of the 100 plots 
available less than 25 per cent are inhabited. Site R_ME2 is the furthest from Phnom 
Penh at over 50km away. R_ME2 is home to only a single family; the 500 land plots 
available in the site are all but abandoned, leaving the single household feeling 
vulnerable, insecure and exposed. The family feared the local criminal gangs who had 
attempted to kidnap and coerce their son into joining and at the time of contact, were 
being harassed and threatened. The final resettlement site is R_ME3, a different 
resettlement as the three aforementioned, as its location is still relatively close to the 
four central khans and there is a factory nearby. This site was chosen, as it was the 
only example whereby the residents claimed to have benefited rather than lost out 
during the process of resettlement. 
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Map 9. Approximate locations of fieldwork sites (Google, 2014) 
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Fig. 7 Case study site CH1 
 
 
Khan Chamkarmon 
Settlement facing eviction.  
Contacted October 2011 
39/68 (57 per cent) household surveys conducted 
 
 
 
Note: Many community members originate from the former controversial eviction 
sites, Dey Krahom and Koh Pich that were burned to the ground in an apparent arson 
attack. Their houses had been burnt down in a suspicious fire. 
Contacted October 2011  
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Fig. 8 Case study site RK1 
 
 
Khan Russei Keo 
Settlement facing eviction.  
Contacted April 2012 
2/2 (100 per cent) household surveys conducted 
 
 
 
Note: Only 2 households remained after approximately 39 were evicted earlier in the 
month 
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Fig. 9 Case study site RK2 
 
 
Khan Russei Keo 
Settlement facing eviction.  
Contacted April 2012 
5/12 (25per cent) household surveys conducted 
 
 
Note: Formerly relocated from an area 50-100m away, but returned from relocation 
site as site unsuitable for habitation. Currently living immediately behind Chrang Bak 
in the vacant space between the back of the houses and the river. 
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Fig. 10 Case study site R_TK1 
 
 
Khan Pou Senchey 
Relocated September 2011 from Railway line and station in Khan Tuol Kork 
Contacted March 2012 
39/100 (31 per cent) household surveys conducted.  
 
26km from central Phnom Penh 
Resettlement land purchased by the government. 
Infrastructure supported by the government: Electricity, water and toilets  
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Fig. 11 Case study site R_ME1 
 
 
Khan Sen Sok 
Relocated 2001/02 from Tonle Bassac and Bouding area in Khan Chamkarmon. 
Contacted April 2012 
4/28 (14per cent) household surveys conducted  
 
15km from central Phnom Penh 
Resettlement land purchased by the government. 
 
Note: Only 3 relocated families from original 100 remain. Other residents bought 
plots from relocated families. No water, no sanitation, only private electricity.  
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Fig. 12 Case study site R_ME2 
 
 
Kampong Speu Province (No longer in Phnom Penh) 
Relocated 2009 from Khan Steung Meanchey 
Contacted March 2011 
1/1 (100per cent) household surveys conducted 
 
54km from central Phnom Penh 
Land purchased by the Municipality of Phnom Penh. 
 
Note: 504 plots of land marked, however entirely abandoned except for one remaining 
family 
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Fig. 13 Case study site R_ME3 
 
 
Khan Meanchey 
Relocated 2009/10 from Steung Meanchey and Tuol Kork areas. 
Contacted March 2012 
39/120 (27per cent) household surveys conducted 
 
8km from central Phnom Penh 
Land purchased by the Municipality of Phnom Penh  
 
Note: within 100m of a garment factory and excellent transport links 
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3.2.iv Household survey  
A household is a common unit of analysis. However what constitutes a household 
varies across the globe.
42
 In Europe the household is usually a unit used to describe a 
family of immediate relation, occupying a single housing unit. The traditional 
emphasis on the nuclear family that may form an assumption in Europe (although this 
is certainly changing) cannot be applied to other continents. For example the familial 
aspect can be dropped altogether and the emphasis placed upon the housing unit 
rather than the relationships between of those who occupy the unit. Another 
classification of a household could place an emphasis on the arrangement between 
people living together, such as the sharing of food or other goods, which may result in 
multiple households living in a single housing unit. Therefore economic relations 
rather than familial, may be used to define a household. Whereas this research began 
using the terms family and household interchangeably, what constitutes a household 
and or a family in Cambodia are not necessarily the same thing. Whereas Cambodian 
typically families live together in a single housing unit, this frequently includes 
extended family and distant relatives. However, due to high rent prices in Phnom 
Penh, this research occasionally came across multiple families, friends, couples or 
individuals living in a single housing unit and sharing rent, however keeping all other 
expenses separate. Therefore, this research has taken the emphasis on household 
income and expenses as indicating a household, rather than the housing unit or the 
relationships between cohabiters. 
 
                                                 
42
 Discussion of what constitutes a household based around UN Statistics Division 
definition of households and families: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/fam/fammethods.htm 
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As a methodological strategy, a survey may be conducted in a number of ways 
including via the telephone, face-to-face, or left with respondents to fill without the 
presence of the researcher. Surveys can also be designed to respond to a specific point 
in time or be longitudinal. They are able to generate both qualitative and quantitative 
data as well as provide the opportunity for observation and comparison (the good 
research guide, pp. 5 – 12). A semi-structured household survey was chosen as the 
focal research method for this thesis to act as an anchor, grounding the extended 
interviews and life histories in data regarding the everyday lives of the urban poor. 
Surveys were conducted face-to-face to enable the researcher to observe, ask and 
respond to questions from the respondents. 
 
In expectation of collecting both qualitative and quantitative data a semi-structured 
household survey was prepared prior to fieldwork. However after discussion with 
other doctoral researchers in the city, the survey was amended as it was recommended 
from experience, that it was usually acceptable for a survey to take between 30 – 60 
minutes but thereafter respondents would be less willing to respond to questions. The 
survey was therefore designed in two parts .The first section was quantitative with 
primarily tick box or short spaces for responses. This section sought details about who 
lived in the household, details of their education and employment as well as 
household expenditure and access to services. The second half of the survey was 
qualitative and more focused on experiences, responses and opinions of urban 
development. For surveys taking place in resettlement sites a third quantitative section 
was included to collect retrospective data prior to the resettlement process on 
household income and expenditure. This was necessary to evaluate an extra „before 
and after resettlement‟ line of analysis regarding their lives before and after their 
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relocation. Whilst the author undertook extensive language training before fieldwork, 
the household survey was conducted with the assistance of a Khmer research 
assistant. All interviews were audio recorded to allow for subsequent checking of the 
accuracy, quality and consistency of translation as multiple research assistants were 
employed (Berazneva, 2013). All household surveys were conducted with the author 
present except for a small portion of the first case study. It was during the first case 
study site that the decision to allow research assistants to conduct the survey alone 
was take, however this resulted in missed fields and unclear responses. Further, 
important details were often divulged in comments and anecdotes outside of the 
household survey. Therefore after completion of the household survey in the first case 
study site, the decision for the researcher to be present for all household surveys was 
made. 
 
As the linguistic ability of the author strengthened, she was able to follow the survey 
and ask questions to confirm answers. Eventually the researcher was able to conduct 
parts of the survey, which was beneficial for two reasons. First that this built rapport 
with the respondents as communication was made directly with the respondent rather 
than communicate through a third party. Secondly, the researcher was able verify 
answers or ask for further clarification on points of interest more easily. 
 
Surveying households primarily took place in the property itself with the head of the 
household. However, one settlement requested to meet at the Community 
Representative‟s house. This proved to be unfruitful as people waiting to be surveyed 
interrupted the respondent replying to the household survey. It also became evident 
that respondents were omitting certain details or gave different answers to questions, 
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knowing that their neighbours and friends were present. As soon as possible, 
household surveys conducted in this manner ceased. Instead, waiting respondents 
were given numbers and the household surveys were conducted individually in the 
home of the respondent. This is one example of the researcher learning and adapting 
the methodological process to the circumstances presented. 
 
This research aimed complete household surveys with a minimum of 25 per cent of 
households in a site. Initial attempts at random selection were not fruitful as during 
the day people are at work and therefore many of the houses were empty. Instead 
household surveys were conducted with any household in the site who were willing to 
take part. This generally fell between 25-50 per cent of residents per settlement, 
excluding the sit with a single household and site R_ME1, in which only 14 per cent 
of households were willing to take part. A bias mentioned above becomes evident 
here, as sites were visited during daylight hours. Therefore household were all 
members work were excluded, as were households unwilling to partake in the survey 
due to the absence of the head of the household. 
 
When possible, Community Leaders or Representatives were contacted prior to 
beginning the survey. This served not only to introduce the researcher and research 
objectives but also to confirm whether the settlement location and its land registration 
status. How individual households were contacted depended on the organisation of 
the settlement. Where a Community Leader or Community Representative was 
present, they were contacted, usually by telephone and informed about the intended. 
Often the Leader or Representative encouraged residents to take part in my survey. In 
settlements without a formal representative, a site visit was conducted a few days 
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prior to beginning the survey to introduce and explain the research and allow time for 
households to consider whether they would like to take part. A verbal introduction 
was the most effective, as opposed to a written handout, as literacy levels were often 
very low in the sites, whereas word of mouth spread very quickly. Prior to each 
household survey, the researcher repeated the introduction, explained the survey 
process and requested permission to proceed. The survey was only completed in each 
site when all households who were willing to take part had done so. 
 
3.2.v Life histories 
Life histories reveal information about the respondent through their own memory and 
narrative (Thompson, 2000). Life histories are useful at mapping an individual‟s (or 
group, or community‟s) life over time, which can in turn be linked, compared and 
contrasted to social, political or economic events in history (Denscombe, 2010). Life 
histories in his research were used to gain a more detailed understanding of the events 
affecting the lives of poor Cambodians and the opportunities, if any, there have been 
to improve their well-being. Three informants were chosen to conduct in depth life 
history interviews with. These three informants were selected because of their 
willingness to talk and the detailed accounts they gave during the household survey. 
The life histories were loosely guided by a series of prompts, however informants 
were able to tell their own story in their own words. By allowing the informant to 
recall their own life rather than respond to questions, they emphasise the things that 
are most important to them, worry them, or that stand out in their memory. This 
insight is invaluable in understanding the forces and events that have affected the life 
trajectory of members of urban poor settlement sites. By understanding what is 
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important to respondents, whether it is family, health, religion, money, property or 
otherwise, steps that can be taken towards alleviating their concerns can be taken.  
 
3.2.vi Key respondent interviews 
A series of semi structured key respondent interviews with a variety of NGOs and IOs 
operating in Cambodia were organised. Local authorities and Phnom Penh City Hall 
were contacted numerous times, but this research was persistently refused an 
audience, with no reason given. A former District Chief willing to meet and be 
interviewed was found however, upon hearing my refusal by the local authorities. 
Informal meetings were also held with ADB and AusAID representatives. The format 
these interviews took depended on the interviewee and whether the interview was 
taking place in Khmer or English. However, I used semi-structured questions to 
prompt and guide the interview to try and have my questions answered, whilst not 
preventing the respondent from discussing what they believe to be important and 
relevant. 
 
Representatives from the following organisations were interviewed: Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, AusAid, Asian Development Bank, 
Cambodian Labour Federation, Independent Democracy of Informal Economy 
Association (IDEA), Bridges Across Borders Cambodia (BABC) (renamed Equitable 
Cambodia in 2012), Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT), LICADHO, Community 
Managed Development Projects.  
 
Interviews with tuktuk drivers and motodop drivers were also conducted. These 
interviews served two functions in this research. Primarily these interviews were 
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collected to gauge the different perspectives of the public towards on the 
government‟s development plans and attitude towards Phnom Penh‟s urban poor. 
However these interviews have also contributed to the discourse of insecurity and 
informal economy. 
 
3.2.vii Archival research 
To fully understand the complex political and economic context of contemporary 
Cambodia, in-depth archival research was conducted. Archival research can reveal 
and lead to the reconstruction of events that resulted in particular historic events in 
contemporary national and municipal policy and its enforcement. Archival research 
provides an opportunity not only to piece together events and domestic and 
international interests that have created the environment in which evictions take place, 
but is also an opportunity to understand the different perspectives of those being 
evicted, the government and international investors.  
 
There are a number of different libraries, documentation centres and archives to 
choose from in Phnom Penh. Archival research sites visited included CDRI, STT 
library, The National Archives, The National Library, and the JICA library. However, 
access to these archives or to sensitive documents can prove tricky. Whereas 
university libraries, NGO and IO libraries as well a couple of public libraries were 
easily accessible, requesting particular documents within the National Archives in 
relation to UNTAC files, was met with refusal. These files were not yet available 
online and therefore inaccessible otherwise.  
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Much of the Cambodian law is unavailable online or in Khmer script and therefore it 
was essential to locate translated copies of Cambodian land and labour laws. However 
an increasing number of research blogs and processes of archive digitalisation meant 
that the number of resources now available on the internet has increased significantly 
since my last visit to Cambodia in 2010.  
 
3.2.viii Fieldwork summary 
Figure 14 outlines a fieldwork timetable for this research. Doctoral fieldwork was 
conducted between August 2011 and May 2012 in and around Phnom Penh. After a 
period of settling, scoping and networking, seven settlements in total were contacted: 
three sites facing eviction and four relocated sites. 14-100 per cent of households 
were surveyed in all seven sites. Alongside the household survey, three life history 
interviews were conducted and seven shorter interviews with tuktuk drivers. Key 
informants from various stakeholders were interviewed and archival research was 
conducted. Throughout the entire duration of fieldwork, Khmer language lessons 
were attended.  
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Fig. 14 Fieldwork Timetable 
Phase Month Activity 
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August 
2011 
• Arrived in Phnom Penh 18th August. 
• Reconnected with existing personal network and engaged with NGO 
connections initiated earlier in the year by email. 
• Found accommodation and bought a bicycle 
September 
2011 
• Started scoping for potential communities to work with. 
• Began language training with a personal tutor. 
• Met with other Research Students in Phnom Penh to talk about the 
practicalities of fieldwork in Phnom Penh 
• Drafted household survey questionnaire 
• Hired two permanent assistants and three temporary assistants. 
• Decided upon three communities to contact. One community was unsuitable to 
work with; the second could not be located. Successful contact was made with 
the third community in Chamkarmon 
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 October 
2011 
• Visited site three times before beginning survey to become familiar with 
community dynamics.  
• Finalised survey questionnaire for the community. 
• Conducted settlement. 39/68 households completed the survey. 
• Interviewed the Director of Cambodia‟s Informal Economy Trade Union 
• Began archival research 
• Continued language training. 
November 
2011 
• Began inputting data from survey into .xl 
• Conducted two life histories with two key informants from settlement. 
• Continued archival research 
• Conducted interviews with tuktuk drivers. 
• Continued Language training 
 December Back in London 
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January 
2012 
• Began scoping for relocated communities to contact. 
•  Loss of data due to computer malfunction 
• Continued language training 
February 
2012 
• Decided upon four relocated communities to contact to assess suitability for 
interviews. 
• Finalised household survey questionnaire for the relocated communities. 
• Conducted two more interviews with tuktuk drivers. 
• Continued language training 
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March 
2012 
• Contacted the three resettlement sites to survey. Each community took roughly 
one week to survey 25% of households. 
• Contacted relevant government ministries, local authorities to request 
interviews. Access denied. 
• Continue language training. 
April 
2012 
• Surveyed fourth resettlement site. 
• Conducted key informant interviews with NGO workers. 
• Surveyed two settlements facing eviction 
• Continued archival research 
• Continue language training 
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May 
2012 
• Finalised archival research 
• Finished scheduled interviews with NGO workers and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 
• Concluded any remaining interviews and responsibilities. 
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3.3 Problems and practicalities of fieldwork 
Time spent prior to doctoral fieldwork in Phnom Penh, from March to July 2010, laid 
the foundations necessary for conducting research in the city. During this time a 
network of contacts was developed and a familiarity with the city. This prior 
experience was essential in planning fieldwork was scheduled as adaptably as 
possible to accommodate challenges and obstacles. A practical issue unforeseen at the 
time of planning however was transport to settlement sites. The cost of hiring a tuktuk 
or motodop daily for the purpose of fieldwork was impractical due to the large 
distances to travel and difficulties in locating settlement sites. A tuktuk or motodop 
would have to have been hired for the entire day, as there was little chance of finding 
a tuktuk or motodop to travel home from some of the more remote settlements. The 
decision therefore was made to learn to drive a scooter, hire one at $30 per month and 
learn to use a handheld satellite GPS. This decision presented different difficulties and 
dangers as road conditions in the city are variable, traffic is treacherous and the 
scooter was loaded with two persons and the necessary household surveys and 
equipment. Further unforeseen problems at the time of planning were the increasingly 
frequent power surges and power cuts across the city. This led not only to delays in 
completing daily tasks, communications, data inputting and analysis, but the demise 
of a laptop and subsequently the loss of input data. 
 
Whilst most obstacles faced during fieldwork were overcome in one-way or another, 
there were instances that no planning or solution could be found for. An excerpt from 
the author‟s research journal in May reads: 
I‘ve waited for days to speak to the Archivist at the National Archives and upon being 
told of the presence of a full catalogue of UNTAC files, I paid an extremely high fee. I 
was then however denied access to the UNTAC files because they had not been 
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organised in the approximate 20 years since their departure. I offered to organise the 
files myself, free of charge, but was turned away. Around the same time I was trying 
to speak with the Municipality of Phnom Penh regarding their Strategic Development 
Plans for the city. After submitting the appropriate documents and letters in person as 
requested and being approved, I waited for three days in their offices before being 
told I was not granted permission to speak with them. A few weeks later a colleague 
of mine was seen within minutes of submitting his request. I submitted my forms 
again, but have heard nothing back. 
 
The following section outlines conditions and circumstances planned for during 
fieldwork and the advantages of a mixed methods approach, which allowed the 
adaptability to respond to unforeseen events. 
 
3.3.i Field assistants 
Field assistants were recruited through personal and professional networks. Those 
who applied were interviewed to gauge their grasp of English but also their attitude 
towards urban poverty. Some potential assistants were not comfortable talking to the 
poorer residents of Phnom Penh or could not provide sufficient assurance of political 
sensitivity/neutrality. Assistants who demonstrated an understanding of development 
and an interest in the objectives of the research were selected. 
 
Field assistants were trained on the overall research objectives so as to understand the 
context of the household survey. Following this, the entire survey was explained in 
English and Khmer to make certain that field assistants understood the questions and 
used the appropriate words in the field. Often assistants made notes on an extra copy 
of the survey, which they brought with them for clarification, and occasionally 
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suggested different phrasing of question. This input was important for phrasing and 
selecting the appropriate vocabulary. 
 
The survey conducted in the first settlement surveyed was slightly different from the 
following six sites as two and later five assistances were recruited. This was due to 
the time restriction for conducting the survey (only being able to speak with 
respondents on their lunch break from 13:00-15:00). The two initial assistants 
understood the survey in depth and so split and paired with the new assistants to 
create two teams. The new assistants worked alongside the original assistants, as the 
researcher moved in between the teams checking and monitoring their work. Once the 
survey was complete, it was decided against repeating this methodology, despite its 
efficiency. This was due to the numerous errors made on the surveys and the 
importance of being present during each survey so as to be fully aware of each 
respondent‟s unique experiences. Following the first survey the format of the survey 
was also streamlined to make the recording of answers more efficient. 
 
In 2012 a new field assistant was hired, with whom three large settlements were 
surveyed. This continuity was invaluable; however he migrated to Korea in mid-
April. The final three settlements were smaller and surveyed with the same assistant, 
which again brought the benefit of continuity. 
 
Whilst it would have been best practice to have had a single research assistant 
throughout the household survey, this was not possible. However as mentioned above, 
this problem was limited as much as possible through the audio recording of 
interviews and accuracy checking conducted. 
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3.3.ii Language and literacy 
An intensive Khmer language course at the South East Asian Studies Summer 
Institute in Wisconsin-Madison, USA was attended prior fieldwork and language 
tuition continued with a professional language tutor throughout fieldwork. However 
the benefits of language acquisition soon paid off, as the author was able to pose 
questions and understand the answers of respondents and ask subsequent follow up 
questions. Being able to speak Khmer enabled the author to build rapport with 
colleagues and respondents, to follow the surveys, interviews and answers. It also 
meant that details and extra pieces of information outside of the scope of the research 
questions were not lost, which added significant value to the interview process. 
Consequently the benefits of language acquisition were not only invaluable for day-
to-day communication but allowed the researcher to access information that otherwise 
would have gone unrecorded.  
 
However, as in all languages, the numerous different accents, dialects and uses of 
informal language or slang were at times beyond the authors comprehension and 
therefore all research was conducted alongside native Khmer field assistants who 
were able to explain in more depth. In the beginning the input of field assistants was 
essential as it can be considered rude to ask questions of a certain nature directly, 
which may have had an impact on respondents‟ willingness to speak openly. Subjects 
such as divorce, household debt and health are not subjects that can be approached 
„head-on‟. Instead, the survey was restructured and the author worked with the Khmer 
language tutor and field assistants to make the flow of questions more appropriate and 
verbally less abrupt. One such example was the translation of the verb „to be scared‟. 
The objective in this instance was to discover how respondents felt about their 
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forthcoming eviction. Towards this the word „scared‟ had been translated into the 
Khmer word kl‘aatch. This word is inappropriate in this context as it purports to 
feeling spooked or frightened, such as by a ghost. The word p‘hie, meaning to be 
worried, was much more appropriate.  
 
Another problematic linguistic issue occurred early in fieldwork. One of the first 
respondents approached in the first settlement asked what was happening. The field 
assistant answered that she was there to conduct research for the author on „urban 
poor people‟. The respondent was shocked and embarrassed. To have called her 
„poor‟, by association, challenged her dignity and identity. The author apologised in 
Khmer and replied that the research was focusing on urban development. 
 
Relating to the problem of translation, researchers face the question of whether to 
have work translated literally or meaningfully. That is to say, whether the Khmer was 
literally translated and as a result, may occasionally make little sense in English. Or 
whether the meaning of the Khmer was translated and therefore interpreted by the 
translator into English. As the field assistants employed were not professional 
translators they were asked to translate directly from Khmer to English. In the 
knowledge that their vocabulary may not adequately convey the translated meaning, 
this was seen as the most appropriate translation approach. In the event that 
something was unclear, this was discussed with the field assistant or if something 
persisted in being problematic, the Khmer language tutor was hired to translate the 
work professionally. Whilst it would have been desirable for the Khmer tutor to 
translate all of the interviews and work, this was not possible due to his teaching 
commitments. 
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Towards the end of fieldwork, the author considered a change in how the household 
surveys were conducted in order to contact as many settlements as possible. Printing 
and distributing household surveys to settlements, to be filled in independently by the 
households was considered. The survey was modified and amended to become a 
majority of multiple-choice questions with extra pages for open-ended qualitative 
questions. However, after a quick review of already completed surveys and after 
speaking with colleagues, this methodological change was rejected. A large 
proportion of respondents contacted so far were illiterate and there was concern over 
the authenticity of responses as village chiefs vary in their control over the residents 
in their village. It was feared that village chiefs might intervene, edit or censor the 
survey and/or responses. Further, listening and speaking with the respondents one to 
one had allowed great opportunity for clarification and further detail that would be 
missing from these surveys. 
 
3.3.iii Ethics, safety and security 
The ethical component of conducting field research, particularly amongst vulnerable 
people, must be taken into account in every stage of the research process (Wood, 
2006; Cramer, Pottier & Hammond, 2011; Malici & Smith, 2012). The planning, 
execution, analysis and dissemination of results all involve ethical considerations. 
This section outlines these considerations before, during and after fieldwork, however 
there are some common themes that resonated throughout. This fieldwork research 
was conducted at all times within the law. No bribes were paid and no money was 
given to respondents at any time. Research was conducted honestly, transparently and 
considerately. Conclusions have been drawn from fieldwork data and analysis without 
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elimination, manipulation or distortion of results. At all times this research adhered to 
the doctrine of „do no harm‟. 
 
The researcher is a British, white, 26 year old female and was aware that certain ideas 
and expectations would surround her identity: for example, that perhaps she was an 
aid worker, English teacher or a tourist and did not speak Khmer; and/or that she was 
wealthy, would have access to organisations, money, aid, the international media. 
These assumptions may have at times been detrimental to fieldwork as they may have 
altered respondent‟s replies to questions, however they may also have been useful as 
curiosity surrounded the researcher and her presence in an urban poor community. To 
satisfy this curiosity the researcher answered questions as openly as possible, when 
appropriate. Humour was discovered to be a useful tool for breaking down 
assumptions and stereotypes, particularly phrases in Khmer that play with word order 
and syntax. 
 
Prior to commencing a household survey, each site was visited to introduce the 
research, researcher and field assistant to the representative or village chief where 
possible. In the event that the site was not organised as a community, the researcher 
walked around and spoke with residents. This slow introduction to the household 
survey allowed the research objectives to be disseminated by word of mouth and 
allowed the researcher to gauge the plausibility of conducting a survey in the site, 
depending on the response and welcome of site residents. Residents would be 
informed of an approximate household survey agenda and asked what days and times 
would be most suitable for them to take part should they wish to. Upon two occasions 
the conduct of household surveys was helped immensely by the settlement 
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representative and chief with official maps of the area and information about the 
resettlement and development plans. At no point were settlements visited with NGO 
workers or other foreign nationals and at all times it was made as clear as possible 
that no financial or other assistance could be provided. At all times the researcher and 
field assistants were open and honest about their backgrounds and research objectives, 
and were respectful when residents refused to take the survey or answer a particular 
question (Malici & Smith, 2012).  
 
Aware of the saying „time is money‟ and that respondents were willingly offering 
their free time to assist this research, a small gift of gratitude was offered to each 
household. Money was not offered, as this was not a transaction or payment for an 
individuals‟ time. Further the researcher was concerned that money may false 
responses from respondents trying to provide the „correct‟ answer in return for more 
money (Malici & Smith, 2012). The ethical implications of payment were also 
unclear and therefore payment decided against. Further, robbery either of the 
respondents or the researcher was a very real possibility. If it became known that 
relatively large sums of money were being carried, this may have exposed 
respondents or field assistants to potential harm (Malici & Smith, 2012, p.194). 
Instead a gift of gratitude, decided upon after discussion with the Khmer language 
tutor and field assistants, was offered to survey respondents: a krama (traditional 
Khmer scarf), a bar of antibacterial soap and notebooks and pencils to any number of 
children studying in the household (otherwise two notebooks and two pencils). To 
respondents with whom lengthy life history histories were conducted, two packets of 
dried noodles, tinned fish, tinned condensed milk, a krama, antibacterial soap, 
notebooks and pencils were offered. These items were not luxurious gifts but practical 
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items that, despite their low cost, would potentially be unaffordable. The offer was 
occasionally refused, however, when stressed that it was not payment but a gesture, 
the gift was more often than not accepted. In a small number of circumstances, such 
as a household living in extreme poverty, without clothes for the children for 
example, extra kramas and soap were offered. 
 
Personal safety as well as the safety of the respondents and assistants was of utmost 
concern. Everything was done to prevent and pre-empt any problems, however on one 
occasion the author found herself and her assistant in considerable danger. The 
following is an exert from the researcher‟s fieldwork journal from April: 
I was near the completion of my survey in a resettlement site R_TK1. 
Until that moment I had experienced nothing strange and no 
problems. Everyone had been very kind and willing to speak with me. 
I was in the middle of a survey with an older man when I heard a 
walkie-talkie. I hadn‘t seen any walkie-talkies in the site before and 
was a little surprised but not concerned. Shortly after a brief 
exchange with the man‘s wife and an unknown person could be on the 
other end of the walkie-talkie. A woman, I would estimate in her 
thirties, approached my assistant shouting. I couldn‘t follow the 
conversation, but after a heated exchange on her part, my assistant 
and I left the house and returned to our contact in the settlement, the 
community representative.  
 
It transpired that there was a challenge to the community 
representative‘s position within the community, which was seen as 
privileged. There was also a much more serious conflict between the 
newer settlement (NS) that I was surveying and the older settlement 
(OS). The NS was seen as being privileged with toilets, doctors and 
medicine and overall, much better compensation packages than those 
in OS had received. When the NS arrived the OS assumed control 
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over their site however residents of the NS resisted this. The situation 
was made more complicated as the access road to NS branches off of 
the OS access road and so the OS have been blocking access to the 
NS. The chief of OS had connections with the Cambodian People‘s 
Party and abused these connections to block services such as doctors 
and assisting NGOs to NS and steal money from their bill payments 
resulting in the cutting off of electricity and water. In recent weeks 
the chief of OS has apparently become increasingly violent and 
staged road accidents. My contact in the NS had a few weeks earlier 
been pushed from her moto and hospitalised. She lost two toes in the 
‗accident‘.  
 
My presence in the community without asking the permission of the 
chief of the OS, who claimed power over the NS, has resulted in my 
assistant and I being threatened with another ‗road accident‘. As far 
as I knew the settlements were two individual sites and I had seen no 
signs, experienced no difficulties or heard any mention of the conflict. 
Worried for my safety, the community representative of the NS gave 
my assistant and I a 4 moto escorted journey back to the city along an 
alternative road that was much longer, but considered safer. 
 
Months later it was reported that the chief of the OS and his allies, 
whilst drunk, fired shots into the house of the community 
representative and attacked the residents with chains and handmade 
weapons. A number of residents were hospitalised but thankfully the 
NS community representative had heard rumours of the attack earlier 
in the day and moved her family to stay with relatives. 
 
The researcher was deeply concerned that her presence in the site may have 
compromised the safety of my respondents. Had any indication of the conflict been 
made known prior to commencing the survey, the survey would not have been 
conducted. As it transpired, the event took place after more than 30 households had 
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been surveyed and a life history been taken. Despite having been spent over a week in 
the site, not once had any household respondent or the Community Representative 
mentioned any problems with their neighbouring community.  
 
This event raised a number of issues that had not initially been appreciated or 
recognised by the researcher regarding resettlement: the importance of location of the 
site in terms of proximity to other settlements, the apparent inequality in services 
provision, infrastructure and compensation within and between close settlements, and 
the power of local political leaders. As a result of these events, increased checks were 
made with NGOs and colleagues prior to contacting a case study site. However these 
events also added a previously unknown dimension to fieldwork analysis. 
 
Despite taking appropriate vaccinations before departure and medicines during 
fieldwork, the researcher fell ill whilst in Cambodia. Spending long hours under the 
tropical sun in the extreme heat was less of a problem for field assistants but resulted 
in regularly bouts of dehydration, migraines and heat stroke for the researcher. In one 
settlement next to an open sewage canal, the researcher‟s body reacted so badly to the 
heat and unsanitary conditions that a rash broke out and covered her entire body for 
the duration of the survey in that settlement. Stomach pain and general sickness were 
weekly (sometimes daily) occurrences, although this was not unusual amongst the 
expat community who were not as gastronomically resilient as the local population. 
The researcher was however hospitalised twice: once with gastroenteritis and once 
with amoebic dysentery. Bed ridden for a week and suffering fatigue, sickness was a 
further unexpected challenge to this research. Whilst this must be an occurrence 
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experienced by other researchers, no methodology literature was found relating to 
illness and the ability of a researcher to achieve their research agenda. 
 
Whilst every effort was made to build rapport and make respondents feel comfortable, 
there were boundaries that were not cross, however. For example, no alcohol was 
consumed with respondents. Phone numbers were not exchanged and no friendships 
were established with respondents. Despite occasionally persistent questioning, the 
researcher‟s personal life was not discussed in depth nor was her social habits or 
where she lived in the city. This avoided the creation of relationships or feelings of 
dependency or responsibility between the researcher and the respondent.  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The choice of taking a mixed methodological approach to fieldwork was an attempt to 
approach urban labour and land issues from as many angles as possible so as to 
capture its complexity. This also facilitated a flexible, adaptable and responsive 
methodology. Given time and funding constraints, the largest number of case study 
sites possible were contacted and surveyed, in the most robust process possible. The 
following chapters present and triangulate the findings of these household surveys, 
life histories, key respondent interviews and archival research. The analytical 
framework outlined in the introduction is used to challenge preconceptions of urban 
poverty, labour and land issues and identifies the theme of insecurity throughout the 
analysis.  
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4. Who are the urban poor and what resources, networks and mechanisms do 
they rely upon? 
 
 
4.1 Who are the urban poor?  
Poverty is usually characterised as a rural problem in low and middle-income 
countries (Sheng, 2010; Beall & Fox, 2009). While with the rate of urbanisation and 
economic growth may be contributing to the fight against poverty overall, the plight 
of the poor in urban areas is overlooked as poverty manifests itself differently in rural 
and urban settings (Beall & Fox, 2009; Gilbert & Gugler, 1994). Alternative means of 
survival, such as foraging and subsistence agriculture, are unavailable to the urban 
poor (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2013). A cash income is essential as access to food, 
accommodation, transport, water and toilets is commoditised. The necessity of a 
monetary income, poor housing conditions, exposure to crime and violence and 
insecure livelihoods create a particular urban strain of vulnerability different to that of 
rural areas.  
 
The following discussion of data collected during fieldwork is aimed at picking apart 
urban poverty to better understand the reality of urban poor livelihoods and coping 
practices (Goodhand, 2004; Williams & Windebank, 2003). This section will outline 
demographics from three urban settlements facing eviction and four resettlement sites. 
The resettled households provided information regarding their household before and 
after their resettlement. Beginning with a breakdown of the survey and household 
respondents, analysis into household income, expenditure, savings and borrowing, job 
types and other coping mechanisms will be presented. This relates to the second part 
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of the first research question: what resources and mechanisms do they rely upon to 
survive? What emerges are livelihood strategies that are multiple and complex, with 
both formal and informal elements. The empirical findings of this research will be 
situated within academic debates surrounding informal economy and labour 
insecurity. However, without an appropriate term to encompass the complexity 
uncovered, specific to the urban environment, this section will offer a more accurate 
illustration of what the author has termed the urban poor economy. 
 
4.1.i The household survey 
Household surveys were conducted in Phnom Penh from October 2011 to April 2012. 
In total, 122 households were surveyed: 45 households facing eviction from three 
sites in central Phnom Penh and 77 households from four resettlement sites in the 
surrounding area. 
 
These case studies represent the breadth of urban settlements in Phnom Penh as well 
as the various outcomes of forced resettlement. Sites CH1, RK1 and RK2 are sites 
facing eviction, whereas sites R_TK1, R_ME1, R_ME2 and R_ME3 are resettlement 
sites. The circumstances of each site were unique: CH1 site was chosen due to its 
large size and central location. CH1 is located within the central khans of Phnom 
Penh to the south. The site appears to be an island or reclaimed land within a lake and 
is accessed via a single wooden bridge. However the lake is predominantly sewage as 
the city‟s sewage canals run directly into the lake. The sewage canals are open canals 
and treated with chemicals at various points. As a result the water is a deep blue-black 
colour and rubbish thrown into the canals also collects at the site. The smell of rotting 
sewage was so strong it became overwhelming for residents, many of whom suffered 
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headaches and ill health. However this site was centrally located and there was a 
wood workshop onsite, providing opportunities for various manual work and services. 
The site had been earmarked for development, but nothing had been heard by 
residents in regards of their eviction for over two years. As a result many believed it 
would not happen, while others speculated as to when they might be moved and what 
the site might be turned into. Residents had heard rumours of the site becoming a 
water or sewage treatment plant, or a shopping mall. Many residents in site CH1 had 
been previously evicted from other sites in Phnom Penh, most commonly from Koh 
Pich, an island adjacent to the city, after the Koh Pich fire of 2001.
43
 This 
phenomenon of households and individuals experiencing multiple evictions will be 
raised at length in the discussion of experiences of resettlement later in this chapter. 
 
RK1 and RK2 were chosen as central sites earmarked for development. The sites 
were roadside to the north of the city, beyond the Cambodia-Japan Friendship Bridge. 
Although not strictly in the central four khans, the sites were close to the heart of 
Phnom Penh, Wat Phnom. However, RK1 had partially been evicted prior to our 
arrival, the respondents that remained informed the author that they had been allowed 
to remain as they had paid the police high sums of money. Residents in site RK2 were 
the remaining residents of another eviction a few hundred metres away. The RK2 
respondents had been left off of the compensation and resettlement lists, for reasons 
unknown to them. Therefore as they had not been resettled, they decided to stay. 
However their homes had been completely destroyed and the land fenced off. With 
little alternative, they grouped together and were living on the riverbank. Despite the 
                                                 
43
 See local urban NGO, STT‟s „Facts and Figures‟ report here: http://www.adhoc-
cambodia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/STT-Resettling-Phnom-Penh-Facts-and-
Figures-December-2012.pdf 
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inevitable rise of the river in just a few months, residents had built homes and laid a 
concrete path.  
 
Site R_TK1 was selected as it was a large site and the resettlement had been 
organised by AusAID and the ADB. The residents of R_TK1 were evicted and 
resettled as a result of the Rehabilitation of the Railways Project coordinated by the 
ADB and AusAid. This relocation site was supposed to set the example for 
resettlement projects in the country, however it has faced enormous criticism from 
residents, Cambodian and International NGOs (STT, 2011; Amnesty, 2011).  
 
R_ME1 is an older resettlement site, selected to illustrate the failure of development 
policies and plans to materialise. This site was promised state connections to water 
and electricity as well as proper roads. None of these have transpired and residents 
had little hope of seeing improvements any time soon. 
 
R_ME2 is a resettlement site of over 500 plots, over 50km away from Phnom Penh. 
However R_ME2 was abandoned by all but one family. The site was considered too 
far to commute to Phnom Penh, with no markets, schools, labour opportunities or 
even a water supply close by. It was chosen to illustrate the abandonment of 
unsuitable resettlement sites. 
 
Finally R_ME3 is a resettlement site close to the city, within 100m of a garment 
factory with good roads and markets, health centres and schools nearby. This site was 
chosen as it showed the maintenance or potential improvement in livelihoods and 
wellbeing that is considered to be an essential part of the resettlement process. 
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Fig. 15 Case study summary 
Site Ref Status Distance from Wat 
Phnom (km) 
No. Households 
Surveyed 
 
% 
CH1 Facing eviction 6.5 39/68 57% 
RK1 Facing eviction 2 2/2 100% 
RK2 Facing eviction 2 5/20 25% 
R_TK1 Resettlement site 26 39/126 31% 
R_ME1 Resettlement site 15 4/20 20% 
R_ME2 Resettlement site 54 1/1 100% 
R_ME3 Resettlement site 8 32/120 27% 
 
Figure 15 shows the percentage of households surveyed from each site, their eviction 
status and distance from Wat Phnom. Wat Phnom, the pagoda sharing the same name 
as the city, has been taken as the marker form which distance is measured due to its 
central location and cultural importance. These distances have been mapped (see Map 
7) and what is immediately observable is that some of these sites are a considerable 
distance, over 50km, from the city. The location of sites is important as this affects 
commuting costs. Costs and distance will be discussed in detail below, however to 
illustrate the point, 1 litre of petrol in Phnom Penh costs roughly $1.25 and covers 
25km economically. If a site is 25km from Phnom Penh, at least $2.50 is required 
simply to cover the cost of petrol to go to and from the city. Construction workers and 
motodop drivers earn roughly $2.50 - $3.75 per day. Therefore construction workers 
or motodop drivers who live 25km from Phnom Penh would potentially earn $0-$1.75 
per day, allowing for the cost of petrol for their commute. The actual profit of a 
motodop driver would be in fact far less if we consider motodop drivers require more 
petrol to drive their customers around within the city. 
 
As well as household data, information on all household members was collected 
including age, gender, marital status, education status and income contributed to the 
household. As a result, this section will present data on 122 households and 670 
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household members identified and willing to partake in the survey. Gaps in 
information are evident in a small number of instances. This is as a result either of 
hesitance on the part of the respondent to reply to a question, in which case the 
variable was left blank or poor wording of the first household survey draft, for 
example requesting „relationship to the respondent‟ which does not indicate gender. 
 
Map 10. Approximate locations of fieldwork sites and key (Google, 2014) 
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4.1.ii Household respondents 
Household surveys were conducted by speaking with a household respondent. 
Typically this was the head of the family (Khmer: Mae Krusah), an elder of the Mae 
Krusah or the spouse of the Mae Krusah. In this survey, 87 per cent of respondents 
were female and only 13 per cent were male. The status of Mae Krusah is not 
necessarily restricted to men, as 34 per cent of female respondents were considered to 
be the Mae Krusah. This is in contrast to household and family studies, which 
routinely place a male figure as the head of a household in Cambodia (McKenzie-
Pollock, 2005). Nor can it be assumed that females take on the role of Mae Krusah 
only in the absence of a male, as 28 per cent of female Mae Krusah were married, 17 
per cent were divorced, 53 per cent were widowed and only one was unmarried. On 
the other hand 100 per cent of male Mae Krusah were married. This challenges the 
understanding that women only take over as head of the household in the absence of a 
male, in circumstances such as in times of conflict or as a result of genocide (Kumar, 
2001). 
 
All respondents were over 18, the average age of respondent being 44 years old. 71 
per cent were literate. Of this 71 per cent, 48 per cent had stopped education at 
primary level, 23 per cent had attended some secondary education and one respondent 
had attended university. Of the illiterate respondents (29 per cent) all but one was 
female. However, the university-educated respondent was also female. Education will 
be discussed, amongst other things, in the next section with the larger household 
member statistics. 
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4.1.iii Household members 
693 household members were recorded in the household survey. However, some 
individuals requested that their information not be included and therefore the 
following information concerns the 670 whose consent was granted. Some 
information is missing, for example when the age or education level of a household 
member is unknown. This is often due to extended family members and friends living 
within a household. However, for 11 individuals the gender was not noted. Instead 
„friend‟ or „relative‟ was entered on the form. This is likely due to the earliest survey 
having a „relationship to the respondent‟ question rather than a specific gender 
question for household members. Occasionally it was possible to listen back to the 
audio recordings and clarify information, however as Khmer names are not 
necessarily indicative of gender this was not always possible. Therefore, whilst the 
information of all consenting household members has been included wherever 
possible, in a small number of cases it is missing and has been indicated as such. 
 
Of the 670 household members, 53 per cent (355) were female, 45 per cent (304) 
were male and 2 per cent (11) did not have their gender specified. Figure 16 shows 
the literacy levels by gender. We can see that whilst 79 per cent of females and 89 per 
cent of males are literate, female illiteracy figures (21 per cent) are almost double that 
of male illiteracy levels (11 per cent) which are nonetheless, still significant. Figure 
16 also indicates that whilst the majority of male and females attend primary school, 
the numbers drop drastically for secondary education: only 20 per cent of female 
household members had received some secondary education and 27 per cent of males. 
However this is not indicative of the household member having completed their 
primary or secondary education, only that they received some schooling at that level. 
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Fig. 16 Education levels by gender (%) 
 
 
The variables of primary, secondary and university education were recommended 
after consultation with a current teacher, as these categories would be understood by 
Cambodians despite the changes in education system in the years during and after 
conflict. The former education system, based upon the French model implemented 
during the early 20
th
 century, had been deconstructed under the Khmer Rouge and 
teachers deliberately targeted for extermination. Throughout the 1980s the education 
system in Cambodia mirrored that of the Vietnamese system, likely due to their 
presence in the country, but was restricted in scope by political disagreement as to the 
appropriate curriculum. The education system was reformed with the early 
development plans after the presence of UNTAC in the early 1990s. A further system 
of informal education is acknowledged by UNESCO but not accounted for by the 
RGC. This relates to preparation for schooling via teaching at home.  
 
At present the government oversees a dual system of formal and non-formal 
education (NFE) through the Ministry of Education (UNESCO, 2010). The formal 
education structure is that of primary, secondary and higher education run by schools 
and institutes supported by the government, for which students pay subsidised fees. 
Teachers at these institutions receive their wage from the state. Despite it‟s name, 
NFE is considered an official avenue of education by the government as they 
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recommend a curriculum and offer guidelines. Apart from this, responsibility for 
providing education is held by a third party. These third parties are commonly a local 
or international NGO, a community scheme or classes conducted by Monks and Nuns 
at the local pagoda. NFE is relied upon to provide education for the poor and 
disadvantaged, minority groups and those aged 15 – 45 (RGC National Policy on 
Non-Formal Education, 2002). Whilst there are the formal and NFE policies in place, 
education in Cambodia faces many obstacles including corruption, low teacher wages, 
limited resources, migration and seasonal work (UNESCO, 2010). 
 
One respondent, a teacher, discussed at length the problem facing the Cambodian 
formal education system. He stated that teachers are paid so poorly that they run extra 
classes and charge students a premium for these extra classes. To make sure all 
students pay for extra classes, only half the curriculum is taught in normal teaching 
hours. Therefore these extra classes are not added support for students, but are in fact 
half of the curriculum. This practice was widespread he claimed and posed further 
problems. The teacher who was considered to be more senior had the monopoly on 
extra classes. Therefore as a more junior member of teaching staff, he was unable to 
benefit from giving tutorials and subsequently was unable to supplement his income 
and unable to support his young family.  
 
One of the tuktuk drivers interviewed, Tom, commented on corruption within the 
public school system from the perspective of a parent, but also revealed another issue 
facing graduates who wish to become teachers in the capital:  
The public school, a lot of corruption. pay 1000KHR per day to public teacher, but 
private education cost the same! Just pay at the end of the month. Teacher in Phnom 
Penh can earn more but if a teacher graduate wants to stay in Phnom Penh, has to 
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pay $10,000 if you want to stay. Otherwise you go to Koh Kong! Preah Vihear! 
(Provinces very far from the capital). Yeah sure. Corruption, sure! Pay $10,000 USD 
to Ministry of Education. Got to clean from top down. Like sweeping steps. Clean the 
bottom, just gets dirty from the top. If you have money you have everything 
 
Tom knew of the corruption facing new teachers as his nephew had graduated and 
wanted to teach in Phnom Penh, but could not afford to pay $10,000 USD to the 
Ministry of Education. In his analogy that follows, „like sweeping steps‟, Tim refers 
to the need to tackle corruption from the top, rather than the bottom: If one sweeps the 
bottom step first, dirt from the steps above will fall on it as they are cleaned. If you 
sweep the top step first however, all the steps will be cleaned. Therefore, tackling 
corruption amongst teachers is futile if corruption remains in the Ministry of 
Education. 
 
Other education issues to consider are that of the quality of education and cheating 
amongst students in school. This has recently come to the media‟s attention as after a 
recent crackdown on students cheating in exams led to 70% of students failing their 
year 12 exams in 2014. Year 12 exams are the Cambodian equivalent to the UK A-
Level examinations and determine a student‟s entrance to university. Of the 90,000 
students who took the test, only 11 were awarded an A. This comes in contrast to the 
80% of students who passed their exams in 2013 (Guardian, 2014; Radio Free Asia, 
2014; Phnom Penh Post, 2014). The failure of schooling attendance or presence of a 
school certificate to guarantee an education is extremely problematic for collecting 
data on this subject. This research however proceeds on the basis on the information 
offered by respondents was not given in order to benefit themselves financially or 
otherwise, and therefore unlikely to prompt exaggeration. 
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4.1.iv Rural-urban migration 
Fig. 17 Provincial Origins of Household Respondents 
 
 
Figure 17 displays the provincial origins of household respondents. Of the 122 
households surveyed, only 15 per cent of respondents were originally from Phnom 
Penh. The remaining 85 per cent had migrated to the capital. 62 per cent of those from 
outside Phnom Penh came from the provinces immediately East and North East of the 
capital, between Phnom Penh and Vietnam: Kandal (12 per cent), Prey Veng (14 per 
cent), Svay Rieng (20 per cent) and Kampong Cham (16 per cent). Migrants from as 
far away as Battambong (4 per cent) in North West Cambodia were also included in 
the survey. Respondents commonly stated the reason for their migration to the city 
was to earn more money to support their families in the provinces. A tuktuk driver 
interviewee described the draw of the city: 
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You know in Cambodian countryside is very hard to find a job. But you know if you 
want to make a business in the countryside you cannot, old people they start before 
you, the business already there, it is hard to get business from them… If you come 
from the countryside, you know if you want to rent apartment close to the city, 
expensive, if you go outside to suburb is ok. Some people come from the countryside 
can rent small room 2.5x2.5m room, near airport. Share bathroom, around $15-30 
USD per month. Especially for garment factory. Eat not so good, where they live 
pollution, noisy, dirty, but no choice. No choice. Debt? Die? Miserable? Which you 
chose? You choose miserable. 
 
Migration to the city is also seasonal as people live in the city and return home to the 
provinces during rice planting and harvesting times. However another interviewee 
described that this the reverse is also true, that people who live in the countryside 
come to the city for work for a couple of weeks at a time: 
If someone sleeping in his tuktuk, he is from countryside. His family in countryside 
and maybe he comes for two three weeks and goes home. But it is not good sleep. So I 
can say all the driver of tuktuk around 90% from provinces so after the collect and 
cut the rice, they go and come and work. You know in Phnom Penh around 2.5million 
so the real Phnom Penh people around 30-40% but 60-70% from province and come 
but driver a tuktuk, 90% from countryside. Depend on the driver, house in the 
countryside, after tuktuk driving job he go home feed the pig, chicken, grow rice. A lot 
of local jobs in the countryside. 
 
The interviewee here has described how people avoid paying for accommodation by 
sleeping in their tuktuks. Therefore they are able to save as much money as possible 
and return home with supplementary income. 
 
There was an overwhelming sense that many respondents did not like the city and 
would, if they had the choice, return to their families and homes in the countryside. 
This speaks to the importance of the family as a means of support, but also identity, 
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pride, safety and strength in Cambodian society (McKenzie-Pollock, 2005). The same 
interviewee quoted above, stressed his desire to return to the countryside despite 
earning good money in the capital: 
I don‘t like to live in Phnom Penh but I have no choice. For me I want to have a house 
near a local market in the province. I want my wife to have a stall in the market, but 
in the province not in Phnom Penh, it is too big for me here. You know the market in 
countryside is not to big, is small, you want to relax, you want breeze... I can drive 
easily, play volleyball. This is what I done when I was young. In Phnom Penh I don‘t 
have a choice. In future maybe I sell my house and I build local house and then I can 
open a farm behind my home and in front my home I can sell groceries with my wife, 
or I can repair motorbike. This is what I want. I don‘t like competitive job. For the 
city when you are young, happy place, disco, but when you have family, you are 
thinking man, you‘re a husband and father.  
 
 
4.2 What resources and mechanisms do they rely upon to survive? 
This section takes a closer look at individual job types and the urban poor economy. 
The relevance of the term urban poor economy will be reinforced through engaging 
with debate surrounding the informal economy and the presentation of job types and 
income data. Job vulnerability and insecurity will be addressed and the case for the 
term urban poverty reiterated. The presence of what the author has termed horizontal 
regulation will also be demonstrated through qualitative analysis. Moving on from the 
individual level, household income will be looked at including expenditure and prices, 
alternative sources of livelihood support, and saving and borrowing. Data from all 
seven sites will be presented to demonstrate the disparity between sites. The obvious 
line of comparison is that of sites facing eviction and those in resettlement sites, 
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however variations within these groups will be highlighted and suggestions for 
influential factors identified.  
 
4.2.i The informal economy and decent work  
This section will develop on the informal economy discussion begun in the 
introduction. Relevant academic debate relating to current discussions of labour, 
insecurity and informal economy will be addressed, followed by ILO definitions of 
informal economy and associated terms. Crucial to this are the ILO Decent Work 
Agenda, which will be addressed using the case study of the ILO Better Factories 
Cambodia programme. 
 
The informal Economy 
The term „informal economy‟ first emerged in the early 1970s in Hart‟s article on 
Ghanaian informal income opportunities in the Journal of Modern African Studies, 
and the joint UNDP and ILO report on employment and inequality in Kenya. Both 
texts challenged the Marxist idea of a surplus of unemployed people, the „reserve 
army‟ (Hart, 1973; Denning 2010). The informal economy did not disappear with the 
growth of capitalism and mechanisation, as many foretold it would, instead the 
informal economy expanded and permeated every country across the world (Harriss-
White, 2010). Since this realisation in the 1970s, the informal economy became an 
umbrella term for all kinds of economic activity outside the taxed and regulated 
formal state economy. Precisely because such activities are by definition beyond the 
reach of official regulations and statistical and fiscal monitoring, it is inherently 
difficult to secure reliable quantitative estimates of the scale and scope of „informal‟ 
economic activities. However, despite its extensive use, definitions are vague and 
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have been criticised as offering little analytical purchase (Oberai, 1993; Godfrey et. 
al, 2001; Rizzo, 2002).  
 
Whilst there has been a departure from the constraints of a binary approach to the 
informal economy which is outlined below shortly in discussion relating to the ILO‟s 
Decent Work Agenda, the term persists in scholarship as academics acknowledge its 
short comings but grapple with how people operate outside of state regulation, what 
this means, how it presents in countries transitioning from war to peace and what the 
consequences of these unregulated economic practices might be for development. In 
this regard it is useful to review the literature of how unregulated economic practices 
are conceptualised and how these conceptualisations might relate to the Cambodian 
context. This discussion sets the scene for the urban specific angle offered in this 
thesis, which calls for an understanding of the urban poor economy. 
 
Unregulated economies are complicated in peacetime but even more so in the context 
of a country undergoing a transition out of armed conflict such as Cambodia was 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s due to the necessary disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration of troops, refugees and internally displaced persons who require 
employment and homes (del Castillo, 2010). The subdivisions of combat, shadow, 
coping and economies have been offered by Goodhand (2004) to understand how 
informal economies and their actors behave in the specific context of armed conflict, 
reconstruction and state building. The combat economy refers to economic resources, 
their production, allocation and mobilisation, aimed at disempowering particular 
groups within a conflict. The shadow economy speaks to economic activity 
unregulated by state institutions and finally the coping economy encompasses 
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population groups who „cope‟ i.e. survive through diverse livelihood strategies aimed 
at maintaining their asset base. However Williams and Windebank, in their book 
„Poverty and the Third Way‟ (2003), argue that an ability to „cope‟ is not determined 
simply by household economic inputs and outputs. For example two identical 
households may have the same income, but one has the support of support of a family 
member to care for their children whereas the other has to pay for childcare, therefore 
creating an extra expense (Williams & Windebank, 2003, p. 79). Instead, our analysis 
of whether a household can „cope‟ or not, must take into account the ability of the 
household to call upon services or acquire the goods they deem necessary (Williams 
& Windebank, 2003, p.80). Williams and Windebank refer to this as coping 
capability (2003), emphasising outputs and an ability to complete work, rather than 
simply measuring household income to understand poverty. Williams and Windebank 
place wellbeing and the ability to meet needs and desires on an equal level with 
providing food and shelter for a household. Taken prima facie this understanding of 
alternative means of supporting household income through means other than income 
is relevant to the objective of this research. It is exactly the non-monetary factors that 
are overlooked, but essential in our understanding of urban poor lives and their 
wellbeing, which are disregarded in much academic and policy related discussion of 
the informal economy.  
 
However Williams and Windebank‟s inclusion of desires in the coping capabilities 
may stretch a little too far, as the presence of carpet in a home or the whether or not 
an individual has two pairs of outdoor shoes  (2003, p. 81), goes beyond that of 
„coping‟ and into the realm of „luxury‟. People from all walks of life have unfulfilled 
desires, such a new kitchen or a foreign holiday once a year, but this does not indicate 
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that an individual is living in poverty. Rather, the political economy approach to 
urban poverty pursued by this research combines the importance of the diversity of 
livelihood strategies identified by Goodhand‟s coping economy with the significance 
of non-monetary factors and the ability to acquire what households deem necessary, 
from Williams and Windebank‟s coping capabilities 
 
Unregulated economic activity can have a positive presence by providing a supportive 
network and essential goods during and after a conflict. Social and household 
economic practices, non-monetary exchanges between small personal networks, 
(Wallace & Latcheva, 2006; Pugh, 2004) become lifesaving during a transitional 
context to create the coping economy, filling legitimate deficits in social welfare 
under a weak state. Attempting to wipe out or regulate these kinds of practices, which 
have been criticised as undermining the state by increasing corruption and 
exploitation (Wallace & Latcheva, 2006; Pugh, 2004), could be devastating to poor 
and or remote communities, as this would take away the safety net of those who are 
most vulnerable. The removal of the coping economy would eliminate social-welfare 
elements that a weak state simply cannot provide (Pugh, 2004).  
 
Taking analysis further along the trajectory of development, from transitioning 
economies to economies in developmental states, issues may arise when essential 
coping/informal economic practices become consolidated beyond that of survival and 
begin to undermine the legitimacy of the state or formal state economy, such as 
through tax evasion. A-legal practices (a-legal, as opposed to illegal due to a lack of 
jurisdiction or law rather than breaking the law) may become illegal once regulatory 
institutions, rules and laws are formed; making practices illegal that may have 
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previously existed in an a-legal economy. Wallace and Latecheva, whilst 
acknowledging the genuine supportive role social and household economies can play, 
argue that black economies (criminal and corrupt activity outside of the formal 
economy) erode confidence in the state and public institutions, and also increase the 
perception of corruption (2006). Affecting public spending by lowering the tax intake, 
distorting government figures for employment income and consumption (Schneider & 
Enste, 2000), so-called black economy activity can undermine a fragile government 
and increase the risk of a return to conflict. It has been argued, however, that 
unregulated economies can actually have a laundering effect; forcing a corrupt formal 
economy to reform as persons launder their money, by-passing the added cost of 
bribery and private accumulation via incorrupt informal economic practices and 
therefore mitigating government induced distortions to enhance formal state economic 
activity (Pil Choi & Thum, 2005). Whilst both are plausible occurrences and perhaps 
applicable in other transitioning states, the corruption and nepotism that plagues 
Cambodia has been institutionalised both locally and nationally. The coping economy 
(Goodhand, 2004) or safety nets (Pugh, 2004) form an essential mechanism of 
survival for Cambodians and extend beyond a transition from war to peace. They 
become normalised means to support a household, external to state mechanisms or 
initiatives (Goodhand, 2004‟ Pugh, 2004; Rizzo, 2002). These unregulated economic 
coping practices during times of peace are more commonly referred to as the informal 
economy. However in peacetime or conflict, these informal coping mechanisms 
resonate insecurity. 
 
Lyons and Snoxell (2005) highlight just how insecure informal economy workers are 
through their research into informal traders‟ ability to withstand „shocks‟ through 
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social capital. Social capital is a popular but difficult to define term, resting upon the 
assumption that social, political and economic networks are important for desirable 
outcomes (Fine & Lapavitsas, 2004). For example, colleagues, friends or family may 
be able to provide financial, political or personal assistance in a time of need. Social 
capital is problematic, however the focus of this thesis is on another part of Lyons and 
Snoxell‟s article, the presence of „shocks‟. These shocks may be national issues such 
as currency devaluation, but may also be individual issues such as a family member 
falling ill, forced displacement or the death of a family member. An example of a 
shock identified in my research was the changing of utilities payments. Payments for 
electricity could be paid weekly or monthly. This was within the saving capacity of 
the respondents. After resettlement, however, electricity bills were ordered to be paid 
quarterly. Saving for three months electricity was beyond the capacity of respondents 
and, as a result, many had had their electricity cut off. A village chief who had taken 
responsibility for all payments to the electricity company exacerbated the situation. 
The chief not only failed to pay their bills on time, but squandered the electricity 
money on alcohol. He was however powerful, aligned with the local authorities and 
not afraid to use violence against the residents. 
 
For Lyons and Snoxell the ability to create and enhance social capital is one 
mechanism for surviving such shocks. They also correctly identify female informal 
traders as particularly exposed, as women make up a higher percentage of workers in 
the informal economy according to the ILO (2002). Yet for Lyons and Snoxell the 
informal economy is once again limited to traders and little attention is paid to the 
other forms of economic activity within the informal economy. In denying the 
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complexity of the informal economy, Lyons and Snoxell advocate the notion that 
informal economies hinder economic progress. 
 
Breman describes another aspect of insecurity for informal economy workers: 
perpetual mobility (Breman, 2004: p. 232). Developments in transport and transport 
infrastructure have resulted in workers not only migrating internally but 
internationally. Further, in 1995 the World Bank‟s World Development Report 
declared that the informal sector was not a cause of, but a solution to poverty (World 
Bank 1995). By abandoning the formal sector and low employment figures, the Bank 
advocated informal employment as the best means of guaranteeing employment 
friendly growth (Breman, 2004: pp. 236-7). This, Breman argues, increases the 
vulnerability and migration of informal sector workers as a consequence of exposure 
to the global economy, thereby creating a free for all (1996, p.12).  
 
The scale of labour insecurity became evident during the lengthy discussions with 
household members when asked about their jobs and how often they worked. Often 
respondents were unable to give even approximations of how may times a week or 
month they might work, as they simply could not say. They might work two or three 
days on week, five days the next, but only a single days work for two weeks. In these 
circumstances, the most recent week or month was taken for the survey. Similar 
issues arose when trying to estimate wages. A successful day for some sellers may see 
them earn $5 USD, however some days they might make a loss. Often they were 
unable to explain the reason behind this variation. Occasionally, one respondent 
explained, that this was down to circumstances out of their control, such as poor 
quality produce bought at the wholesale market. Poor quality produce may come 
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about after a bad harvest or if fresh vegetables are bruised and damaged in transit as a 
result of not being packed sufficiently. This leaves street sellers in a predicament as to 
whether to buy damaged goods or go a day without an income. However having 
already spent money for transportation to the wholesale market, they are already at a 
loss. Reluctantly they buy poor quality vegetables to sell, knowing that they will 
likely lose money that day.  
 
The most precarious circumstances were those from respondents completing manual 
labour tasks in R_TK1. Both males and females loaded and unloaded 25-60kg rice 
sacks from trucks. Workers in this instance waited by the side of the road to be picked 
up by the trucks if they were needed. Sometimes the trucks arrived three times per 
week, sometimes they didn‟t appear for two weeks. Due to their resettlement location, 
far away from main roads and with little passing traffic, it was unlikely that they 
would find any other labour opportunities. 
 
Poor health was a contributing factor to labour insecurity. On the most basic level, 
many of the respondents and their families do not have shoes meaning that not only 
are small cuts prolific, but these cuts are open to infection. In site CH1 in southern 
Phnom Penh, many women complained of headaches and illness. This may be a result 
of living over and next to open sewage in 40-degree heat. A life history given by a 
respondent in CH1, named Srey for the purposes of this research, explained how ill 
health stopped her from working and had lost her a training contract to be a 
pharmacist‟s assistance and a much sought after garment factory job, as her headaches 
and stomach aches were so painful she could not attend work regularly.  
I started working as a cleaner in a health centre. I knew someone who already 
worked there and they got me the job. When I was working there I began to help the 
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Pharmacist at the centre and after a while, he offered to pay for me to train to become 
a pharmacist assistant. I wanted to be a pharmacist assistant so much! But I couldn‘t. 
I get so sick with intestinal problems and stomach problems that I could not work 
regularly. I have to go to hospital to have injections in my stomach. I also think too 
much and because of this I get sick. When we have money I feel ok, but when we have 
no money, this is the time when I get sick. I had to stop my work at the health centre 
because I could not go in regularly. Later I got a job at a garment factory, but I could 
only work for two weeks. The conditions were so difficult and I became sick again. In 
the garment factory if your job requires you to stand, you have to stand all day. If 
your job needs you to sit, you have to sit all day. It is not good for your health. There 
are artificial bright lights and no fresh air, only air conditioning, which makes you 
sick. Now, when I am feeling well, I sell snails and shells to eat from a cart along the 
street. But some days I am too sick to do this. When I am sick for a long time but need 
money, I make and sell borbor (rice porridge). 
 
In her account Srey describes the arduous conditions of garment factory workers and 
the different labour opportunities open to her, however also how her poor health has 
affected her job prospects and ability to keep a regular job. Srey describes how at 
times of low income, her illness becomes worse. Whereas Srey experiences 
unemployment as a result of ill health, the sudden ill health of a family member, a 
health „shock‟ can lead to the impoverishment of an entire family. A recent study 
from China on health payment-induced poverty investigated the financial impact of a 
health „shock‟ to find the consequences are catastrophic and equivalent to a poverty 
trap (Yang, 2014). . The WHO‟s 1999 report, „Labour market changes and job 
insecurity: a challenge for social welfare and health promotion‟, found that not only 
was ill health a problem for job security, but job insecurity was a major contributor to 
ill health. R. Moynihan writing in the British Medical Journal in 2012 emphasized 
that chronic job insecurity is more dangerous to an individual‟s health than 
unemployment. Both texts argue that increased job security is not only being good for 
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production rates and profit, but is highly beneficial to an employee‟s health. However, 
insecurity and informality too often go hand in hand. 
 
The Decent Work Agenda 
A shift towards recognising the variation within the informal economy took place in 
1999 at the International Labour Conference with the paper titled „Decent Work‟ 
(ILO, 1999). This was further developed in reference to the informal economy with 
the paper „Decent Work and the Informal Economy‟ (ILO, 2002). Emerging from this 
recognition of the diversity of the informal economy and the continued ambiguous 
use of the term, the Decent Work Agenda (DWA) was set. The DWA aims to put into 
action the goal of the ILO, to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain 
decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human 
dignity (ILO, 2006, p. 3), through the implementation of four key objectives: 
1. Employment - opportunities for employment, investment, entrepreneurship and 
development in the aim of creating sustainable livelihoods. 
2. Rights - establishing or reinforcing labour laws that recognise and respect workers 
rights, in particular for the poor and disadvantaged. 
3. Social Protection - ensuring working conditions are safe including the provision of 
breaks and length of working hours, access to healthcare and compensation for loss 
of income as well as respect for family and social values. 
4. Representation - allowing and facilitating workers and employers organisations 
and dispute resolution mechanisms. (ILO website, Decent Work Agenda)
44
 
 
The DWA set the ball rolling for a new approach to informal workers and informal 
economies, taking into account the nature of employment as well as work within 
formal and informal enterprises. As a result the ILO works with a variety of 
                                                 
44
 Available here: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--
en/index.htm 
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terminology relating to informal workers, places of work and means of employment. 
These include: 
1. The informal sector: production and employment that takes place in small  
unincorporated or unregistered enterprises. 
2. Informal employment: employment without social insurance/protection that takes  
place in both the informal and formal sector. 
3. The informal economy: all units, activities and workers defined above and their  
outputs.
45
 
This breakdown is further detailed by dividing informal employment into two 
categories: informal self-employed and informal wage employment. The informal 
self-employed includes employers in informal enterprises, contributing family 
workers, members of informal producers cooperatives and own account workers 
(Chan, 2012, p. 7). Informal waged employees are those working without social 
insurance or protections that are usually associated with formal contracted 
employment. Work that falls under this category includes domestic workers, manual 
labour, part-time workers, undeclared and unregistered workers (Chan, 2012, pp. 7-8). 
 
The ILO‟s DWA is informed by this more detailed understanding of informality in the 
workplace, defining „decent‟ work as follows: 
Decent work… sums up the aspirations all people have for their working lives; for 
work that is productive, delivers a fair income with security and social protection, 
safeguards basic rights, offers equality of opportunity and treatment, prospects for 
personal development and the chance for recognition and to have your voice heard.
46
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 Informal sector defined at the 1993 ICLS, informal employment defined at the 2003 
ICLS and the informal economy definition from Chan WIECO working paper, 2012, 
p. 8. 
46
 Quote taken from ILO website‟s Decent Work page available here: 
http://www.ilo.org/asia/decentwork/lang--en/index.htm 
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The ILO goes on to state that decent work is central to poverty alleviation efforts and 
ultimately is the foundation of peace and security in society. As a result the DWA has 
become part of the Millennium Development Goals and informed the recent World 
Development Report  (WDR) 2013 titled „Jobs‟. 
 
The WDR Jobs report builds on the foundation of the DWA by identifying the 
importance of jobs and job creation for development as well as self-esteem and 
happiness (WDR 2013, p.2). The report explores how job creation can be encouraged, 
such as through education or on the job training; whether or not improvements in 
industry in one country will come at the cost of jobs in another country; how people 
and jobs are able to withstand „shocks‟, and how workers can be reallocated from 
areas of low productivity to greater productivity are addressed. The report identifies a 
typology of challenges facing jobs and development, highlighting the different issues 
facing agrarian and urbanizing countries, youth unemployment and aging societies, 
resource rich nations and small island nations and conflict affected areas.  
 
Despite its length and breadth, however, the starting points of reference, of the waged 
and unwaged worker, fail to acknowledge the complexity of job types and the 
influence of external factors including social, cultural and political contexts that 
influence job opportunities in developing countries (van der Hoeven, 2012). The 
report doesn‟t clearly define what it means by „good jobs‟ and how these differ from 
„decent work‟ (Bretton Woods Project, 2012). As a result recommendations for „good 
jobs‟ to tackle the challenges identified are vague. For example, in response to the 
challenge of urbanising countries, recommendations are to provide opportunities for 
women. What this report does not recognise is that in many urbanising contexts and 
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rural for that matter, women are already working in paid employment as well as at 
home. Women at home frequently support the trade of other members by preparing 
goods for the market, making handicrafts, completing jobs that can done in the home 
as well as taking care of family members and other essential domestic work. For 
example in site R_ME3 one women who was at home during the day taking care of 
children and her elderly father also prepared fresh pineapples for other family 
members to sell. As the hot sun dried the fruit out, rather than take all the pineapples 
to sell throughout the day, the family members came back periodically to collect fresh 
pineapples to sell on the streets. This meant that pineapples were kept fresh but also 
limited the number of unsold pineapples at the end of the day. In another group of 
households, bags of clothes fresh from near by garment factories were delivered to the 
houses by motodop in the morning and collected at the end of the day. Any family 
members at home, children and the elderly included, took a piece of clothing and 
trimmed the loose threads of garments using small shears. This was done ad hoc 
throughout the day and at supplemented the income of the household. Work therefore 
was completed around other tasks and due to the relative ease of the task, could be 
completed by young children and adults, and when time became available. For 
example some children were trimming threads when they came home from school for 
lunch, whereas the grandmother sat under a palm tree for shade and socialised with 
other residents for most of the day, whilst trimming threads. Another woman who 
stayed home during the day used old newspapers to make gift bags, which were 
bought by a local handicraft enterprise to present their goods. In this instance the 
woman was given piles of newspaper, string and glue by the organisation, which 
bought from her nay of the bags she made. These examples demonstrate jobs, or 
informal economic activity, which would not necessarily be classified as „decent jobs‟ 
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but are achievable and flexible to allow women, or whoever is at home, to contribute 
directly and indirectly to household income whilst caring for children, other family 
members and completing domestic necessities. 
 
Ben Selwyn identifies three further issues with the DWA: the inability to explain 
work that is not „decent‟, weak enforcement and the DWA‟s weak conceptualisation 
of class relations under capitalism (Selwyn, 2014). Significantly, Selwyn 
demonstrates the DWA‟s inability to identify the causes of „indecent‟ work by 
outlining assumptions underpinning the approach, namely the assumption that 
improper policy choices and unsuitable micro-institutional structures are the cause of 
indecent work. The case study of the ILO in Cambodia is pertinent here through their 
Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) project.
47
 There is scarcely a more monitored 
programme which involved United States of America and Cambodia signing a three 
year textile and apparel exports on the condition of better working conditions and pay 
for Cambodians employed in the sector. However despite the boom in the industry 
and employment in the sector, the garment industry is plagued with political 
interference in trade unions, unsustainable working hours and poor working 
conditions, disputes over pay and unfair dismissals (Selwyn, 2014; Arnold, 2013). 
And whilst all factories in Cambodia must sign up to the better factories programme, 
the BFC has no power to punish those who do not enforce its policies. (Rollet, Phnom 
Penh Post, 1
st
 October 2015). This reflects Selwyn‟s second critique of the DWA, the 
lack of enforcement. 
 
                                                 
47
 See website: http://betterfactories.org/ 
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When discussing enforcement of DWA norms, Selwyn argues that despite the World 
Bank and the ILO focusing on decent work and jobs in the 2013 report, there is a lack 
of practical implementation of these norms. Strategies of mobilisation for trade unions 
are missing whilst the struggle of workers is not recognised as a contributing factor to 
DWA. Instead, elite actors dominate the discourse and use the DWA as a brand 
enhancement strategy, whilst negating the principles the DWA advocates. For 
Cambodia this can be seen in the BFC programme which was recently congratulated 
for its performance by the World Bank (Rollet, 2015) yet the BFC was described as a 
failure in a recent report from Stanford Law School and Workers Consortium (2013). 
This report titled Monitoring in the Dark, described BFC factories as prioritising 
factory owners and international buyers interests over those of factory workers, 
failing to address wages and worker disputes and a general lack of transparency  
(Stanford Law School, 2013). 
 
Selwyn‟s final critique concerns the DWA‟s conceptualisation of class relations under 
capitalism. It is argued in his paper that the DWA fails to recognise an essential 
component of neoliberal capitalism: the systematic exploitation of the workforce. This 
oversight leads the DWA to assume that if the right institutional context can be 
created, capitalists will not exploit their workforce. However for factories in 
Cambodia to compete globally, under the BFC exploitation of a poor workforce has 
been an essential factor (Selwyn, 2014) and maintaining this exploitation, or working 
to increase it, has been the reality of the garment industry in Cambodia. 
 
Rather than decent work underpinning a society‟s peace and security, it has resulted 
in insecurity, deepening poverty and further exploitation. And alternative argued for 
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by Selwyn is that of a „bottom up‟ approach where reform is guided by workers and 
worker led reform. By prioritising the elites and institutional arrangements over 
workers and worker-led struggle, the DWA is disarming the people it is designed to 
support. Instead the prioritisation of workers and worker-led reform should form a 
basis for context specific short term, medium and long term goals (Selwyn, 2014).  
 
Global changes in labour and employment, such as the shift from industrial work, 
agriculture and farming to service provision and activities, outsourcing of services 
overseas and the increasing urbanisation of the work force have been identified by 
Standing (2010). Standing addresses these changes from the perspective of poverty 
alleviation and increasing insecurity to argue that social policy, not labour markets, 
are most appropriate at tackling economic insecurity and poverty. Labour markets 
instead are better placed to tackle economic function and efficiency. 
 
The discussion of DWA, which began in response to the attempts of the ILO to 
disaggregate the informal economy, appears most predominantly in the BFC 
programme that focuses on contractual work within the garment industry. Many 
respondents saw factory work, despite the poor working conditions, as a highly 
desirable job. This research will return to factory workers and other formal 
employment in the following section, which argues for a term, which reflects the 
urban context and non-monetary contributions to households such as support, and 
preparation alongside opportunistic monetary income from desirable goods. 
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4.2.ii The Urban Poor Economy 
Cities in developing countries have substantial surplus labour in various 
guises. Their labour force continues nevertheless to increase, swelled not only 
by natural population growth but also by rural-urban migration that accounts 
for more than half of urban growth in most developing countries (Gugler, 
1997, p. 114) 
 
Cities are centres of power and wealth, but also of surplus. Surplus labour is 
nominally spoken about in an inevitable sense. It is assumed and usually accepted that 
a certain level of the population will not contribute to social good. The argument, that 
surplus population is a bi-product of development, can be traced back to the work of 
18
th
 Century scholar The Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus. Malthusian scholars 
theorise population rise and fall through a series of positive checks that increase the 
death rate and preventative checks that decrease the birth rate. Through these checks, 
which include famine, disease, war, contraception, abortion and celibacy, the 
population is self-correcting. During the process of these checks exists a surplus 
population. This 18
th
 Century work has been interpreted by scholars to argue that 
capitalism facilitates progress, a rise in productivity and population, which includes 
checks resulting in the exclusion of parts of the population from enjoying this 
progress and productivity (Duffield, 2007). In other words, progress for some can 
only come at the cost to others. These „others‟ are the poor and marginalised, the 
surplus population, collateral damage or „human debris‟ (Arendt,1951).  
 
Marx drew his theory of capitalism from classical political economy, in particular the 
work of Ricardo: a system of generalized commodity production whose output is 
bought and sold on the market. Ricardo portrayed modern society as an antagonistic 
class structure made up of landlords, capitalists and workers who can only increase 
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their respective shares of the net product by reducing those of others (Callinicos, 
1999: p. 86). For Marx, class formation and relations are key features of capitalism. 
Labourers, unlike slaves or workers in a feudal system, are doubly free (free from the 
control of owners/lords, and free to sell labour power to any bidder) but compelled to 
sell their labour power to survive. Capitalists are equally compelled to innovate by the 
logic of competition. Marx rejected theories developed from the starting point of the 
individual, however the abilities of the individual to innovate and produce, i.e. social 
production, set the foundation for the development of class through the relationship 
between those whom exploit and those whom are exploited. Labour production, for 
example, is a type of social production. Marx‟s belief that capitalism created a 
„reserve army of labour‟, a proportion of the population permanently unemployed, has 
come to be understood as a necessary part of employment relations of employment 
and unemployment (Ceruti, 2010, Denning, 2010: p. 84). Marxist theory of primitive 
accumulation accounts for the reserve army of labour as a result of the transition from 
collective to private property rights. Harvey (2004) develops the theory of primitive 
accumulation to argue that the reserve army also comes about through accumulation 
by dispossession whereby the powerful few dispossess the weak majority of land and 
wealth. Harvey might argue that this is the case in Cambodia due to the selling off of 
public goods such as land, lakes and other natural resources. This may also be the 
case in relation to the forced evictions taking place in Phnom Penh whereby the 
government is sectioning and selling off lucrative parts of the city, despite the fact 
that people have been living in these areas for decades.  
 
Neoliberal economists argue that involuntary unemployment doesn‟t exist: 
unemployment is either voluntary or due to a backlog in the labour market (Denning, 
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2010: p. 85). This may tie into the luxury of unemployment hypothesis discussed in 
the introduction (Gilbert, 1994; Gugler, 1997). This hypothesis supposes that 
unemployment is a luxury of those who can afford to be unemployed. Those facing 
real hardship cannot afford to be unemployed and do not have the savings or family 
support to fall back upon. 
 
This thesis has not found evidence to support this hypothesis however. 
Unemployment was rare in this study, however a small number of cases were found. 
In these circumstances it was usually due to ill health or old age that a household 
member was unemployed. In this instance, the unemployed member usually takes on 
household duties, caring for children, cooking, cleaning or preparing goods for sale by 
other members of the household. Unemployment for an individual without a family or 
friend to rely upon however is a disaster and an issue of life or death. One life history 
respondent, Tep, described how as an orphan he had fled exploitation and physical 
abuse by his employers: 
Tep: My parents disappeared when I was young. For a while I lived and worked for 
an old man. The old man brought me Phnom Penh to go to an orphan organisation he 
said. However, I was cheated, and he sold me to a rich man. I had to do a lot of work 
for him on the farm for one year. He said that the contract is one year, so I could not 
leave before the contract. But I stay there many years. Then I decided to run away 
from that place but the rich man‘s guards tried to find me, they wanted to catch me 
back. The rich man was a nice guy, but his wife and child were not kind. In early 
morning, at 4 am, I had to clean pigs‘ cages, feeding them. I also look after the cows 
on that farm. I worked from very early to very late. I tried to run away many times but 
they brought me back. But then one time I ran away to Phnom Penh, but I was robbed 
my first night as I slept under a bridge. I don‘t know where to go. I couldn‘t find 
work; no one would hire me. I tried to be an ejai (recyclables collector) but people 
beat me and pushed me away. I didn‘t know what to do, so I went to a Wat. The 
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monks in the Wat allowed me to become a monk, and gave me an education in the 
Wat. 
 
Tep did not chose unemployment; rather he tried everything he could do to avoid it. 
The respondent recalled how in feeling hopeless and destitute he went to a Wat to 
pray. It was here that he met a monk who took pity on him, offered him food, 
clothing, a place to live and gave him an education. It was as a result of this education 
organised by the monks at the Wat that the young man was able to learn to read, 
write, learnt numeracy and began to learn English.
 
With these skills, he was able to 
find a job as a security guard in Phnom Penh. At the time of interview Tep had left his 
security guard job and had become a tuktuk driver. Excerpts from his interview 
continue below. 
 
Guy Standing‟s (2011) work identifies the emergence of a section of society he calls 
the precariat – a „dangerous new class‟. The members of Standing‟s precariat are 
unaware of their status: for the precariat is not a class as far as the working class or 
middle class are concerned, but a class „in the making‟ (Standing, 2011). It is made up 
of three groups.  The Atavists Standing identifies as descendants from traditional 
manual labourers and lives, angry at the status quo and the inability to reproduce the 
past. They are „alienated, anomic, anxious and angry‟ (2011) and as such, blame 
migrants and politicians for their precarious situations. The Nostalgics are alienated, 
angry, anxious and anomic yet they are different to the Atavists as they are migrants 
or ethnic minorities. The Nostalgics are also politically timid and unable to relate to 
society, yet are without a home. Finally he describes the Progressives, a large group 
of educated people who feel duped and denied the future they were promised through 
their pursuit of education and qualifications. One unifying characteristic of the 
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precariat is labour insecurity. The precariat are not just insecure, but have accepted 
the expectation and accept a life of labour insecurity lies before them (Standing, 
2014). The precariat largely consists of youth and is also disproportionately female 
(Standing, 2011; Breman, 2013). 
 
However, whilst Standing‟s book may be useful to understand the emergence of youth 
rioting in Europe in the past decade, Standing‟s focus on Western and advanced 
economies, drawing from similarly western media, lacks historical contextualisation 
and offers little more than a one-size-fits-all model for understanding insecure labour 
conditions (Breman, 2013). Standing‟s precariat class fails to acknowledge or 
accommodate localised histories, economies, cultures and politics. It also paints a 
negative and aggressive picture of the insecure work force, which he argues is looking 
to blame, name and shame people for their undesirable circumstances. Participation in 
the informal economy is for some a choice, as he himself wrote in his 2010 article. 
For example many of the small business owners and tuktuk drivers explicitly stated 
that their choice of profession was their choice. Opportunities existed for young men 
to work regular, contracted hours, but that these jobs were undesirable.  
 
Alongside and very much bound to the characteristics of labour insecurity in 
Cambodia is a culture of violence and instability. As discussed at length in the 
historical background chapter, Cambodia has experienced civil conflict since the early 
20
th
 Century. The 1991 Paris Peace Accords were ineffective in their peacebuilding 
efforts and rather than create a peaceful democracy have rather legitimised violence 
and coercion. Violence used to control and coerce the population, and to dispose of 
opposition to the government, continues today (HRW, 2012). The title of the HRW 
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report, ―Tell them that I want to kill them‖: Two decades of impunity in Hun Sen‘s 
Cambodia uses a quote from Prime Minister Hun Sen‟s Deputy Chief of his private 
bodyguard unit, Hing Bun Heang in response to journalist questions regarding the 
1997 grenade attack against Hun Sen‟s main political opposition, Sam Rainsy. The 
report examines politically motivated murders from the early 1990s including that of 
prominent Trade Unionist Chea Vichea in 2007 up to the more recent incidents, such 
as the murder of the environmental activist Chut Wutty in 2012. In just two years 
since the publication of this report, politically motivated violence against trade 
unionists and land activists has resulted in false imprisonment and multiple deaths due 
to police using electric cattle prods and live bullets to disperse peaceful protests (The 
Guardian, 2014; Phnom Penh Post, 2014). 
 
Household respondents were faced with threats and coercion on a day-to-day basis. 
Respondents who were street sellers selling snails for example, spoke of being 
targeted by the local police. The police would track them down and fine them for 
creating a public mess as the shells of the snails eaten by their customers were left in 
the street. In a similar circumstance, police officers and security guards might fine 
street sellers who walk past their properties, down certain popular streets or past 
markets. These fines were completely arbitrary but sellers were faced with physical 
abuse or destruction of property if they refused. The insecurity bred by constant threat 
of arbitrary arrest, fines and imprisonment is a clear feature of the case studies of 
urban poor settlements facing eviction and those in resettlement sites. Caroline 
Moser‟s work on Latin America categorises urban violence in order to create a 
„roadmap‟ for its eradication (2004). Along with her colleagues, Moser charts 
violence thematically (political, institutional, economic, social) against the 
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perpetrators (state, non-state, gangs, street children) and its manifestations (armed 
conflict, territorial, theft, riot, sexual violence etc.) (2004, p.5). Her classification of 
the routine, daily violence such as exclusion, threat and bullying mentioned above, are 
classified as social violence, which is perpetrated by family and friends. In fact, local 
authorities in many cases perpetrate this type of violence. This kind of violence is 
more akin to Galtung‟s structural violence, where violence is embedded into social 
structures and norms, a limitation that Moser acknowledges (Moser, 2004, p. 6). 
Another example of structural violence in Cambodia are the forced evictions taking 
throughout Cambodia. The evictions in Phnom Penh are frequently violent as the 
police and private security companies clear the path for international investment via 
the forced eviction of urban poor communities living in desirable and profitable urban 
areas. The eviction process not only destroys their homes and divides communities; it 
also removes the income generating opportunities of informal economy workers 
dependent on selling their labour power to the urban labour market (Mgbako et al., 
2010). Few opportunities exist for the urban poor when they live in isolated 
resettlement sites twenty kilometres out of the city. 
 
It is within the specific nature of the context in Phnom Penh, that of surplus labour, 
ILO supported neoliberal capitalist development aimed at exploiting the workforce 
for profit, politically motivated violence and perpetuated insecurity, that this research 
comes to address the livelihood strategies of the urban poor. The remaining part of 
this section will use data collected during fieldwork regarding job types and income, 
to argue the case for the need of a term to describe life within the aforementioned 
context. 
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Figure 18 displays the variety of job type, arranged in cumulative order with absolute 
numbers and percentages indicated. The variables of student, unemployed, retired, 
cannot work due to illness and did not respond, amount to 242 household members, or 
36.1 per cent of household respondents, as they do not regularly contribute to 
household income or saving practices. However, it must be noted that these members 
of the family perform other essential tasks such as looking after younger family 
members, cooking, cleaning, irregular small-scale production of goods such as the 
preparation of fruit for sale etc. Their presence and assistance indirectly contributes to 
the household by allowing other household members to work. The following statistics 
nonetheless relate to the remaining 428 household respondents from the seven 
settlement sites that regularly directly contribute to the financial income of the 
household. 
 
The diversity within the job types is vast, from professional lawyers and famous 
musicians to beggars and collectors. The largest groups at the bottom of the second 
column indicate the highest frequency of job type, these are Factory worker at 14.49 
per cent, Street seller: Food at 13.55 per cent, Domestic Labour at 12.62 per cent, 
Construction at 10.98 per cent and Driver: Motodop at 7.48 per cent. 
 
By using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), we can 
gain a clearer idea of the spread of employment engaged in by household members 
(Figure 19). Through this classification system, we can see that the main areas of 
employment for household members are services and sales work (40.89 per cent), 
elementary occupations (27.34 per cent) and plant and machine operators and 
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assemblers (23.83 per cent). The lack of skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery 
workers is likely a function of the urban emphasis of this fieldwork. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18 Variety of job type collected from household survey 
Job Type No. %  Job Type No % 
Beautician 1 0.23  Street seller: Drinks 2 0.47 
Beggar 1 0.23  Cook / Chief 3 0.70 
Driver: Taxi 1 0.23  Laundry 3 0.70 
Driver: Tuktuk 1 0.23  Security guard 3 0.70 
Engineer 1 0.23  Soldier 3 0.70 
Fortune Teller 1 0.23  Cleaner (Domestic) 4 0.93 
Hair dresser / Barber 1 0.23  Driver: Delivery / Moving 4 0.93 
Lawyer 1 0.23  Mechanic 4 0.93 
Musician / Singer 1 0.23  Crafts: Handicraft 5 1.17 
Nanny 1 0.23  Street seller: Other 6 1.40 
Sex worker 1 0.23  Street seller: Deserts 7 1.64 
Skilled: Tailor 1 0.23  Skilled: Carpenter 8 1.87 
Street seller: Toys 1 0.23  Agricultural worker 10 2.34 
Teacher 1 0.23  Shop worker 11 2.57 
Village representative 1 0.23  Collector (Ejai) 13 3.04 
Waiter 1 0.23  Shop owner 15 3.50 
Business owner 2 0.47  Market seller: Food 16 3.74 
Cleaner (restaurant) 2 0.47  Manual labour 28 6.54 
Cleaner (vehicles) 2 0.47  Driver: Motodop 32 7.48 
Driver: Cyclo 2 0.47  Construction 47 10.98 
Hotel worker 2 0.47  Domestic Labour 54 12.62 
Secretary / Admin Assistant 2 0.47  Street seller: Food 58 13.55 
Skilled: Electrician 2 0.47  Factory worker 62 14.49 
  TOTAL 428 100 
Ref Fig. 19 ISCO -08: Major Groups codes No. %* 
0 Armed forces occupations 3 0.7 
1 Managers 3 0.7 
2 Professionals 8 1.87 
3 Technicians and associate professionals 2 0.47 
4 Clerical support workers 2 0.47 
5 Service and sales workers 175 40.89 
6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers - - 
7 Craft and related trades workers 16 3.74 
8 Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 102 23.83 
9 Elementary occupations 117 27.34 
*percentage of 428 household members who regularly contribute to 
household income and other economic coping practices 
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However, whilst the ISCO is useful in categorising the different kinds of employment, 
it fails to contribute to the understanding of the division between the formal and 
informal employment sectors. This research has attempted to bridge this gap by 
combining the ISCO classification framework with the ILO‟s definition of the 
informal sector. There are two interpretations of the ILO‟s informal sector definitions: 
firstly, that there is an intrinsic relationship between non-registration and informality; 
secondly, that there is a denial of the intrinsic relationship of registration and instead 
an emphasis on the informal sector as a form of production, recognising non-
registration as a characteristic, rather than an indicator, of the informal sector. (ILO 
„Measuring Informality‟, 2013). 
This broad definition is operationalized for statistical purposes and the informal 
sector defined as comprising those household unincorporated enterprises with market 
production that are: 
1. Informal own account enterprises (optionally, all, or those that are not 
registered under specific forms of national legislation); 
2. Enterprises of informal employers (optionally, all those with less than a 
specified level of employment and/or not registered and/or employees not 
registered) 
(ILO, 1993) Informal Sector definition 
This research has taken the second interpretation since determining the registration 
status of employers, employees and an enterprise was a near impossible task during 
fieldwork. By recognising non-registration as a characteristic rather than intrinsic to 
the informal sector, we are free to explore other characteristics and intrinsic 
relationships. 
 
Therefore in combining the second interpretation of the ILO‟s informal sector 
definition with the ISCO major group codes, this research can demonstrate the formal 
nature of employment for people considered to be part of the informal economy. 
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Figure 19 breaks these down into ISCO categories to demonstrate this, showing that 
38 per cent of household members are employed in jobs considered to be part of the 
formal sector (163) and 62 per cent (265) in the informal sector. The majority of 
informal sector workers are employed in service and sales work (58.5 per cent) and 
elementary occupations (24.9 per cent), whereas the majority of formal sector workers 
are employed as plant and machine operators, and assemblers (40.5 per cent), 
followed closely also by elementary occupations (31.3 per cent). 
 
Figure 20 demonstrates that the urban poor, considered to be part of the informal 
economy, partake in formalised professions. One may also deduce from the varied job 
types, that the formal and informal economies rely upon each other enormously. 
Street sellers wait outside garment factories for the thousands of workers to break for 
lunch. Motodop drivers take construction workers to work. Mechanics fix the cars and 
motos of businesses men and hotel workers. These jobs are reliant and sustained by 
the interaction between formal and informal workers. In the following section, 
suggestions are offered for a more relevant and responsive categorisation that can 
accommodate such variation whilst acknowledging the urban context and non-
financial contribution of household members who stay at home, „the urban poor 
economy‟. 
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Fig. 20 Percentage and number of informal and formal sector workers in each 
ISCO labour classification 
Ref International Standard Classification 
Occupations -08: Major Groups codes 
Informal 
Sector 
Formal 
Sector 
% No. % No. 
0 Armed forces occupations .  1.8 3 
1 Managers 0.8 2 0.6 1 
2 Professionals 0.4 1 4.3 7 
3 Technicians and associate professionals . . 1.2 2 
4 Clerical support workers . . 1.2 2 
5 Service and sales workers 58.5 155 12.3 20 
6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers . . . . 
7 Craft and related trades workers 1.9 5 6.8 11 
8 Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 13.6 36 40.5 66 
9 Elementary occupations 24.9 66 31.3 51 
 TOTALS  265  163 
 
Gugler (1997) and Gilbert (1994) argued that the informal economy is not a desirable 
form of employment and is beneath that of formal employment, and even 
unemployment. However this research argues, in line with Standing (2010), that in 
fact working in the informal economy for many is a choice and not a result of falling 
out of the formal sector. This is illustrated by the seven interviews conducted with 
tuktuk drivers and from speaking with household respondents. All of the tuktuk 
drivers interviewed expressed that it had been their choice and was their preference to 
work in their line of work. One of the drivers had been a security guard for a wealthy 
family, earning regularly $70 per month. Despite liking the job, the family and the 
regular income, he left the job to become a tuktuk driver. When asked why, he replied 
that in the peak season he could earn up to $500 USD per month, and in the low 
season just $40 USD per month. However he preferred to work for himself and felt 
that it was better to have a seasonal high income of $500 USD than a regulated 
income of $70 USD. Tuktuk driver Chhet explains his reasoning for leaving work as a 
security guard, knowingly choosing informality: 
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Chhet: I was a security guard when I first moved to Phnom Penh (1993). I was paid 
$60 per month. I got married and became a motodop driver because I could earn 
more money. Yes a security guard‘s money is regular and a Motodop Driver‘s money 
is irregular, however I could still earn more money driving a moto: $3-$4 per day. 
Then in 2005 I bought a tuktuk. 2005 - 2008 I could make $12-$15 per day. However 
since 2009 I make only $7.50 per day. I think the change is due to many, many more 
tuktuks on the road, so the competition is high. But also people take taxis more now, 
the taxis are taking our business. 
 
 This story was repeated with the other tuktuk drivers interviewed, some recalling 
stories of poor working conditions, exploitation and maltreatment under former 
bosses. The following are three excerpts from interviews with tuktuk drivers Den, Tep 
and Tom, discussing how they came to be tuktuk drivers. In all three instances the 
drivers left formalised jobs in a factory, a hotel and a security company: 
Den: Before my wife and I worked in a factory. The days were long, the money was ok 
but we were sick a lot. The factory was the one where you print on clothes. The smell 
was bad, it was so bright inside, we got sick a lot but we carried on working there. 
Anyway, they closed the factory, they said it went bankrupt. It burnt down. We could 
have found jobs in other factories but I can‘t work like that any more. I decided to buy 
a tuktuk. I prefer working as a tuktuk driver to the factory because I like working by 
myself, I like making my own money and I can have enough time to relax. I want to 
get a good spot at the market but they are full. The drivers have been there for many 
years, I only started four months ago. Olympic or Orrusei market, because many 
people go there, but it is difficult without parking. If we want to park we have to talk 
to the manager and pay money. I cannot go to the riverside because I don‘t know 
English. But I hope I will get a parking space soon. 
Jobs in factories, despite the often poor working conditions, are highly desirable 
because of the regular income and the ability to earn over time. However Den chose 
not to pursue another factory job, preferring to become a tuktuk driver. At the time of 
interview he was parked on a back street, unable to park any closer to the market. 
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However, as above, he expressed the hope that he would one day be able to park in a 
good site. 
Tim: When I first came to Phnom Penh I worked at the hotel reception. I worked 
there only one year then I started to drive a tuktuk. I didn‘t like working at the hotel. 
My boss was not good and I didn‘t make much money, maybe $80 for one month. 
Tuktuk means freedom. I am a free-bird… But yunno my job sometimes good, 
sometimes broke, because we have a lot of tour company in Cambodia. They collect a 
lot of tourist from yunno Asia, Western (countries), they are cheaper than us because 
they are a company with a lot of people. Sometimes broke, eat bai at home!
48
 On 
average per month make around $600 USD… Same same but different. You know this 
saying? Is meaningful. Some driver is successful, some driver is not successful. You 
can ask me (what) I (find) difficult, the first is to find the customer, the second is 
gasoline is expensive, the third my job is dangerous job. I must be careful all the time, 
the car has four wheel but we have only one wheel to break. You need the time and 
cannot drive close to cars. And then parking, is not easy to find a working place. I 
don‘t put my tuktuk at home I leave it at the national hospital, I leave there and I have 
motorbike to go home, because is hard, make my back ache, a lot of gasoline, a lot of 
time, bumpy, holes, where is the road?! Just holes! If rains not easy to drive. $12.50 
to leave my motorbike and tuktuk. Is ok no problem. My problem is customer! 
 
Tim‟s interview was conducted in English. Tim had studied English at university and 
had worked in a hotel prior to becoming a tuktuk driver. However he didn‟t like 
working at the hotel and was able to capitalise on his linguistic skills and was earning 
a very good wage for a tuktuk driver. 
Tep: When I left the Wat I became a security guard. I work for a security company. 
The company sent me to guard at an NGO that helps people read. People in the 
organisation liked me, and they help me a lot. The helped me to get Cambodian 
National ID card. Before, I did not have it because I don‘t have family. I got paid $90 
to be a security guard, but I could not save much money. The money I earned was 
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 „Eat bai at home‟, bai is Khmer for steamed white rice, this is a common saying 
that suggests one does not earn a lot of money and so must go home to eat their lunch. 
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spent on renting a place to stay, food, transport and learning English. I could not 
save enough money. I decided instead to hire a tuktuk. It cost $150 USD per month to 
hire a tuktuk. When I had the tuktuk I started to earn enough to cover the rent for it, 
my home and food. I am able to save money being a tuktuk driver. Being a tuktuk 
driver is different from being an employee. The boss always complained when we did 
not well at work. Now I am my own boss. After I pay for everything I can have $50 
USD left. Then after renting for so long, I wanted to buy my own tuktuk, I had some 
money saved but not enough,
49
 but one of my regular customers, a Frenchman loaned 
me 1000$. I had enough money to buy this one. I have to pay the money back every 
month for one year. Now, I only have two month left.  
 
Tep, a tuktuk driver who gave a full life history, also left regular work with an 
organisation that provided security guards to companies, NGOs and families. He 
usually parked his tuktuk outside an apartment block occupied by international staff, 
many of who worked for the UN and other international NGOs. As a result, Tep had 
many regular customers. However, a couple of days after this interview, Tep had his 
tuktuk impounded by the police, from where it went missing. Tep described that the 
police will impound tuktuks to earn extra money through fines. The fine could be 
anything from $20-200 USD. Tep paid $200 USD fine, yet Tep‟s tuktuk, with just two 
months left to pay off his loan, had gone „missing‟ from the impound. He believed the 
police had sold it. The news was devastating to Tep, but what could he do? He 
decided that in order to keep the loyalty of his customers, he would rent another 
tuktuk while he pursued informal leads in an attempt to get his own tuktuk back. As 
the drivers know the city well he was confident that if the tuktuk was in the city, he 
would find it. However if it had left Phnom Penh, he may never get it back. 
 
                                                 
49
 In 2011 a tuktuk carriage and motorbike cost $1200-1500USD depending on the 
style and quality 
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Another example of the choice to remain part of the informal economy comes from 
one of the life history respondents from the site CH1, named Lin for the purposes of 
this research: 
I came to Phnom Penh with my mother in 2001. My mother had been forced to marry 
my father during the KR but the KR killed him after I was born. We have farmland in 
Prey Veng province but one year, about 11 years ago, we had a bad harvest and we 
did not make enough money to pay for the seed we had used. We were in a lot of debt, 
so my mother and I came to Phnom Penh to look for work to pay off our debt. I lived 
with my mum and took care of her but we were very poor. I have rented this house in 
Phnom Penh all the years I have been here. When I first came to Phnom Penh I made 
and sold small cakes, but there was no profit in this. I stopped after a short time and 
ever since I have collected ejai (recyclables). We paid off our debt in two years. 
However when my mother died, I did not have enough money to pay for the funeral. 
The landlord who rents these houses took pity on me and paid for her funeral. The 
landlord is a good man and knows that since the rent has gone up from $10 per month 
to $20, some months I cannot afford to pay rent, but he does not kick me out. I pay 
what I can and he lets me stay. I used to rent an ejai cart (a cart to collect 
recyclables) from the landlord for 2,000KHR per day as well, but he understood that I 
could not afford to rent this cart, pay rent on the house and earn enough money to 
pay for food for my daughter and I. So the landlord gave me the cart. I bring him all 
of my recyclables so that he can sell them and he lets me use the cart rent-free. I can 
make 500KHR for 1kg of cardboard. Normally I do two collections and so I can 
collect 100kg of cardboard. I can sell my cardboard to the landlord for 500-600KHR 
per kg. I can sell plastic to him for 1,500KHR per kg, aluminium cans for 6,000KHR 
per kg (roughly 63 cans) and scrap metal for 1,100KHR per kg. I only collect ejai 
from the street, some people buy from houses and restaurants but this is too 
expensive.
50
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 The assistance given to Lin contradicts established beliefs on Cambodian civil 
society that emphasises that people are individualistic, self-preserving and self-
promoting. See section 2.2. 
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From Lin‟s life history, it becomes clear that a single bad harvest can have 
catastrophic effects, forcing Lin and her mother to leave their home and move to 
Phnom Penh to pay off their debt. However, Lin was fortunate to rent her home and 
ejai cart from a landlord who is willing accommodates her precarious circumstances. 
Had Lin rented her home or ejai cart from the formal sector, she may not have been so 
lucky and may have faced eviction and had her ejai cart confiscated. The informal 
nature of her work allows Lin to survive difficult periods of low income, as her home 
and her ejai cart are secure. Further, Lin remains in Phnom Penh despite having paid 
off her debt. When asked why she did not return to the provinces Lin replied: 
I want to go back to Prey Veng one day. I still have my land there and family there. 
But in Prey Veng it is hard. People do not pay for things; instead they like to use 
credit. Because they use credit, I have to use credit as no one pays for the things they 
buy from me and so I have no money. In Phnom Penh people pay for their things and 
it is easier to manage the debt. 
 
Lin‟s response characterises an important difference raised at the beginning of this 
chapter between rural and urban contexts, from the perspective of those living in 
poverty: cash and credit. In the countryside credit and debt can be built up with 
neighbours and paid off with exchange of goods or small payments, as customers are 
neighbours and are unlikely to disappear. However as Lin mentions, it may take a 
long time for payments to be made. Whereas in the city, people are more transient, 
your customer base is passing crowds, and a small business or street seller must be 
paid immediately. If you do not have the money, you do not receive the goods (Mitlin 
& Satterthwaite, 2013). In site CH1 it was mentioned that often people who could no 
longer afford rent or pay for goods, vacated their homes during the night so as to 
avoid payment and embarrassment. During the process of this fieldwork, two 
households contacted for the survey „disappeared‟ before the survey was complete. 
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These residents owed rent money but had fled and were therefore effectively unable 
to return to that part of the city because of their debt. 
 
This chapter has thus far engaged with the debate surrounding the informal economy, 
its use, definition and applicability. It is clear that despite attempts by the ILO to 
further define the informal economy that ambiguity persists in its use as a term. The 
main two critiques from the perspective of this research are the lack of 
acknowledgement for non-income generating initiatives that can support a household, 
whether this is cleaning and raising a family and therefore removing the cost of 
childcare, and the use of desirable objects for opportunistic earning potential, such as 
having a mobile phone, bicycle or motorbike. These desirable objects will be 
discussed further below. The term informal economy does not distinguish between the 
rural and urban contexts, despite the different challenges this presents. The living 
circumstances of many people in the countryside comprise of a traditional family 
home. The family unit can provide essential support and provide a „safety net‟ for 
people who fall ill or lose their jobs. However many people in Phnom Penh have left 
their families in the provinces and are alone in the city trying to earn as much money 
as possible so that they can send money home. Individuals rent rooms alone, 
sometimes groups of individuals get together and share costs. Yet the safety nets 
associated with rural life such as family, or credit with local businesses, are not 
present in urban areas. In Phnom Penh, money is what counts. 
 
However this economic focus on basic income misses the ingenuity of the urban poor 
who use multiple strategies for generating their livelihoods. This includes collective 
buying and price setting, ejai, renting out of desirable objects, growing small crops or 
 181 
having small livestock, having family members prepare goods for market around their 
other work etc. 
 
To acknowledge the diversity of livelihood generating actions, the formality of what 
has been described as informal and to bring to the forefront the importance of the 
urban environment, this thesis suggests the term „urban poor economy‟. The term was 
defined in the introduction but in order to highlight the possible critiques of the term 
the definition is repeated below:  
The livelihood generating and coping practices of individual residents and 
households in urban areas, living close to a city-specific poverty line. 
 
It is important to stress that this term is born from the Cambodian context and 
specifically used to portray the urban poor of Phnom Penh; it has not been designed 
for projection onto other urban poor populations. However, it may be useful in 
offering points of comparison to other Cambodian cities or capital cities in the South 
East Asia region and broader global south. 
 
The urban poor economy does not include violent or criminal behaviour however it 
does include previously discussed a-legal behaviour due to gaps in policy and law. 
This is to shed the characteristic of criminality, which has been used to paint all 
informal economy workers with the same brush. 
 
One critique of the urban poor economy may be that the term simply replaces the 
informal economy. This is not the case, however. Firstly, the specificity of the 
geographical location as indicated by the „urban‟ part of the term challenges the 
geographic bias of the rural environment in Cambodian specific informal economy 
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discourse. The distinction between rural and urban experiences of poverty is essential 
for development. Secondly, the term encapsulates the interaction and shared 
characteristics of the formal and informal economies, rather than focusing solely on 
the informal aspects. Thirdly, the term urban poor economy might be criticised as 
having little analytical use due to the breadth of what the term entails. In this respect 
the author acknowledges the diversity and complexity, however the term was not 
designed to be used to „measure‟ the urban poor. Instead, the term is an 
acknowledgement of the specific history, social relationships, actions and other 
livelihood generating practices undertaken by the urban poor. The term has emerged 
from engaging with the urban poor as a result of this fieldwork, it was not prescribed 
or imagined prior to fieldwork. This reflects the same intentions of Hart who first 
intended the informal economy to refer to social organisation rather than something 
that was to be quantified and measured.  
 
However the term could be used by policy makers and development workers to 
acknowledge and recognise challenges facing the urban poor and work to remedy 
these. In whatever respect the term is used, at the forefront of the term are the urban 
poor residents themselves: their lived experiences and day to day activities. 
Finally this research acknowledges that an urban poor „class‟ may indicate an urban 
middle class and elite. Whilst this is an extension beyond the scope of this research, it 
is believe that a more nuanced and geographically appropriate understanding of an 
emerging middle class in urban areas of Cambodia as well as the elite is appropriate 
and necessary. 
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4.2.iii Horizontal Regulation 
Finally before consulting the household survey data in detail, this research challenges 
the core underlying assumption of the informal economy, that it is unregulated. This 
research has already shown the breadth of job type within the informal economy, yet 
to assume that small vulnerable enterprises and businesses can be productive and 
profit making without some form of regulated processes seems naïve. A recent 
publication titled Organising Women Workers in the Informal Economy: Beyond The 
Weapons of the Weak (2013) edited by Naila Kabeer, Ratna Sudarshan and Kirsty 
Milward responds to the formalisation within informal economy debate through 
discussion of how and why women in the informal economy have organised 
themselves. The women in question are defined as informal economy workers, using 
ILO definitions given above, who have united through struggle to demand recognition 
for the work they do, increased their bargaining power with employers and the state, 
and broadened their emancipatory potential. The book offers case studies from India 
Brazil, South Africa and Thailand to demonstrate the various ways women, who are 
often poorer and more insecure than their male counterparts, have come together to 
form organisations and trade unions in the informal sector. The ILO described the 
enormity of the task facing these women in their 2004 Organising for Social Justice 
Report : the needs and problems of such a diverse work force are as varied as the 
barriers and constraints they face in organising (p. 45). 
 
The Kabeer et al publication focuses primarily on trade unions and organisations of 
informal workers drawing on case studies of litter pickers, sex workers and other 
informal work undertaken by women. The chapter authored by Kabeer, Milward and 
Sudarshan. „Beyond Weapons of the Weak‟ (pp. 1-48), identifies the impetus for 
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organisation of workers as commonly external from than from the women themselves. 
They identify NGOs, both local and international, and the educated middle class as 
often being the driving force behind initial attempts at organisation (2013, pp. 5-6). 
As informal workers are often self-employed, geographically isolated and working 
under causal conditions, the challenge of building a shared identity is crucial for unity 
and organisation. Other divisions such as race, ethnicity, class, caste, legal status etc. 
can undermine the struggle for better working conditions and improved wellbeing 
(2013, p.13). Particularly interesting is discussion of „soft power‟51 resources 
available to organisations such as education and increased awareness. This may 
materialise as sexual health education, employment and workers rights education or 
awareness of free health clinics, government grants for child support or compensation. 
In one example, an Indian sex worker organisation created childcare centres for their 
members to use, which doubled up as a centre to disseminate information and have 
meetings (2013, p.26). 
 
There has been an attempt to organise tuktuk drivers into a type of trade union for 
informal workers by a group called Independent Democracy of Informal Economy 
Association (IDEA)
52
. IDEA is actually an NGO, not an official trade union, which 
attempts to support informal workers through „soft power‟ resources such as 
education on labour rights, and traffic rules and regulations, and assistance in 
appealing traffic fines. Whilst the group is open to all informal workers, it primarily 
                                                 
51
 In the 1980s Joseph Nye developed the term „soft power‟ to refer to an ability to 
persuade, attract or co-opt rather than „hard power‟, which involves coercive actions 
and force. Although originally used by Nye to discuss the actions of states (see his 
2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics) it has been used in 
this instance as a „weapon of the weak‟, a reference to James C. Scott‟s book 
published in 1987, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. 
52
 See IDEA‟s website: http://www.ideacambodia.org/pages/index.php 
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works with street sellers, motodop and tuktuk drivers. When IDEA was raised in 
discussion with drivers, the author was met with mixed responses. Only one tuktuk 
driver interviewed, Sok, was a current member of IDEA and displayed their logo on 
the side of his tuktuk. Sok replied the following when asked why he had joined the 
organisation 
Sok: I join IDEA because if I have a problem with the traffic police or other tuktuk 
the can help. They have office in Phnom Penh, also Siem Reap, Sihanoukville and 
Banteay Meanchey province. They are moral. I don‘t pay fee to be a member but if I 
go to a workshop something like this, for the trainings on traffic law and regulations, 
road safety you know, is free but they ask for 2,000KHR to pay for lunch and a snack 
and drink. But I never had a problem with police or other driver so far. 
 
The majority of tuktuk drivers however, were suspicious of IDEA and avoided them. 
Tuktuk driver Van described his experience with IDEA: 
Van: Before I was a member of IDEA. When I carry the goods (clothes) for customer 
to Olympic market the police caught me. Then I asked IDEA for help, but they could 
not help me. The police charged me. Apparently the goods I bought to the market 
were illegal, the owner had not paid tax. But I was still fined even though they did not 
belong to me. IDEA spoke to the police, but could not solve the problem. They asked 
money from me for the cost of the petrol to get there, and then I no longer trusted and 
left IDEA. 
 
From the experience of Van, IDEA provided no assistance in challenging his fines 
and then requested money to cover their costs, despite failing to assist him. Van saw 
little advantage to being a member when they did not provide assistance as they had 
promised through membership and they had, he believed, shown their true colours by 
asking him for money. Den, who had only recently become a tuktuk driver had heard 
of IDEA but upon asking if he would become a member or consider membership he 
replied I am not a member. They have no principles. They are no better than the 
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traffic police. When asked to elaborate, he declined to answer. Perhaps Den had had a 
bad experience with IDEA or had heard stories from other drivers, whatever the case, 
suspicion and distrust of the organisation was commonplace amongst those 
interviewed. The comparison with the traffic police, a largely arbitrary corrupt 
presence on the roads of the capital, reflected Den‟s perception of IDEA as also 
corrupt. If we refer to earlier quotes from drivers relating to why they had become 
tuktuk drivers, overwhelmingly they had stated the freedom of earning their own 
money and the absence of an employer to report to as significant contributing factors. 
For many it appeared as though this freedom would be sacrificed with membership to 
IDEA. IDEA was perceived by many as corrupt, intent on controlling tuktuk drivers 
and taking money from them. 
 
The reaction to the attempts to organise tuktuk drivers by IDEA has apparently not 
been met with much success, despite their presence in several urban areas of 
Cambodia. Harriss-White criticises the unsymmetrical and selective creation of 
organisations such as guilds and trade unions within the informal sector as „vertically 
structured‟ and themselves modes of control and informality in their administration, 
perpetuating patronage and commonly linked to political associations or societal 
hierarchies (2010, pp. 172-3). Perhaps more needs to be done to clarify IDEA‟s 
objectives and establish realistic expectations of what they can achieve through their 
soft power resources. More could be done to create a shared identity amongst its 
members and potential members, so that membership has value and meaning. 
Nevertheless the organisation is seen as a top down initiative, instigated and run by 
professionals rather than the tuktuk drivers themselves. This is perhaps a contributing 
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factor to the distrust of the organisation, as tuktuk drivers do not identify with the staff 
of IDEA.  
 
The level of organisation between women in the informal economy, as discussed 
above, has not emerged in Phnom Penh amongst men or women of the urban poor 
economy, to the extent described in the case studies included in their book. 
Conceivably IDEA is the beginning of a shift towards increased organisation of the 
informal sector workers, or perhaps social institutions are more relevant as economic 
regulators at present. Harriss-White discusses the presence of social institutions as 
economic regulators in her article examining the Indian informal economy (2010). 
Her work identifies four social institutions, gender, life cycle, caste and class (2010, 
pp. 172-174). Gender is a social economic regulator through gender having a crucial 
role in defining what jobs are open to individuals, but also as women 
disproportionally more so than men are expected to give up their jobs to have a family 
and/or take care of family members who are sick or elderly. The life cycle of the 
urban poor is also an economic regulator as labour opportunities change from child 
labour through to adulthood. There is scarce a „retirement‟ age for the urban poor and 
thus decline in health or work related injuries usually bring an end to employment. 
However other ways in contributing to a household income are still possible. Harriss-
White‟s case study of India identifies the rigid caste system as a social institution that 
shapes the ideologies of work and status, however more relevant perhaps in Cambodia 
and other countries is the class system. Class can encompass several „fault lines‟ that 
may affect ones ability to engage with the labour market including education, religion 
and provincial origins (2010, pp. 172-174). 
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Social institutions to an extent perform economic regulation across societies as a 
whole, not only amongst poor. The influence of gender, life cycle, and class are 
certainly relevant to the Cambodian context, as they are in most societies. However 
this cannot explain the level of organisation present amongst tuktuk drivers and street 
sellers. Nor does the peer-to-peer relationship mimic the discussed examples of trade 
unions and organisations through the case studies outlined in Kabeer et al‟s book. 
However, Kabeer, Milward and Sudarshan offer advice from their work that is 
relevant to the creation of the term horizontal regulation, but also the entirety of this 
thesis:  
One critical lesson that comes out of our analysis is the importance of starting with 
the experiences and realities of the workers themselves (Kabeer, Milward and 
Sudarshan, 2013, p. 40) 
 
Therefore, following this advice, this research identifies what has been termed by the 
author, horizontal regulation: the regulation of locations and selling sites, commodity 
purchase, selling and service prices, by those active within a similar trade or physical 
space. This term has emerged from descriptions of street seller practices and tuktuk 
driver relationships, given by street sellers and tuktuk drivers themselves. Horizontal 
regulation can be characterised as peer to peer, in contrast to vertical regulation, 
which can be characterised as top down or regulation from an employer or institution 
to an employee. For instance, tuktuk drivers have particular locations upon which they 
have a monopoly of service, for example outside of a market or hotel. Tuktuk driver 
Thom explained: 
Thom: The teams arrange themselves. Since tuktuk first start in Cambodia people 
found their place that they are comfortable for the past 15 or 20 years and the team 
system start when so many tuktuks start and the competition got too high. The team 
system start probably 10 years (ago). In the team there is a team leader that the 
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members vote for. The team leader is responsible to make sure everyone take their 
turn and get fair amount of business and if there is any problem with the hotel or 
another team the team leader can sort out. Also if someone new want to join the team 
the team leader need to ask everyone and they vote and the team leader can‘t just let 
someone in himself. So people usually hang around their own team in their own spot 
because they are comfortable there and can get business. Even they take the customer 
somewhere else they don‘t hang around there to wait for new customer. They 
normally go back to their spot. But at the big tourist place like Tuol Sleng (S-21 
genocide museum) sometimes its more freely and people can take a customer from 
there even if not part of the team… It a bit different for every team probably. 
 
Occasionally tuktuk drivers even pay hotel managers or market owners for prime 
locations. An earlier quote from tuktuk driver Den detailed how he had recently 
become a tutuk driver and was hoping to get a parking space at a popular market. 
However these are in high demand and a payment to the market must be made. A 
tuktuk driver therefore cannot simply stop on another person‟s site and take their 
potential customers. There must be an agreement, overseen by a hotel/market or a 
team leader. The agreement usually relates to the number of drivers present, how well 
each driver is known to each other and how trust worthy they are, perhaps even price 
setting, before another driver is allowed to park outside certain parts of the city. 
Consequently there are agreed arrangements between tuktuk drivers and tuktuk driver 
teams as to their presence within the city. Another driver Tim also worked on the 
riverside, but moved up and down the promenade. Tim elaborated further on the 
presence of teams: 
Tim: Is very hard, some hotels have teams and some teams stay in some places, so if 
you are new, you have a tuktuk and speak English, but if you don‘t know someone, it 
is not easy to find a place to work. It has become more difficult… I come to this spot 
(riverside) for me I always move along the Mekong riverfront. I don‘t like to stay in 
front of one hotel because the hotel around the river front, if you stand in front the 
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hotel, the tourist walk out and they never take a tuktuk because they walk out and 
from here to somewhere like museum or palace is very close so they can walk. The 
team, like around Raffle Hotel, This is a team, they have around twenty driver, they 
got an organisation, arrangement, only twenty no more, but here is no problem, 
everyone can come and work. But it depend on your ability, if you have ability, good 
English, you can. Business depends on ability… but for me yunno, I can say, I am a 
driver who knows a lot. I never go west but I know the western culture and I always 
tell my customer to be careful in my limousine! Take care of bags, cos here is 
different… exactly, some months is good for tourist. March to August is low. From 
September to February is good. 6 month low 6 month high. Weekend is the busiest 
time. You know boxing, apsara dancing, lots of programme. Depend on the 
programme, you say oh you want to see kick boxing sir? I can say in the mornings not 
busy, tourist come here on holiday take a rest! Say about 10am people decide to go 
yunno, go killing field you know. But now, even though high, because of tour 
company. The tour company collect tourist from everywhere. They have partner 
business abroad. So now is high time, but for me it is not. The tour company you 
know, they have website, everything, partner, business… for me? nothing, only me! 
But right now I don‘t think about other job, but I cannot guess the future. 
 
If you stay in front of apartment or flat, foreigner area, like BKK1 you can have 
regular customer, but not expensive, just normal price. But this (location, the 
riverside) is just for tourist. But the most popular area in Phnom Penh is where the 
foreigner like to live and stay, BKK1 and around Russian Market, S-21 (genocide 
museum) but for me I work for tourist not local or foreigner… Yunno from 2007 to 
now is very hard to make business with this job, but before 2007 not lots of drivers 
now the job is famous, before is better. Not only my job, but all sellers in the market, 
everyone, but now everyone from countryside is coming here. It is narrow from one 
day to one day. Very narrow.  
 
Tim described above how the different locations across the city speak to drivers with 
different abilities and expected income. Some tuktuk drivers might prefer to have 
regular customers and therefore might situate themselves in the highly international 
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area of Phnom Penh, Boeung Keng Kang 1 (BKK1). A tuktuk driver might drop 
someone off to work each day, drop their children off to schools and do the 
subsequent daily pick ups as well. This will result in a regular income, but the driver 
will be limited in how much they can negotiate their prices. A different driver might 
be able to become part of a team on the riverside where there are many tourists. 
Having tourists as customers provides an opportunity for drivers to inflate prices or 
encourage tourists to do extra tours and programmes, as tourists are unaware of how 
distances and prices. An income in this area might be more irregular, some drivers 
may only have one or two customers a day, but just two journeys at inflated prices 
could be very lucrative. However to be in these locations the tuktuk driver must have 
a good command of English and/or French so as to communicate with their 
customers. If a driver cannot speak English or another foreign language, their 
opportunities may concentrate around markets or Khmer hotels. The customer base in 
these areas is predominantly Khmer and distances are usually local. The drivers in 
these instances are dependent on frequent short journeys. However these areas are 
also highly desirable and a new driver requires some lead, a friend or relative, to open 
the opportunity for them to join a team. 
 
If a driver is considered to have broken this arrangement, they may be exiled from a 
part of the city and victim to abuse or even destruction of property. This research 
argues that there is a form of regulation present here whereby the rules are created and 
reinforced by those to whom they apply. The presence of this regulation is also found 
amongst street traders, for whom there are commonly agreed locations within the city 
for individuals to sell their products or produce. However unlike the tuktuk drivers 
who are free to negotiate their fee, the price of goods is commonly set by sellers 
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verbally whilst they prepare their products and produce, before they set out for the 
day. This ensures that individuals do not under cut each other and therefore expect a 
decent price for their items. If a seller under cuts the other sellers, they may be 
excluded from collect buying power, verbally attacked or beaten, or banned from 
parts of the city. Again here it is clear that there are rules that must be followed 
amongst sellers, to ensure that they earn enough money to survive. These rules are set 
by themselves and are upheld by themselves. One household respondent explained 
their own horizontal regulations: 
Every morning, first light, we go to the market and buy fresh shells. By buying all 
together we get a good price. But some days the shells are not so fresh. Some days so 
bad we cannot buy them. Some days no shells for sale at the market. Then we bring 
the shells back in buckets and everyone gets what they paid for but normally we get 
one large bucket each. There are maybe 20-30 people or more here who sell shells 
everyday. Some people own their shell cart but most people rent it from a man across 
the water. Some people add salt or chilli to the shells. I keep chilli in a bag and 
someone can buy it as extra. Depending on the price we paid for the shells in the 
morning, we set a price per tin of shells.
53
 The people who have been here the longest, 
like me, we have our areas set. For me my business is around Steung Meanchey. I do 
a good business here. No one else from our group is allowed to sell there unless they 
ask me or I have finished. Other people sell near the markets. Some people walk the 
streets and go by schools and businesses. Some people have to walk a long, long way 
to sell their shells but if it is a good spot it is worth it. If you are new, you are allowed 
to buy shells but it is up to you to find a new place to sell them. Also, whether you sell 
all your shells or not, you have to pay for them. 
 
                                                 
53
 Shells sellers fill an old tin can with shells as a measure. These are then put in a 
plastic bag for the customer to take away. If the seller doesn‟t have plastic bags, the 
seller will wait for the person to finish eating the shells from the tin before continuing 
on. 
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The shell sellers had a small window to sell their stock, as the shells were exposed to 
the heat and sunlight on the open cart tops. As the sellers sold on the streets, the shells 
were out in the sun and heat for the entire morning and by the afternoon would have 
gone bad and were lost stock. Therefore with just the morning and lunchtime to sell, 
competition over location was fierce. The settlement site was littered with heaps of 
unsold shells, rotting in the sun. One household respondent in particular, a young 
woman, mentioned that the collective buying of the shells was a reason she had rented 
a small room in the site. However the respondent was not successful in her selling, 
and a few weeks later „disappeared‟ one night owing rent to the landlord and money 
to the shell sellers. 
 
The term horizontal regulation may be understood in a similar vein to that of Frances 
Stewart‟s „horizontal inequalities‟ (Stewart, 2002). The notion of horizontal 
inequalities aims to understand the relationship between cultural groups in society and 
had been used by Stewart and the UK‟s Department for International Development‟s 
Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) to identify 
economic, social and political horizontal inequalities as causes of conflict (CRISE, 
2010). Whilst the similarities between the concepts goes awry here, the initial 
conceptualisation behind horizontal inequalities can be useful for understanding 
horizontal regulation in that the point of focus is the relations between groups (or 
within groups or between individuals in this case), rather than between the state and a 
group. A similar concept has been found in European law, that of Direct Impact 
Effect (EU legislation summary, 2010). Direct Impact Effect has two forms, 
horizontal and vertical. Vertical Direct Impact Effect is a consequence of 
relationships between an individual and a state. Horizontal Direct Impact Effect is a 
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consequence of a relationship between two individuals. However whilst these 
definitions legislate the ability of an individual to call another individual or a state 
before a national or European court, they illustrate another example of a consequential 
peer-to-peer relationship. Whereas horizontal regulation is an important concept as it 
challenges a core assumption of the informal economy that it is unregulated, 
moreover the term presents a nuanced approach to current debate concerning 
organisation within the informal economy. Horizontal regulation offers an alternative 
discourse to narratives within debate and prefixed assumptions surrounding means of 
organisation, trade unions and social institutions as economic regulators. 
 
4.2.iv Household livelihood data  
To develop a more detailed understanding of household income the data has been 
broken down into settlement averages. Unfortunately this was not possible to the 
same extent for household expenditure as respondents from resettlement sites 
struggled to remember accurate daily expenditure amounts on items such as food, 
transport, education, medicine etc. This can be explained by the fact that in some 
cases resettlement had taken place up to a decade earlier. The problem of information 
recall is a long standing issue for researchers (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld & 
Sailer, 1984). However it was decided that income from jobs held when living in 
former sites was more reliable, as household respondents were more confident in 
giving accurate wage amounts, although the author recognises income recall too is 
problematic. In respect to this, when income was difficult to remember, further 
clarifying questions were posed, such as often another family member completed the 
same task or perhaps managed household finances. Data collected by the Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI) and other sources concerning wages and 
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prices, particularly price increase and wage stagnation, will be discussed to 
contextualise the data collected. 
 
Figure 21 outlines the average weekly pay of the different job types included in the 
household survey. The range between the highest and lowest incomes has been 
included so as to expose the variation within job types. This table affords an insight 
into the weekly incomes of various job types within the city. 
 
However the reader should be aware that not all jobs are worked across seven days or 
for all of the year. This was mediated for as much as possible with, by calculating 
income based on number of days worked and income per day. The choice of 
representing income per month was made, as this would typify a month working, 
rather than annual income, as during the months of harvest work is frequently put on 
hold.  
 
Income and expenditure are investigated in Figures 22, 23 and 24. When collecting 
this data the number of days worked on average each individual was accounted for. 
For example motodop drivers tend to work every day, as do construction workers. 
However, garment factory workers often work 6 days per week, but may work 
overtime. Number of working hours, days and months was taken into consideration 
when calculating weekly household income. 
 
Figure 22 displays the average number of household members in each settlement, 
average household income and average income per household member (in $USD). At 
the bottom of the table, the total averages are given. Despite central locations, the  
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Fig. 21 Weekly income by job type, average per week, lowest and highest incomes, 
USD 
Job type Av. Low High Job type Av. Low High 
Agricultural worker 11.29 7.50 24.00 Lawyer 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Beautician 24.50 24.50 24.50 Manual Labour 14.27 3.94 112.00 
Beggar 8.75 8.75 8.75 
Market seller:  
Food 
10.79 5.00 63.00 
Business owner 15.75 25.00 35.00 Mechanic 9.00 18.75 20.00 
Cleaner  
(Domestic) 
13.00 15.00 25.00 Musician 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Cleaner  
(Kitchen/Rest.) 
15.00 11.25 12.50 Secretary 13.13 5.00 37.50 
Cleaner  
(Vehicles) 
7.50 15.00 15.00 Security guard 21.88 18.75 25.00 
Construction 16.18 1.25 26.25 Sex worker 15.00 15.00 15.00 
Cook/Chef 16.00 5.00 22.50 Shop owner 12.43 3.50 525.00 
Crafts: Handicraft 23.31 10.00 35.00 Shop worker 25.77 8.75 87.50 
Driver: Cyclo 30.00 7.00 17.50 
Skilled:  
Carpenter 
8.95 6.25 75.00 
Driver:  
Delivery/ 
moving 
20.00 26.25 30.00 
Skilled:  
Electrician 
17.50 17.50 17.50 
Driver: Motodop 13.99 2.50 52.50 Skilled: Tailor 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Driver: Taxi 40.00 40.00 40.00 Soldier 18.33 13.25 18.75 
Driver: Tuktuk 87.50 87.50 87.50 
Street seller:  
Deserts 
25.38 7.50 78.75 
Ejai  
(recyclables) 
15.79 1.00 26.25 
Street seller:  
Drinks 
35.00 35.00 35.00 
Engineer 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Street seller:  
Food 
20.28 3.75 87.50 
Factory worker 20.63 8.75 32.50 
Street seller:  
Other 
18.93 6.25 43.75 
Fortune teller 125.00 125.00 125.00 
Street seller:  
Toys 
12.50 12.50 12.50 
Hair dresser/ Barber 17.50 17.50 17.50 Teacher 43.75 43.75 43.75 
Hotel worker 45.00 45.00 45.00 
Village  
Representative 
3.75 3.75 3.75 
Laundry 23.33 8.75 35.00 Waiter 15.00 15.00 15.00 
AVERAGE TOTALS 26 21 51 
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Fig. 22 Average number of household members, 
weekly household income in $USD and income 
per household member per day. 
CH1 
No. in HH 4 
HH total income PW $ $55.85 
$ per person per day $1.99 
RK1 
No. in HH 4 
HH total income PW $ $63.00 
$ per person per day $2.25 
RK2 
No. in HH 5 
HH total income PW $ $29.55 
$ per person per day $0.84 
R_TK1  
No. in HH 6.6 
HH total income PW $ $99.13 
$ per person per day $2.15 
R_ME1  
No. in HH 5 
HH total income PW $ $30.13 
$ per person per day $0.86 
R_ME2  
No. in HH 5 
HH total income PW $ $53.75 
$ per person per day $1.54 
R_ME3  
No. in HH 6.5 
HH total income PW $ $67.60 
$ per person per day $1.48 
TOTAL AVERAGES 
No. in HH 4.2 
HH total income PW $ $53.30 
$ per person per day $1.81 
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average weekly income varies dramatically from settlement to settlement, from as 
much as $99.13 to as little as $29.55, a difference of $69.58 per week. Individually, 
this amounts to a difference of $1.31 per household member per day. Similarly, 
income per household member per day ranges from $0.84 to $2.25. This wide 
variation would not have been evident if we had taken just the total weekly average at 
$53.30 per household and daily $1.81 per household member. Despite all settlements 
being considered urban poor and the residents being part of the „informal economy‟, it 
is clear that there is much variation within this term relating to household income. 
 
Figure 23 is a comparison of household income and expenditure, portrays the inability 
to meet household needs as four of the seven settlements exceed their weekly income. 
In settlement. Site RK2 is particularly shocking as households are in deficit by almost 
as much as they are bringing in therefore earning only half of what they need to 
survive. Households usually cover this debt by taking out loans and partaking in 
borrowing schemes (discussion to follow, see Figure 39). 
 
Figure 24 evidences the importance of taking a more nuanced approach to household 
income and expenditure as the total averages tell a very different story when the 
figures are broken down by site. To put the figures into perspective, the national 
poverty line currently sits at $0.61 (2,473KHR) per person per day, $1 being roughly 
the equivalent of 4000KHR. However when we take into account that over 80 per 
cent of the Cambodian population live in rural areas, one might expect the national 
poverty line to be inaccurate in relation to the urban poor. This would be because of 
the inflated prices and cost of living in Phnom Penh, where prices for rent and daily 
goods are commonly double or triple their rural equivalent. 
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Fig. 23 Comparison of average number of household members, average 
weekly household income and expenditure in sites facing eviction 
 Income Expenditure +/- 
CH1 
No. in HH 4 4 / 
HH Total income $USD $55.85 $32.51 +$23.35 
$USD per person per day $1.99 $1.16 +$0.83 
RK1 
No. in HH 4 4 / 
HH Total income $USD $63.00 $72.88 -$9.88 
$USD per person per day $2.25 $2.60 -$0.35 
RK2 
No. in HH 5 5 +0.4 
HH Total income $USD $29.55 $57.44 -$27.89 
$USD per person per day $0.84 $1.64 -$0.80 
R_TK1  
No. in HH 6.6 7 0.4 
HH Total income $USD $99.13 $43.40 +$55.73 
$USD per person per day $2.01 $0.89 $1.12 
R_ME1  
No. in HH 5 5 / 
HH Total income $USD $30.13 $86.70 -$56.57- 
$USD per person per day $1.28 $2.48 $1.20- 
R_ME2  
No. in HH 5 5 / 
HH Total income $USD $53.75 $33.00 +$20.75 
$USD per person per day $1.54 $0.94 $0.60 
  R_ME3 
No. in HH 6.5 5.8 -0.7 
HH Total income $USD $67.60 $41.55 +$26.05 
$USD per person per day $1.66 $1.02 +$0.64 
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For example, on a good day a motodop driver in Phnom Penh might earn 10,000KHR 
($2.50), a construction worker 15,000KHR ($3.75) and a garment factory worker 
11,000KHR ($2.75) per day. However these incomes, whilst above the national 
poverty line, are barely able to support individuals, let alone families, in Phnom Penh. 
For example rice per kilo can be as little as 700-800KHR in the provinces, whereas in 
Phnom Penh rice retails for 2200-3700KR (data for 2014, taken from 
www.agriculturalmarketing.org.kh ). 
 
The issue of price increase is not isolated to Phnom Penh or even Cambodia. It is a 
result of international factors as well as domestic demand and supply. CRDI‟s „Impact 
of High Food Prices Report‟ (2008) identifies food prices increasing by 36.8 per cent 
nationally from 2007 to 2008, housing materials and transport by 27 per cent for the 
same period (CDRI, 2008, p.9). Focusing on the food prices, the report indicates that 
rice, the staple food in Cambodia, rose by 100 per cent March to July in 2007 and the 
same period in 2008. This was across all rice varieties as well. Meat rose by 50 per 
cent and meat and vegetables rose 20-30 per cent (CDRI, 2008, p.9). CDRI released 
Fig. 24 Average income and expenditure comparison in sites facing eviction and 
resettlement sites 
TOTAL AVERAGES 
 Income Expenditure +/- 
Sites Facing Eviction 
No. in HH 4.3 4.3 / 
HH Total income $USD $53.30 $36.88 +$16.42 
$USD per person per day $1.77 $1.23 +$0.54 
Resettlement site 
No. in HH 5.8 5.7 / 
HH Total income $USD $62.65 $51.16 +$11.49 
$USD per person per day $1.54 $1.28 +$0.26 
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an assessment of the 2008 price rise, „Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Rising Food 
Prices on the Poor and Vulnerable and Policy Reponses in Cambodia‟ in 2012. This 
report attributed the price rise to three demand-side explanations and five supply-side 
observations. The demand-side explanations were the growing global population 
partnered with strong income growth in emerging economies, the increased 
production of ethanol and bio-fuel and precautionary actions taken by regional 
countries such as the Philippines, which imported higher quantities of rice in the first 
quarter of 2008 to avoid incurring further price increases (CDRI, 2012, pp. 4-5). 
Supply-side explanations included dwindling food stocks, slow productivity, poor 
weather conditions, high fuel prices and restrictions on export (CDRI, 2012, p. 5). 
The depreciation of the US dollar was also listed as a contributor to increased food 
prices paired with low interest rates at this time (CDRI, 2012, p. 6).  
 
Figure 25 is a list of recent prices in Phnom Penh compared with prices for similar 
goods in the Province of Battambong. Battambong was chosen because there was the 
most data available for this province.
54
 Figures were taken at their highest cost for the 
prices in Battambong whereas the figures for Phnom Penh were taken by a 
Cambodian research colleague in the Daemkor market in Phnom Penh in February 
2014. Other prices for everyday goods were collected in Phnom Penh however 
comparative figures were not available. It is understood that this table is not by any 
means comprehensive however it does illustrate the higher cost of living in Phnom 
Penh for these basic goods, showing that goods in Battambong are as much as double 
the price in Phnom Penh. 
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Fig. 25 The price difference for basic food goods 
between Phnom Penh and Battambong 
Item Weight 
g/kg 
Phnom Penh 
(USD) 
Battambong 
(USD) 
Rice 1kg $0.55 – 0.93 $0.20 
Green leaf 
vegetables 
250g $0.13 $0.06 
Pork 1kg $3.00 $2.22  
Chicken 1kg $5.75 $3.75  
Fish 1kg $3.00 $2.00 
 
Both the 2008 and 2012 CDRI reports indicate that increases in food prices have 
negative consequences for the poor in both rural and urban settings, where obtaining 
food can be a daily struggle (CDRI 2008, p. 6; CDRI, 2012). When talking about the 
weekly cost of food for a household in Phnom Penh, the most frequent response was 
roughly 10,000R ($2.50USD). However after speaking with a respondent who at first 
appeared to misunderstand the question, it became clear that she was asking for 
further clarification: basic food or nutritious food? 10,000R she explained, will buy 
you basic rations of rice and a few vegetables, but if a person wants meat and eggs 
and other more nutritious food the cost increases from 10,000R to 15,000-20,000R 
per week.  
 
The cost of nutritious food and not simply subsistence has been highlighted in the 
CDRI 2008 report which recorded 50 per cent of people contacted for the report tried 
to save money by purchasing less nutritionally balanced and varied foods. Other 
strategies include parents eating less and giving more their children, skipping meals 
all together, work extra hours or extra jobs. These strategies have been identified as a 
contributing decline in health and well being as well as school drop out rates as young 
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people leave school to work or take care of sick relatives (CDRI, 2008, pp.58-59).
55
 
 
What the above figures do not show us however are levels of household saving, 
borrowing and debt. Figure 26 presents a breakdown of settlement saving habits. It is 
clear that saving at home is by far the most common means of saving, followed by 
Dong Tin. Dong Tin is a rotating saving scheme, whereby one individual is held 
responsible for collecting and saving an agreed amount of money for an agreed 
amount of time from within a trusted group. Every week or month, money is 
deposited and those saving are able to request access to the joint funds. Each 
individual is only able to access the funds once per cycle, and must make their case as 
to the importance of the request. 
Fig. 26 Means of Households saving 
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 The factors described here are known as food security issues and are discussed in 
detail in the CDRI 2008 and 2012 reports, and by the World Food Programme here: 
https://www.wfp.org/countries/cambodia 
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Dong Tin can be very risky however as the saving scheme relies upon trust. One 
respondent recalled their local Dong Tin collector running away with over $500 USD. 
However community rotating saving schemes such as Dong Tin are being advocated 
in developing countries as they thought to encourage values such as democracy, 
community cohesion and reciprocity (Benda, 2013). 
 
 With large deficits to cover, money saving schemes and borrowing are commonplace 
in Phnom Penh. Overall 28 per cent of households were able to save money regularly, 
71 per cent were not and 2 per cent did not respond. Of the 28 per cent that were able 
to save regularly, 64 per cent saved at home, 6 per cent saved with a bank, 3 per cent 
saved with a community saving scheme, 21 per cent saved using Dong Tin and 6 per 
cent saved using other means.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the majority of households surveyed in Phnom Penh, albeit a 
marginal majority of 56 per cent, do not borrow money. 43 per cent do borrow and 1 
per cent did not answer. Of the 43 per cent that do borrow, 21 per cent borrow from 
the bank, 4 per cent borrow from family members, 8 per cent from other sources, but 
the majority at 60 per cent borrow from private moneylenders. This is usually the case 
as to borrow from a formal organisation; one needs not only an official state 
identification card but also a bank account and often a land title. Without regular 
contractual income and a sizeable deposit, many Cambodians are denied bank 
accounts. The land registration process, which has been in operation since 2007 with 
the aid of the World Bank, has been fraught with corruption, nepotism and delay 
(HRW, 2013). Identification documents, if stolen, lost or damaged, cost money to 
replace. As a result, many Cambodians are denied access to secure financial 
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institutions because of these administrative hurdles. As a result, private money 
lending at extreme interest rates is the only option for many. 
 
Other items that are desirable and useful for aiding or supplementing a household 
income include owning a moto, a bicycle, a TV, radio or a phone. A motodop can be 
used to earn money or take people to work, or both. One respondent allowed his 
friend to rent the moto from him during the day to work as a motodop driver provided 
that he take him to and from work. Bicycles can similarly allow people to get to work, 
to take children to school and earn income from renting them out. TVs and radios are 
useful not only for entertainment but can also be used to set up impromptu karaoke 
sessions or screen popular dramas, sporting events and films. Phones too are used to 
receive calls for work for casual labourers but are also rented out for people to make 
phone calls from. In this situation the cost of the call is supplemented with a small 
charge. 
 
However, phones require credit and electricity for charging and motos require petrol 
and maintenance. These items may supplement income but will no doubt involve 
initial buying costs and significant running costs. Data regarding income on these 
items was not captured regrettably, as these are often ad hoc and opportunistic means 
of generating money, nonetheless their importance was evident from speaking with 
household respondents and members. Figure 27 displays their frequency in 
households facing eviction and former sites. 
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Fig. 27 Frequency of desirable income supporting items 
 
 
In one of the central settlement sites, CH1, small crops and chickens were noted upon 
our arrival. The chickens were left to wander and the small salad leaf crops and 
morning glory, were being grown in the sewage. The chickens were kept for food 
however the small crops were sold at market, despite their unsanitary growing 
conditions. A large white rabbit was noted in one household, although this was kept 
for luck rather than food, the respondent replied. Perhaps the rabbit gave some means 
of income as well, however it was undisclosed. Due to the nature of living in highly 
urban areas, the presence of animals or small crops was limited. In resettlement sites 
however, there was increased space and it was more common to see small plants 
growing around houses and chickens. In one house in R_TK1 there was even a cow. 
The cow had cost the owner $200USD and was kept inside with the family. The 
presence of livestock and small crops in the case study sites is shown in Figure 28 
however sites RK1, RK2 and R_ME2 have been excluded from the graph as no 
residents were recorded as having either livestock or crops. 
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Fig. 28 Livestock ownership and small crop farming 
 
A final opportunistic means of earning extra money was described by tuktuk driver 
Tim, who often allowed companies to advertise on his tuktuk: 
Tim: Poster you know, if they advertise on the street is more expensive, so you 
advertise on the tuktuk on the limousine, is cheaper, one poster in one place but 
tuktuk is everywhere. Depend on the price, if the poster is big no, but $8 per month 
for small nice poster, is ok. Easy to get money. If the office is far then no, need to be 
easy to get the money. $7 or more, depend on size and where is office. The wind 
blocked by the sign if too big. 
 
Advertising for companies, particularly phone companies, can be seen across the city 
and the country. Many tuktuk advertise all kinds of businesses from new bars and 
restaurants to political parties. When one household survey respondent was asked 
about the presence of advertisement umbrellas and banners surrounding her small 
shop, she replied that the items were given for free by the phone company when she 
bought sim cards and phone credit vouchers to sell. The phone company and the seller 
had found mutual benefit from these umbrellas: The phone company had free 
advertisement while the shop owner had shade to sit under and keep her items for sale 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Small livestock e.g. chicken, duck
Large livestock e.g. cow, pig
Small crops
R_ME3 R_ME1 R_TK1 CH1
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out of the sun. In the case of tuktuk drivers, they were paid extra money to advertise 
the posters. 
 
The data presented in this section has outlined household monetary income and 
expenditure and the variety of alternative livelihood generating practices that together 
create the urban poor economy. The urban poor economy is characterised by urban 
poor resident‟s flexibility, versatility and resilience, which are demonstrated through 
the breadth of livelihood generating behaviours and opportunities demonstrated in this 
chapter. 
 
 
4.3 What are the present housing conditions of the urban poor? 
The above section focused on livelihoods and alternative livelihood supporting 
practices. This section shifts the focus on urban poverty to the living conditions of the 
urban poor and how the classification of tenure is vitally important in regards to 
development and forced evictions. The section begins by critiquing the terminology „‟ 
as a negative label that does not reflect the living circumstances of many respondents 
who took part in the household survey. Rather status of tenure is offered as a more 
appropriate means of disaggregating the different living conditions and offers a more 
nuanced understanding housing issues facing the urban poor. Tenure is also crucial as 
it is upon tenure status that compensation for evictions is calculated.  
 
The rate of global urbanisation has exceeded all predictions and expectations and for 
the first time in the history of the world, the urban population exceeds that of the rural 
(UN-HABITAT, 2007). At the same time, urban poor houses are emerging and 
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growing at an astonishing rate as cities gain an average of 5 million residents per 
month (UN-HABITAT 2008). UN-HABITAT „State of the Worlds Cities 2008/2009‟ 
report predicted that 60 per cent of the global population would be urban dwellers 
within the next two decades and that, by 2050, one in three people will live in a slum. 
In Cambodia the urban population has risen from 12.6 per cent of the total population 
in 1989 to 20 per cent in 2009. The percentage of the urban population living in low 
standard housing has risen from 72 per cent in 1990 to 78 per cent in 2005 (see 
Appendix 1).  
 
The UN-HABITAT 2007 „State of the World‟s Cities‟ report uses the term slum to 
refer to urban poor dwellings. The report defines a slum household as a group of 
individuals living under the same roof in an urban area who lack one or more of the 
following criteria: 
1. Durable housing of a permanent nature that protects against extreme climate 
conditions. 
2. Sufficient living space, which means not more than three people sharing the 
same room. 
3. Easy access to safe water in sufficient amounts at an affordable price. 
4. Access to adequate sanitation in the form of a private or public toilet shared 
by a reasonable number of people. 
5. Security of tenure that prevents forced evictions. 
(UN-HABITAT, 2007).  
 
It should be noted that employment and income levels are excluded from the above 
criteria, yet slum dwellers are commonly characterised as being poor unemployed or 
informal workers. The degree of deprivation, UN-HABITAT suggests, is indicated by 
how many of the above criteria apply. 
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Whilst this is useful for offering a framework to measure or investigate urban poor 
housing, the use of the word slum is contested in this research. Slums are historically 
synonymous with crime and deprivation, the lowest echelons of society existing in 
dark overcrowded back streets (Davis, 2006: pp. 20-22). In particular the Khmer word 
used in lieu of slum is ana-tub-badai or „anarchy‟. Slum housing is therefore 
translated as anarchical housing. The word „anarchy‟ is associated with disorder, 
criminality, anti-establishment and immorality and is therefore vehemently 
inappropriate as a term used to refer to urban poor housing. This research departs 
from this stereotype and the homogenisation of the urban poor. In fact many of the 
criteria set out by UN-HABITAT would render the majority of properties in Phnom 
Penh as slums. Tenure security for example, as will be examined in depth, is desirable 
but not guaranteed for any resident of Phnom Penh. Further, many families and 
households routinely sleep in one room, which exceeds the three-person threshold 
indicated in criterion 2. This is not seen as an indicator of deprivation, rather a normal 
part of family life. Equally the flooding experienced by residents in the capital, 
seemingly an annual event in recent years, is not due to individual housing in 
particular but is systematic of a municipal failure to maintain and develop flood 
defences. 
 
An alternative to the negatively stereotyped term slum and the inappropriate criterion 
is UN-Habitat‟s tenure classification that identifies the different variations in tenure as 
follows: 
 Formal rights: 
o Registered (including ownership, leasehold and use/occupancy rights). 
o Unregistered but documented (e.g. rental, rent to buy, unregistered 
leases, etc.). 
 211 
o Group/family/household rights (e.g. customary/tribal/clan family 
rights, Islamic tenure types, community land trusts, etc.).   
o Unregistered and undocumented (e.g. adverse possession, use or 
occupancy rights without certificate, customary rights). 
 Irregular tenure: 
o Documented (e.g. written agreements between irregular owners and 
tenants, de facto recognition, illegal subdivisions, customary rights, 
tenancy at will, etc.). 
o Undocumented (e.g. as above but without documents). 
 Homeless. (Payne, 2004). 
This typology of tenure may be useful for moving beyond the more simplistic 
distinctions of land owner, renter and homeless, as it reflects the variation in living 
arrangements of the urban poor. However, there are different degrees of tenure 
security amongst this typology. Khmero and Payne identify 12 further nuances to the 
Cambodian tenure system: 
1. Pavement/mobile dweller,  
2. Tenant in informal housing,  
3. Unauthorised occupation of state public land or mobile boat house,  
4. Unauthorised occupation of state private land or building roof top,  
5. Unauthorised occupation of private land or building roof top,  
6. Temporary housing allocated by government agency,  
7. Family registered book,  
8. Social concession by the government,  
9. Tenant in formal housing,  
10. Court order after dispute,  
11. Certificate of possession,  
12. Certificate of ownership.  
 
Whilst the first six are considered to be informal tenure and the second six to be 
formal tenure, the level of tenure security is far less easily defined. For example one 
settlement may involve multiple forms of tenure categories, whereas those partaking 
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in „unauthorised occupations‟ have a different level of security depending on whether 
the land is state private land or state public land (Khemro and Payne, 2004, pp. 184-
185). State public land includes roads, parks, bridges, port and airports. The rights of 
the public to this land are inalienable. However the tenure of state private land, land 
used for government buildings, ministries, institutions and other vacant land identified 
as belonging to the state, may be redefined. This difference may seem negligible, 
however it is important for DIDR as unauthorised occupants of state private land are 
able to challenge their evictions and the tenure status of the land, whereas 
unauthorized occupants on state public land cannot (Khemro & Payne, 2004, p. 184; 
Payne, 2004, p.10). 
 
Using this more detailed typology and following his fieldwork in Cambodia and the 
Philippines, Payne recommends a comprehensive pro-poor tenure regularisation 
policy. The first step towards this pro-poor policy is the cessation of forced evictions. 
Second, all extra-legal settlements should be surveyed for hazards and Temporary 
Occupation Licences (TOLs) offered to residents found to be living in hazardous 
locations. Payne calls for TOLs to be provided for all extra-legal settlements 
residents, making clear that these are not permanent titles, which Payne argues, will 
increase tenure security without driving up land prices. A range of locations, tenure 
options and developments should be offered to residents after an audit of planning and 
building developments, before a multi-stakeholder partnership is promoted, aimed at 
maximising public benefit from private investment in the city. Finally, Payne 
advocates for institutional reform of the public sector to tackle corruption but also 
build capacity and attract young professionals who would otherwise be drawn to the 
private sector. 
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Payne admits nonetheless, that whilst an occupier may have increased tenure security, 
that without land rights, the occupier may be constrained as to what can be done with 
the land (2004, p.169), such as building restrictions or restrictions on the number of 
tenants. However as Payne identifies, and this thesis advocates, priorities amongst 
urban residents vary. A formal land title may be a priority for the Cambodian urban 
elite whereas increased tenure security, although not necessarily a land title, may be 
the preference of the urban middle class. The urban poor however, prioritise 
proximity to labour opportunities over tenure security and land titles (p.170, 2004). 
This is evident from the building of homes in dangerous or unsanitary locations such 
as over sewers, beside main roads or along the riverbank (see the presentation of case 
studies in section 3.2.iii). 
 
A preparation report for the 2007 UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements 
by Graeme Bristol provides an insight into the MPPs approach to tenure security of 
the urban poor as a part of the development of Phnom Penh. Acutely aware of the 
problem of tenure security, the MPP and local NGOs and various interested groups 
met between 2001 and 2003 to discuss ways in which tenure security could be better 
managed and improved. A pilot project investigating the urban poor was established, 
beginning with a fact-finding mission to clarify the development strategy and 
processes including investigations into resettlement sites, land availability and site 
mapping (Bristol, 2007, pp. 44-46). Following this three case study communities were 
selected, mapped, analysed. The project marked a significant achievement: a 
collective, democratic and transparent approach to urban poor settlement upgrading 
precedent had been established. A city-wide vision was developed including a 
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practical alternative strategy to forced evictions, inclusive of the MPP, NGOs and 
residents, was a reality (Bristol, 2007, p. 45). 
 
The tenure security pilot project was shelved soon after its completion and the 
inclusive development strategy abandoned by all levels of government (Bristol, 
2007). Bristol‟s damning report makes it clear that political change will be a long time 
coming, however the poor must organise and look for alternative means of support: 
Security of tenure continues to deteriorate in Phnom Penh and throughout the country 
and does so largely because of land grabs motivated by development pressures, 
gentrification and beautification — most of which are motivated by money... The 
Cambodian government has, in that respect, failed its citizens, or certainly those who 
are poor. Under such conditions, if the poor are to gain any security of tenure they 
must continue to lobby the government for change, but, more importantly, they must 
find support in international investors, developers, companies, agencies and 
countries. They already have the support of the under-resourced local NGOs. They 
also have the support of the international NGOs such as AHRC, Human Rights Watch 
and COHRE as well as the support of the UN agencies and other governments. 
Although the communities and the local NGOs lack resources, they cannot wait for 
the government to change. One of the most urgent activities they can undertake in a 
coordinated way is the collection of information. Even the act of collecting data about 
one‘s own community is an act of solidarity and an organizational strategy. (Bristol, 
2007, p. 47). 
 
After an impassioned report, Bristol‟s recommendations fall short. He rightly 
recognises that political change is not forthcoming and that alternative avenues should 
be explored, however he simultaneously identifies the urban poor as having support of 
NGOs, international organisations and transnational agencies, and calls for their 
support as the way to move forward. 
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 Without a doubt, the opportunity to own land rather than rent land is likely to be met 
with open arms by the urban poor. What this research has identified however, is that 
the demands and strains on urban poor residents stem not simply from the lack of land 
titles, but from the absence of tenure vulnerability and job security. Owning land but 
being unable to work is less desirable than renting a house and being able to work. 
 
As outlined in the methodology, this section will present data from seven settlement 
sites: three sites facing eviction and four resettlement sites. This section will address 
the housing conditions prior to eviction including the size, structure, tenure status, 
flooding, access to water and electricity, and proximity to local amenities such as 
schools, markets and health facilities. From this baseline understanding, an 
examination into the circumstances of respondents after DIDR will investigate how 
resettlement has changed the lives of respondents in Chapter Five.  
 
4.3.i Size, structure, ownership and access 
In a similar critique aimed at the word „slum‟, the term „informal dwelling‟ is also not 
appropriate for encompassing all dwelling types of the urban poor. „Informal 
dwelling‟ suggests that a dwelling is self-constructed, vulnerable to the elements or to 
illegally occupying land. Four of the households from settlements facing eviction in 
the household survey however, lived in well-constructed permanent housing. Figure 
29 shows a permanent well-constructed house and for comparison, an informal 
dwelling. The walls of the house on the left in Figure 29 are made of concrete and 
brick and the roof is a sheet of corrugated iron. The house on the left in Figure 30 on 
the other hand, is a basic wooden and bamboo structure with no doors, tarpaulin and 
plastic for walls and a palm leaf woven roof.  
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To call both houses „informal dwellings‟ is therefore misleading. The term urban poor 
dwelling is used by in this thesis to relate to describe the homes of the urban poor, 
relating to the low income of the respondent, rather than the materials and structure of 
their home. Further detail regarding the dwelling infrastructure was collected during 
the household survey which recorded the size of plots, the primary materials of the 
dwelling structure, whether the dwelling had a toilet, whether it flooded during the 
wet season, and whether the access roads were well maintained. 
 
 
 
The smallest plots recorded were 4m
2
 however the majority of plots were between 4 
and 20m
2
. The average plot was 28m
2
 and the three households whose plots were 
between 100-200m
2
 were all from site R_ME3. Structures were predominantly made 
of wood, with over 108 households recording wood as a main structural material. 63 
households recorded metal as the second most common, with concrete third frequent 
Fig. 29 Permanent house, site RK1 Fig. 30 Informal dwellings, RK2 
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at 10, bamboo being recorded seven times, plastic and palm at five times each and 
brick only twice. Wood is a desirable material as it is easily shaped, replaced and does 
not retain heat in the property. Metal is commonly used for roofing however 
respondents often said that brick or concrete would be the most desirable building 
material, as these houses keep cool in the hot season and retain warmth during the 
cooler times of year. Whilst corrugated metal, plastic and palm are usually used for 
roofing and all other materials for walls and doors, regrettably what each material was 
used for not specified in the survey. 
 
Regardless of the structural material however, many properties suffered from flooding 
and leaking during the wet season. Figure 31 displays the data collected on flooding 
in each settlement. Overall 79 out of 122 households suffered from flooding.  
Flooding and leakage can undermine the structure of a building; spoil clothing, food 
or business stock. Regular flooding and living in damp conditions is detrimental to 
household member‟s health, particularly the vulnerable young and older members. 
Flooding also facilitates the spread of communicable water borne diseases including 
cholera and hepatitis, and vector borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever 
(„Technical Guidance for Flooding and Communicable Disease‟, ww.who.int). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 31 Does the property flood during the wet season? 
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Results from the household survey regarding dwelling ownership status, Figure 32, 
shows that 57 per cent of the household respondents own or owned their properties 
prior to eviction and 38 per cent have or had a rental agreement. Only 3 per cent lived 
on reclaimed land. This amounts to four households. 
Fig. 32 Status of property 
 
 
Whilst this data is not indicative of causation, it can be useful to identify correlations, 
such as the correlation between rented property and the increased chance of flooding. 
CH1 contains almost entirely rental properties and suffered greatly from flooding, 
whereas households in R_TK1 owned their properties and recorded fewer problems 
with flooding.  
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Regarding the condition of the access roads to the settlement, 67 per cent of 
households responded that they were in poor condition, 31 per cent said they were in 
good condition and 2 per cent did not answer. Poor road condition in this instance was 
defined as either being un-surfaced, as washing away during the rainy season or being 
full of pot holes. The majority of households from the positive 31 per cent are from 
R_TK1 and were living in the heart of Phnom Penh, close to Wat Phnom at this time 
along the railway. This being the centre of the city in proximity to the business district 
of Phnom Penh and major access roads, is likely reason for the good condition of the 
roads. The majority of the households who responded negatively were from site CH1 
and live in a less well-developed part of central Phnom Penh on the proposed sewage 
treatment site. Site CH1 is accessed by a rickety wooden bridge however internally; 
there are no roads, only trodden down earth and woodchips from a nearby workshop. 
 
4.3.ii Provision of utilities and access to services 
Access to sanitation and toilets is outlined as one of the indicators in UN-HABITAT‟s 
slum criteria. Figure 34 breaks down household access to a toilet. In this case, this 
indicates whether the household has their own toilet, as establishing what is a 
reasonable number of people (UN-HABITAT, 2007) sharing would be difficult to 
qualify. For example, 19 respondents in CH1 replied yes when asked if they have a 
toilet, but what they were in fact referring to was a separate wooden shack with a hole 
in the floor over an open sewer, used by a estimated 150-200 people (see Figure 33.). 
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Fig. 33 Shared toilet facilities for an estimated 150-200 people in site CH1 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 35 Percentage of household access to water and electricity 
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Fig. 34 Do you have a toilet? 
 CH1 RK1 RK2 R_TK1 R_ME1 R_ME2 R_ME3 Total 
No 19 5 1 10 3  11 49 
Yes 18  1 29   21 69 
Did not answer 2    1 1  4 
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Figure 34 indicates that the vast majority of households surveyed, 84 per cent, rely on 
private water supplies and over half, 53 per cent, on private electricity connections. 
Figure 35 displays the access and provision of water and electricity to surveyed 
households. Only 3 per cent of households had no electricity connection whatsoever 
and just 2 per cent lived without access to clean drinking water.  
 
In Phnom Penh, and across Cambodia, it is desirable to have connections to the State 
run water supplier and electricity grid, as these are significantly cheaper than the 
private connections. In Phnom Penh this means having water supplied by the Phnom 
Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) and electricity from Electricité du Cambodge 
(EDC). The term „private water provision‟ includes purchasing water by the litre or 
bottle from companies as well as paying for a private connection. The use of a 
rechargeable car battery, as well as a private connection to a private grid, is included 
under the private variable. Royal Decree no. 164NS officially established the PPWSA 
in 1959. From 1958-66 the PPWSA built two new water treatment plans and 
renovated a third. However during the KR regime the water treatment plans were shut 
down and maintenance stopped on water pipelines, which were left to fall into 
disrepair. However with assistance from the French and Japanese governments, the 
three water treatment plants are functioning, however badly damaged pipelines have 
yet to be repaired throughout the city (www.ppwsa.com/kh ). The PPWSA has been 
recognised internationally as complete transformation from an ineffective, poor 
quality, corrupt organisation losing 72 per cent of water due to leakages and illegal 
connections in 1993, to an award winning service with a loss of only 6 per cent in 
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2003 (Brennan, 2012).
56
 The PPWSA were awarded the Ramon Magsaysay 
Award for Government Service in 2006 and the Stockholm Industry Water Award in 
2010. The PPWSA has ben lauded as an exemplary service with the inclusion of pro-
poor tariffs and civil society engagement (Brennan, 2012; Water Aid, 2009). However 
some of the more peripheral areas of the city have been waiting years for a connection 
to the PPWSA. With the rate of the expansion of Phnom Penh, it is may be the case 
that many more people will be waiting for many more years to come. 
 
Electricity in Cambodia is purchased by the EDC from neighbouring Vietnam and 
Laos. Suffering a similar fate of the water treatment plants, electricity infrastructure 
was left to degrade during the KR regime. However despite renovations, a reliable 
electricity connection is scarce to be found in Cambodia, as blackouts are a daily 
occurrence for parts of the city (Phnom Penh Post, 2012). The EDC in 2012 
provisioned 290 megawatts of electricity for Phnom Penh per day, however this was 
short of the 380-400 megawatts required per day (Phnom Penh Post, 2012). Unable to 
meet present requirements, the EDC have also predicted an increase in demand of 15-
20 per cent per year, in line with urban expansion. The frequent electricity blackouts 
are not felt in all parts of the city however. The tourist areas of Phnom Penh are rarely 
hit and areas of the city that are home to government ministries, embassies and the 
Royal Palace are also saved from electricity cuts. An official from the EDC 
acknowledged the selective electricity blackouts, indicating that residential areas of 
Phnom Penh were sacrificed so as to allow for the „special places‟ to remain 
connected (Phnom Penh Post, 2013). However, more recently the entire country 
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 Details from Stockholm International Water Institute: 
http://www.siwi.org/prizes/stockholmindustrywateraward/winners/phnom-penh-
water-supply-authority/ 
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experienced a blackout during water festival, put down to disruptions in Vietnam the 
county‟s main supplier (Phnom Penh, 2015). Yet despite the regular blackouts, the 
EDC grid remains significantly cheaper than private electricity companies. In 
December 2012 one kWh from the EDC cost 610KHR ($0.15). At the same time the 
average price charged by private electricity companies was 2,495KHR per kWh 
($0.623), an increase of over 400 per cent (Facts and Figures report, STT, 2012). 
 
Household respondents saw the proximity to schools, markets and health centres as an 
enormous benefit. Figure 36 shows us that over 80 per cent of households were within 
1km of schools, markets and health centres. Households that replied that they lived 
further than 1km were often referring to their preferred medical centre, market or 
school, rather than the closest. The fact that a preference of health centre was 
discussed may be indicative of the variation in services, healthcare quality or cost of 
services and goods. For example a normal clinic may not be suitable for providing 
antenatal care to a pregnant woman or appropriate services to a HIV/AIDS sufferer. 
Different markets in Phnom Penh also specialise in different products and produce. 
Psar Tuol Tom Pong for example, caters for mostly tourists and therefore the prices 
are inflated for basic goods. Psar Orrusei specialises in wholesale goods, electrical 
goods, new clothing and fabric. Psar Boeung Keng Kang is renowned for second hand 
clothing and home wares. Therefore, proximity to a „market‟ does not guarantee the 
market will be affordable or cater for the needs of the respondent. 
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Fig. 36 Percentage of households within 1km of schools, markets and health 
centres 
 
 
 
4.4 Experiences of resettlement  
Tim: Uh Borei Keila. Boeung Kak. Cambodia a lot of people die under the city 
development. If you‘re poor, you need to run away. If you‘re talking about the law, if 
you want to move your people to outside, you must have a reasonable place. Not far 
away! I cannot agree! But the people in Cambodia they cannot refuse, they respect to 
the leader, they say ok, but they (the government) should pay and buy the land, 
depending on the price in the market, or you should have other place not far from 
city, hospital or school but you move from Boeung Kak to Kampong Speu - how do 
they live? No clean water no electricity - how can you live? The people act ok, but 
they should have fair, real, good compensation not far from where they lived. Abroad, 
if you want to move people, they have good place, not very far. The people nowadays 
they are not stupid. The protest is the last resort. The first - the police, he say now you 
leave. Here the government will build and develop the city, like lakeside (Beoung Kak 
Lake). He has a gun, I don‘t have a gun. Someone has gun? He is winning. Police in 
Cambodia, they hit or fire the gun, tie the two hands and two legs. They have a gun! 
Everyone scared of the gun. 
 
In 2011 more than 60,000 people were forcibly evicted from Phnom Penh alone 
(Open Development, 2012). The current threat of violent forced eviction and 
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inadequate compensation has been described as major human rights concern in 
Cambodia at present (Amnesty International, 2009: p. 2; LICADHO, 2009: p. 27; 
COHRE, 2009: p. 7). As shown in Chapter Four, many households are losing income 
after their resettlement. This section builds upon infrastructure and housing data from 
sites prior to eviction presented earlier in the chapter, to examine the changes that take 
place after resettlement. Changes in basic infrastructure such as roads, sanitation and 
electricity, proximity to healthcare facilities, schools and markets will be analysed to 
see if resettlement has produced positive outcomes for the urban poor. However, the 
presence of coercion, threat and violence in the eviction process is highlighted 
initially and throughout the data and discourse analysis to contextualise the 
infrastructure data. An investigation and discussion relating to compensation for 
eviction will follow. It will be argued that with large numbers of the population facing 
eviction and relocation as well as those already suffering in relocation sites, an 
increased understanding of the labour market could be used to inform and improve 
relocation procedures and processes. 
 
Figure 37 shows the responses of respondents when asked about their experiences of 
the eviction process. The results are varied due to data collection issues raised in the 
methodology, particularly for the first site, CH1. Following fixed questions with yes 
or no answers, open-ended questions followed and revealed more detail regarding 
development plans, violence, intimidation and coercion. For example, when asked 
about the plans for development in CH1 many residents were unaware of the plans or 
believed them to be rumours. The site has a high turn over of residents, many often 
staying only for a few weeks or months and so they would not necessarily be aware of 
the forthcoming eviction. Second, the plans for the site development have been 
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repeatedly pushed back, further fuelling rumours as to their genuine existence. Other 
residents in CH1 recalled a site visit two years prior in 2010 and notification of 
eviction given.  
Fig. 37 Violence and intimidation answers from household survey 
 CH1 
(39) 
RK1 
(2) 
RK2 
(5) 
R_TK1 
(39) 
R_ME1 
(4) 
R_ME2 
(1) 
R_ME3 
(32) 
Did you experience violence or intimidation? 
No 39 0 1 6 1 1 28 
Yes 0 2 4 33 3 0 4 
Did you submit a complaint? 
No 39 2 3 31 3 1 21 
Yes 0 0 2 8 1 0 11 
Did you protest? 
No 39 2 2 32 3 1 22 
Yes 0 0 3 7 1 0 10 
 
However one respondent, despite answering „No‟ to the survey questions, afterwards 
recounted her three trips to Prime Minister Hun Sen‟s house. She had gone to his 
house with the intention of speaking to him regarding the development of the site as 
she was worried about adequate compensation. It may seem strange to have gone 
directly to the Prime Minister‟s house but this is due to inadequate local channels of 
complaint or dispute resolution.
57
 It is common to hear of groups and individuals 
going straight to the Prime Minister, rather than through local government or the 
judicial system, because the local authority and judicial system is corrupt and but also 
because Hun Sen is known to hold ultimate political and economic power. The 
perception is that if something is to change it cannot be done through legitimate 
channels, only the will of Hun Sen can guarantee an outcome. Springer argues that 
this is not an accidental occurrence but a deliberate and calculated manoeuvre of Hun 
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 See section 2.2 for discussion of Cambodian governance and civil society 
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Sen to be seen as the source of power who brazenly plasters his portrait and the CPP 
logo on infrastructural projects (2011, pp. 2557). 
 
Nevertheless, upon further discussion with respondents it arose that four of the 
households came from the former Koh Pich site. Koh Pich is an island next to Phnom 
Penh, formerly wasteland and home to thousands of urban poor residents. In 2009 a 
fire raged through Koh Pich destroying all the residents‟ homes. Despite being 
reported as an accident by the police, the fire was widely spoken about as being a 
result of an arson attack by residents, as they witnessed people starting the fires 
deliberately. Residents lost their ID documents and family books in the fire: the 
official documentation required for employment, access to bank loans, international 
travel and elections. Koh Pich is now known as Diamond Island and is home to „Elite 
Town‟: luxury housing, hotels, a large convention centre and is being further 
developed. 
 
R_TK1, the railway development site, provides an interesting result. 33 of 39 
respondents responded yes when asked if they had experienced intimidation or threat 
during the eviction notice, but only eight complained and seven protested. Complaint 
here represents attempts to follow formal channels of complaint through the local 
authorities, whereas protest involves challenging a policy through alternative means 
such as refusing to leave a site, staging sit ins, organising protest marches etc. This 
site is the responsibility of the ADB and AusAid. One might imagine that the 
presence of these international actors ensured that complaint and dispute resolution 
mechanisms existed. The following is a quote from a respondent in R_TK1: 
The government threatened to destroy our house if we didn't move out. I was very 
angry, I protested but no one would listen. I sent a complaint to City Hall but received 
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no response. The previous location was much better, we had a small house in Russei 
Keo, but we had a good business. We had no debt and no worries. Now we are 
worried all the time and had to borrow $2500 to build the house and another $250 to 
buy food to sell. My two children go to our relatives in the city during the week and 
come back at weekends. We have to pay 5000KHR everyday, so they can go to school.  
 
The circumstances in this quote are not unique. Almost every respondent in R_TK1 
had a similar story. One was an HIV sufferer who was too sick to complain. This 
respondent is only able to survive in the resettlement site due to NGO assistance 
providing life saving medicine. Others wanted to complain but didn‟t know where to 
go or who to speak too. Many of those who did complain explained that the village 
chief at the time did not pass on the complaints, as they did not want to look bad in 
front of their superiors, create more work for themselves or cause trouble. 
 
Government coordinated evictions have thus far removed communities of an 
estimated 33,000 persons (15 per cent of Phnom Penh‟s population) from their homes 
and there is little sign of forced evictions and the illegal tenure of land coming to an 
end. More than 150,000 Cambodians are currently at risk of being forcibly evicted 
across Cambodia (Amnesty International, 2009). The current threat of violent forced 
eviction and inadequate compensation has been described as major human rights 
concern in Cambodia at present (Amnesty International, 2009: p. 2; LICADHO, 2009: 
p. 27; COHRE, 2009: p. 7). 
 
The Cambodian government is not the only government with an inexhaustible 
appetite for exploitation of the poor for private gain. China, Cambodia‟s leading 
development partner and one might say mentor in regard to their human rights record, 
routinely sweeps peasants aside razing entire traditional neighbourhoods and villages 
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to develop new economic zones (Cernea, 1999; Rajagopal, 2000; Dwivei, 2002; 
Davis, 2006: p. 91). When residents protest they are confronted with paramilitary 
police, arrested and sentenced for disturbing the peace. Spatial boundaries are 
redrawn to the advantage of landowners, foreign investors and elite homeowners 
(Durand-Lasserve, 2002; Davis, 2006: p. 98). A result of the evictions is an urban 
segregation in which the poor are marginalised over time, pushed out of the centre to 
the periphery.  
 
Another example is that of the forced relocation of 150,000 residents of a jhuggi 
(squatter town) on the banks of Delhi‟s Yamuna River. The state transported 150,000 
residents in trucks twenty-kilometres away to a peripheral slum, to make way for a 
riverside promenade and tourist amenities (Mitra, 1990: pp. 218-29). The Hindustan 
Times „revealed that shifting [the] jhuggi dwellers of the Capital has decreased the 
average income of families by about 50 per cent‟.  
 
Myanmar can provide another example of forced displacement. 1989-1996 Myanmar 
was the scene of a systematic removal of an urban population, comparable to the 
evacuation of Phnom Penh under the KR. Whole towns disappeared as 16 per cent of 
the total urban population were relocated to hastily made huts twenty-kilometres 
outside of Rangoon This was a deliberate, coordinated attempt to beautify the city in 
time for „Visit Myanmar 1996‟. The government was able to organise such an event 
due to the politics of fear instilled in the people by the government‟s use of violence 
and aggression (Skidmore, 2004: p. 88). As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the Cambodian government also uses „beautification‟ to justify the 
detainment of homeless persons and forced evictions in Phnom Penh.  
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The Philippines provides a final example. The word „infrastructure‟ was the code 
word used by the Filipino government to mean the unceremonious clearance of the 
informal houses of the poor (Seabrook, 1996: p. 267). Rather than evict residents and 
demolish their fragile shelters, Manila has developed a reputation for suspicious slum 
fires: An occurrence that is becoming increasingly common in Cambodia (Hughes, 
2003: p. 33; Amnesty International, 2009: p. 30; LICADHO, 2009: pp. 24-26; 
COHRE, 2009: p. 33) and other countries (Seabrook, 1996; Davis, 2006; Berner, 
1997; Gilbert & Ward, 1985). Acts of arson are cheap and combine eviction and 
demolition with ruthless ease. „Hot demolitions‟, the event of a cat or a rat being set 
on fire and chased in to a slum, spreads fire quickly and can scarcely be traced. „Hot 
demolitions‟ therefore allow the perpetrator to escape prosecution and save the 
investors going through lengthy drawn out development plans and compensation 
calculations (Berner, 1997: p. 144). 
 
An informant, who shall be named Pov for confidentiality purposes, revealed that her 
family had been violently evicted and relocated three times. Each time her family had 
been given a relocation site plot and each time they had abandoned the plot because 
there was no hope of making a living in the site.  
Pov: My father died when I was four. After that I lived with my mum, my sister and 
two brothers near the Russian Embassy, Village 14. In 2000 maybe 2001 there was a 
fire and over 1,000 families lost their homes. At the time I thought it happened by 
mistake, but now I know that someone lit the fire with gas at night time. It was an 
eviction. Someone important wanted the land. In the morning we were put in trucks 
and taken to Sen Sok, the truck was there so quickly. We were taken to an empty plot 
of land. No house! No money! An organisation gave my mum a tent, but it was not 
good. No water, no electricity and we had no money. Mum built a house out of burnt 
wood. My mum sent me to live with my aunt in Phnom Penh so that I could go to 
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school, but after a year she moved back to Phnom Penh too and we made a business 
in Sambok Chap (close to the former site).  
 
In 2006 the police came to evict people again. At night they blocked the roads and 
brought trucks ready to take people away. They blocked people getting in and out. At 
the time I was helping my sister at her business and I could not get back in to see my 
mum. If people refused to leave, their houses were destroyed. Why the police have 
guns and hurt people if it is legal? This time we were taken far away from Phnom 
Penh to Andoung (20km away). The land we were given was small, there was no 
house, no utilities, no building materials, no financial compensation. This time my 
mum decide to stay in the site with my brothers and my sister and me rent a room in 
Phnom Penh so we can work. One of my brothers brother drives a motodop and goes 
back to Andoung everyday. My mum stayed for a short time but no work. After five 
years she thought my brother can get land title, but its 2012, over six years and still 
nothing. When my sister and me opened a coffee shop in 2006 in Dey Krahom my 
mum came to live with us. In 2007 a thief murdered one of my brothers in the 
relocation site.  
 
In 2009 we were evicted from Dey Krahom. It happened at night again, at 2am the 
police arrived to block the roads. At 5.30am they start destroying the houses with 
bulldozers while people were asleep inside. This eviction was well planned. There 
were groups of police at all three exits. The military police this time, if you I begged 
the police, we had a good business there, it was our home. But nothing. Residents 
started a fire to try to raise the alarm, but the police used water to put it out, then 
turned the water against the people. My mum was knocked over but the police just 
laughed. Again we were taken away in trucks, 25km this time, to Domnat 
Drawyeurng. There were houses this time, but small metal boxes like a garage for a 
car. We cannot live there. Before the eviction people were offered $20,000 
compensation, but after the eviction, the money disappeared. After the eviction we 
went to LICADHO (local NGO) for help, and they helped find us a place to rent in 
Phnom Penh. 
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After the interview Pov mentioned that signs had gone up in the area she lived in, 
announcing it had been earmarked for development by the Japanese development 
agency JICA. Before Pov had turned 20 years old, she had lost her father and brother 
and her home and businesses three times. Her life story charts the increasing 
sophistication of the MPP‟s eviction strategy starting with fires, then roadblocks and 
night police raids and finally full night demolitions. The disproportionality of 
response is alarming: armed military police against unarmed and unaware residents. 
Pov‟s experience is regrettably not uncommon. When asked if they had experienced 
violence or intimidation during the resettlement process, 75-83 per cent of 
respondents from the R_ME1 and R_TK1 answered yes. 
 
4.4.i Household income 
A comparison of household income before and after resettlement can be seen in 
Figure 38. Figure 38 breaks down income by household and by household member as 
well as indicating the size of households. Households from site R_ME1 were 
experiencing the least aggregate household income loss ($5.69) yet the greatest loss 
per household member, on average $0.63 per person per day. Households from the 
R_TK1 experienced the greatest loss after resettlement, $21.53 per household per 
week on average, whereas R_ME indicated the least income loss per household 
member, despite experiencing a greater household loss than R_ME1. 
 
Returning to the national poverty line figures of $0.61 (2,473KHR) per person per 
day, it is clear that making a loss of $5+ per week, let alone $20+, is likely to have a 
significant impact on the ability to sustain a household. A loss of $20 per month is the 
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equivalent of losing roughly an entire full time wage earner (UNICEF statistics, 
2010). 
Fig. 38 Comparison of average number of household members, average 
weekly household income in USD and average USD per household member 
per day by former location and resettlement site 
 Former Site Resettlement Site +/- 
R_ME1     
No. in HH 5 5 / 
HH total income PW $ $30.13 $24.44 -$5.69 
Average $ per person per day $1.28 $0.65 -$0.63 
R_ME2    
Average No. in HH 5 5 / 
Average HH total income PW $ $53.75 $41.25 -$12.50 
Average $ per person per day $1.54 $1.18 -$0.36 
R_TK1     
Average No. in HH 6.6 7 +0.4 
Average HH total income PW $ $99.13 $77.60 -$21.53 
Average $ per person per day $2.01 $1.58 -$0.43 
R_ME3    
Average No. in HH 6.5 5.8 -0.7 
Average HH total income PW $ $67.60 $89.64 +$22.04 
Average $ per person per day $1.66 $2.53 +$0.87 
 
The negative impact of resettlement for household income is clear for three of the 
sites. However, the fourth site indicates a significant improvement in average 
household income.  Added income of $22.04 per week is the equivalent of an extra 
full time wage earner in the household. What is different about this site, namely its 
proximity to the city and a clothing factory, will be addressed at length below. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, roughly two thirds of households from the R_TK1 and 
R_ME1 sites replied worse or much worse when asked how the resettlement had 
affected their wellbeing. Complaints made by respondents from both these sites were 
concentrated on their exposure to the labour market; that there were no jobs and no 
opportunities to run small businesses in the resettlement sites that rely upon proximity 
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to crowds, such as selling beverages, food and snacks or other small everyday items 
such as shampoo sachets or phone credit, or recycling of rubbish. By contrast, the 
R_ME3 site represents quite the opposite, as 78 per cent replied better or much better 
when asked the same question. 
Fig. 39 Saving and borrowing before and after relocation 
  R_TK1 (39) R_ME1 (4) R_ME2 (1) R_ME3 (32) 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Save  9 5 0 0 0 0 12 6 
Borrow  19 39 0 4 0 1 7 28 
 
Figure 39 illustrates how relocation changes households‟ saving abilities and 
borrowing opportunities. We can see that in the two sites where households were able 
to save, R_TK1 and R_ME3, more households were able to save before the relocation 
process than afterwards. In other words, households are finding it more difficult to 
save in relocation sites. Conversely numbers of households borrowing have also risen 
in each resettlement site, over double in R_TK1 and quadruple in RME3. 
 
Not only has borrowing increased, but how people borrow has also changed. Figure 
40 shows that, aside from R_ME3, all resettlement sites have experienced an increase 
in borrowing from private lenders. 
 
Fig. 40 Borrowing opportunities before and after relocation 
  R_TK1 (39) R_ME1 (4) R_ME2 (1) R_ME3 (32) 
 Borrowing 
from 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 
Family 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Other 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Private Lender 14 37 0 3 0 1 5 3 
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Other forms of supplementing income and support mechanisms to rely upon include 
owning livestock and growing small crops. In urban areas opportunities for owning 
small livestock and growing crops are limited, as indicated in Figure 41. 
 
Fig. 41 Livestock ownership and small crop farming before and after resettlement 
 R_TK1 (39) R_ME1 (4) R_ME2 (1) R_ME3 (32) 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Small livestock 
(Chickens/Ducks) 
5 28 2 4 0 1 3 2 
Large livestock 
(Cows/Pigs) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Small crops 3 18 0 3 0 0 1 0 
 
Crime was also indicated as a reason for not owning livestock in urban areas. One 
respondent spoke at length about how her chickens were stolen by local gangs in 
Phnom Penh and her deep frustration at the complete disregard of the police who did 
nothing to help. Figure 41 shows how ownership of these items appears to be higher 
in resettlement sites.  
 
Slightly more households in resettlement sites also own motos. Although fewer own 
bicycles in the further away site of R_TK1, in R_ME3 the survey shows a higher 
number of bicycles. This may be due to the higher income, cheap running costs of a 
bicycle and relative proximity to the city. 
Fig. 42 Frequency of desirable income supporting items before and after 
relocation 
  R_TK1 (39) R_ME1 (4) R_ME2 (1) R_ME3 (32) 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Moto 21 24 1 1 0 1 22 23 
Bicycle 21 18 1 1 0 1 13 21 
TV 29 32 1 2 0 1 27 31 
Radio 14 17 1 1 0 0 5 4 
Phone 27 37 0 3 0 1 17 28 
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We can see in Figure 42 that small livestock ownership and crop farming has 
increased in resettlement sites. This is likely to be due to their more rural landscape. 
Having come from the provinces, many residents were familiar with farming 
techniques and resourceful in their use of their resettlement plot. Small gardens 
growing herbs and vegetables were occasionally seen in resettlement sites. However 
crops require water and at certain times of year this is a scarce resource. 
 
4.4.ii Sanitation, services and amenities 
Sanitation, drinking water and electricity are no longer seen as desirable but necessary 
to living a full and dignified life. Figure 42 shows us the number of toilets in 
households prior to eviction in the city and afterwards in the resettlement site. At first 
it appears extremely positive. Here we can see an overwhelming increase in the 
number of households with a toilet. However, upon speaking with residents in R_TK1 
whose resettlement was organised by the ADB and AusAid, significant problems 
were encountered. The presence of a toilet at the back of each plot of land has been 
indicated in this graph, yet a tiny minority of the toilets in R_TK1 functioned 
properly. In fact not only did the majority not function, multiple respondents stated 
that their toilets were blocked to the extent that sewage leaked out of the cubicle and 
into the houses. Conditions deteriorated during the wet season when flooding and 
excess ground water overwhelmed septic tanks and sewage spread across the 
community from house to house. One respondent said the reason for the blockage was 
that the pipes and septic tanks were not laid properly, large enough or of a high 
quality. Rather than use the toilets residents had to walk into the surrounding rice 
fields to go to the bathroom. Therefore whilst Figure 43 indicates an increase in the 
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presence toilets after relocation, for residents in R_TK1, this does not indicate 
whether they are fit for purpose. 
Fig. 43 Toilets in each household before and after relocation 
 
 
Figures 44 and 45 indicate the electricity and water supplies to the resettlement sites. 
Electricity and water are essential utilities however State provided utilities are much 
cheaper than those offered by private companies. Therefore not only is the presence 
of a water and electricity connection important but so is the service provider.
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 Figure 
43 shows us that more households had access to State provided electricity before 
resettlement than after. As a result their bills would have increased significantly, 
perhaps by as much as 400% (STT Facts and Figures report, 2012). In site R_ME1 
electricity was available but only through private companies and was therefore 
unaffordable. In R_TK1 four households had been waiting for months for the state to 
provide electricity to their homes, whilst the other 34 households had been connected 
to the state grid immediately. However, the 34 households who had state provisioned 
electricity faced their own problems as their billing had changed from a monthly bill 
to a quarterly bill. The ability to save for a monthly amount was achievable for 
households but the amount required for a quarterly bill was beyond their saving 
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 See section 5.2.iii outlining the benefits of state water and electricity connections 
over private suppliers. 
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capacity.
59
 Further, the local authority figure in the area had taken it upon himself to 
coordinate and collect all electricity payments. Residents complained that whilst he 
had collected their money, he had not paid their bills and so were facing 
disconnection. 
Fig. 44 Electricity access and provider before and after resettlement 
 
 
Whilst connections to the state electricity grid decreased after resettlement, Figure 44 
showing the connection to state water provisions improved after resettlement. Site 
R_ME1, however, had no access to electricity from any provider before and only one 
household was able to establish a private connection in the resettlement site. Similarly 
this site had no water supply of any sort. Rainwater had to be collected for household 
use and bottled water purchased for drinking water. 
Fig. 45 Water access and provider before and after resettlement 
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Due to resettlement sites being 8–50km away from the city centre, accessibility is an 
important factor for residents. Unless the household had been able to establish a 
business within the resettlement site, household members who contributed to 
household income commuted by necessity, back to central Phnom Penh. Therefore, 
the condition of roads was very important to respondents. If the roads were washed 
away or flooded, people were unable to commute entirely or in time for work. From 
Figure 46 one can see a slight improvement in the condition of roads in resettlement 
sites. In respondent‟s former settlement sites in Phnom Penh, the roads were 
considered good and bad in almost equal numbers, with 38 stating they considered the 
roads to be bad and 36 considering them good. This number changes to 27 
considering the roads in poor condition and 48 considering them in good condition. 
Yet if we break the figures down into individual sites, R_TK1 shows only a slight 
increase, R_ME1 shows a decrease, but only R_ME3 records a sizeable increase from 
a 23:9 (Bad: Good) ratio to a 8:24 ratio. This is also the site that remained close to 
Phnom Penh and had a factory on site. The presence of a Chinese owned garment 
factory that took daily deliveries via lorries to and from the site required suitable 
roads, which is explains the good roads and appropriate maintenance.  
Fig. 46 The condition of roads before and after resettlement 
 
 
Cambodia experiences two very distinct seasons, the dry and wet seasons. Houses and 
buildings, as well as roads, sewage systems and other infrastructure must withstand 
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prolonged monsoon rainfall for up to six months of the year. The ability to withstand 
environmental factors is one of the key indicators in UN-HABITAT‟s investigation 
into urban poor housing. Figure 47 displays the results from the household survey to 
reveal that whilst overall houses did not flood before or after the resettlement process, 
large numbers of houses did flood before and after the process as well. In the site 
breakdown, flooding goes down in R_ME3 however flooding increases slightly in 
R_TK1 and in R_ME1. 
Fig. 47 Whether properties flood or not during the wet season, before and after 
resettlement 
 
 
Finally in terms of infrastructure, the importance of nearby markets, schools and 
healthcare facilities cannot be underestimated. Figure 48 displays the overwhelming 
response that markets, schools and healthcare centres are less accessible in 
resettlement sites than in the city. This is further complicated, as discussed above, as 
clinics and markets vary greatly in their quality, pricing and products. Similarly 
children require access to both primary and secondary schools, however which level 
of school was available was not indicated in the survey. 
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Fig. 48 Proximity to markets, schools and healthcare centres, before and after 
resettlement 
 
 
Lastly the size of house or land plot is important. Figure 49 compares the different 
sites in terms of size of land plot before and after the resettlement. In all but the 
R_ME2 who declined to respond, the size of plot has increased for the majority of 
residents. Residents commented that the increased space and rural environment had 
improved the health and wellbeing of many household members. Many residents in 
their former sites had been living above open sewage in cramped overcrowded 
conditions and had reported previously feeling insecure and vulnerable to crime and 
gangs. Yet while the increased land size was a welcome result of the resettlement 
process, an overwhelming number of residents stated that they would return to their 
smaller plots of land in central Phnom Penh because, despite the health benefits and 
improved wellbeing, they had no money and no jobs. The priority, they said, was to 
provide for their families and that could not be done in resettlement sites, regardless 
of the land plot size. 
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Fig. 49 Land size before and after resettlement 
M
2 
R_TK1 R_ME1 R_ME2 R_ME3 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After 
0-5 2 . . . . . 1 . 
6-10 4 . 1 . . . 1 . 
11-15 11 . 1 1 . . 1 . 
16-20 14 . . . . . 9 . 
21-25 . . . . . . 3 . 
26-30 3 . . 1 . . 4 . 
31-35 1 . . . . . 6 32 
36-40 2 . . . . . . . 
41-45 . . . . . . . . 
46-50 . . . . . . . . 
51-75 1 1 . . . . 1 . 
76-100 1 . . . . . 2 . 
101-150 . 38 . . . . 2 . 
151-200 . . . . . . 1 . 
Blank . . . . . . 1 . 
 
4.4.iii Compensation 
The RGC has an obligation under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to ensure that all those who are subjected to eviction 
and/or resettlement are given adequate compensation for the loss of property. Article 
11 of the ICESCR outlines the obligation in more detail and also expresses the 
importance of the individual‟s free consent to any proposed development-induced 
displacement: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based 
on free consent.
60
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 ICESCR Article 11, p. 4. Available here: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf 
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Parallel to this obligation is the commitment of the ADB, to which the RGC is bound, 
to ensure that those evicted and/or resettled are not worse off, experience loss of 
income or livelihood and in such a circumstances, compensation should be full and 
extend to compensation or commercial structures, assets and income lost during the 
process. In the scenario that the inhabitant is illegally occupying land, they are still 
entitled to compensation for loss of assets, structures and income (ADB, 2009, 
Safeguard Policy Statement, Safeguard Requirements on Involuntary Resettlement 
section pp. 44-54). 
 
Despite these obligations, the 2007 ADB report admitted that DIDR usually lead to 
impoverishment, a fact reiterated by Michael Cernea, in the introduction to his 2008 
edited book „Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement 
through Investments and Benefit-Sharing‟: 
The outcomes of most development-caused forced displacement and resettlement 
leave a disgracing stain on development itself, conflicting with its poverty reduction 
rationale, objective and ethic (p.1) 
 
How exactly compensation is calculated by the RGC and the ADB is based upon the 
1988 „Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice‟. Recommendations 
from this 1988 publication formed the basis for compensation mechanisms discussed 
in the 2007 ADB report „Compensation and Valuation in Resettlement: Cambodia, 
People‟s Republic of China, and India‟. This report begins with the acknowledgement 
that the aim of development is to improve the lives and wellbeing of those affected by 
their projects, central to which is the concept of „replacement value‟ of loss of assets. 
Replacement value is equal to market costs plus transaction costs (ADB, 2007, 1998). 
Therefore full a full survey of each property is required prior to eviction and 
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demolition, in order to determine tenure status, the size of the property and the 
construction materials as well as an investigation into income and commercial assets 
of each property. However many respondents did not recall such a survey being 
conducted, rather they were given a yellow post it with a figure or form of 
compensation written on it and told to thumb print it. In doing so, they were agreeing 
contractually to their eviction and the compensation stated. If they did not 
immediately agree to the compensation residents were threatened with their homes 
and their belongings being bulldozed. One elderly respondent explained how she was 
illiterate and upon asking to show the note to her son that evening when he returned 
home from work, before thumb printing, was refused and threatened. The issuance of 
compensation via handwritten yellow post it notes was recorded and photographed by 
Bridges Across Borders Cambodia in their 2010 report Derailed.
61
 This violates the 
right of the individual to free consent, free of intimidation and threat (ICESCR).  
 
The type and amount of compensation offered to households facing eviction, if 
offered at all, varied from site to site as well as within settlements. Figure 50 displays 
the different forms of compensation received by settlement sites. The households 
recorded as having received nothing, yet were living in resettlement sites either had 
arrived at resettlement sites to live with their family but were financially independent 
of them and therefore classified as a separate household,
62
 had purchased land in the 
resettlement site or were illegally occupying land in the resettlement site. Other 
variables such as money, no land and money and building materials were included in 
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 BABC report Derailed available here: www.babcambodia.org/derailed/derailed.pdf 
62
 See different forms of household discussion in section 3.2.iv 
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the survey however these forms of compensation were not received by those 
surveyed. 
Fig. 50 Compensation type received by Households in resettlement sites 
 
 
From Figure 50 it is clear that money and a defined empty plot of land were the most 
common forms of compensation offered to sites R_TK1 and R_ME3. Defined empty 
land with no accompanying financial compensation was received by half of the 
households surveyed in R_ME1, the single household of R_ME2 and for six 
households in R_ME3. However it is also evident that households in R_ME1, R_ME2 
ad R_ME3 received no financial compensation, despite the obligation to compensate 
for structures, assets and loss of income under the ICESCR and ADB documentation.  
 
The average monetary compensation received by households in R_TK1 was $609.97, 
ranging from $265 to $1,300. Whereas the average amount of monetary compensation 
received by R_ME3 was $987.80, ranging from $100 to $4,000. The range of this 
figure may be attributed to the different sizes of properties or their construction 
materials. For example the loss of a large concrete and brick structure would receive 
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more compensation than a small wood or corrugated iron structure. However the 
variation in compensation types, as well as the difference in amounts of monetary 
compensation may also be due to political connections and bribery. As mentioned in 
the presentation of case studies, the two residents of RK1 were able to remain in their 
homes despite the eviction and demolition of all surrounding businesses and homes, 
because they had paid money to the local authorities. If a resident has the right money 
and connections, such as being a member of the CPP party, they may have been 
awarded increased compensation. Whereas people who were not well connected or 
unable to afford a bribe, may have their compensation claim reduced or be dropped 
from the local authorities list for compensation and resettlement all together.  
 
Whether the authority responsible for the land purchase, the RGC or City Hall in most 
instances, influenced the different forms of compensation was another factor 
considered. Land used for relocation in sites R_TK1 and R_ME1 was bought by the 
RGC whereas land for sites R_ME2 and R_ME3 were purchased by City Hall. 
However both authorities appear to have offered both defined empty plots in one 
location and money and defined plots in the other. Site R_ME1, purchased by the 
RGC had been abandoned by many of those resettled there as it lacked basic 
infrastructure. Site R_ME2, for which land was purchased by City Hall, was a site of 
over 500 plots and has been abandoned by all but one family. This was similarly due 
to the lack of infrastructure but also the distance to the capital (over 50km) and lack 
of work opportunities. However site R_ME3 had been purchased by City Hall, within 
central Phnom Penh and the residents had largely improved their circumstances and 
income. The underlying causes of variation within compensation would require 
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further fieldwork beyond that completed for this thesis, but would make for an 
interesting extension of this research. 
 
Respondents frequently discussed the cost of building a home, stating that to build a 
basic structure of wood with a metal roof would cost over $1000 whereas a more 
desirable structure of concrete with proper flooring and a metal roof would cost closer 
to $2000. With these costs in mind, despite defined land plots being offered, monetary 
compensation was not sufficient in most instances to cover building materials. 
Therefore even those resettled households that were given monetary compensation, as 
well as those who weren‟t, were required to borrow money to build homes as well as 
afford food, electricity, water and other necessities. 
 
Compensation for evictees has created controversy and split communities. The 
government is obliged to provide housing for both owners and renters of property, an 
entitlement recognised by the 2007 ADB report (p.4). Information relating to rental or 
ownership is documented in each residence in what is known as the „family record 
book‟. The family record book is a running narrative of births, deaths, marriages and 
migrations, used by the local authorities to identify those who are entitled for 
compensation amongst other things. However due to poor literacy levels, poor living 
conditions, multiple tenants and poor book keeping, the family record book is used to 
include or exclude residents from compensation in line with the commonly corrupt 
agenda of the local authorities (Mgbako et al., 2010). The local authorities include or 
exclude information contained in the book to either force an eviction or deny a land 
title or compensation claim to residents, which ever fits their agenda at the time 
(Mgbako et al., 2010). 
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Compensation, on the occasions that it was offered, has been virtually exclusively 
offered to land owners and not tenants. This is despite both landowners and renters 
being identified in land and housing rights documents. Compensation normally 
comprises of financial reparation and/or a land plot. The amount of compensation and 
the quality, location and size of the land plot vary from unmarked rice fields to 
marked plots with individual toilets and electricity supplied (see data analysis above). 
However financial compensation for land is frequently below market value and the 
land plots offered in compensation are not land titles. Instead, land receipts of 
residence are issued and are subject to the same five-year occupancy requirements 
before applications for land title can be submitted. Unsurprisingly, these receipts 
rarely materialise or are duplicated and sold for personal profit. In fact, a UN 
supported legal NGO, the Community Legal Education Centre, cannot cite a single 
case where a receipt was issued (Mgbako et al., 2010: pp. 47-49). In this way, poor 
communities are kept vulnerable and mobile by the government, for further 
exploitation or in case of future need for relocation. 
 
Compensation has created internal conflict within organised communities through the 
award of different levels of compensation to different families or the dropping of 
families from compensation registers all together. Residents from RK2, a site facing 
eviction, were in fact residents who had been excluded from the compensation 
registrars for reasons unknown to them. With nowhere else to go, these residents built 
structures on the riverbank behind site RK1, just a few metres away from their former 
homes. They were unable to stay in their former residences as they had been 
bulldozed to the ground and the land fenced off. With no reliable appeal mechanisms, 
residents facing eviction are advised to „take what they can get‟ for fear of being 
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offered nothing if they protest. Respondent‟s recalled how authorities came to their 
homes issuing eviction notices and contracts for compensation, intimidating and 
threatening the residents, forcing them to sign documents they had not or could not 
read.  
 
Communities and settlements facing multiple evictions have been reported in the 
media. Families living in relocation sites therefore are in precarious positions as even 
these sites can be sold for redevelopment (Open Development Cambodia, 27 
September 2012). Life history respondent Pov recalled disabled residents who had 
been resettled in the run up to an election, being evicted from their new homes 
without notice or compensation. Individual stories have emerged showing that it is not 
only the lack of labour opportunities that motivate people to return to the city, as the 
story of a young relocated HIV sufferer illustrates, who moved back to Phnom Penh 
to live with relatives due to the lack of access to medication and medical services in 
the relocation site (Phnom Penh Post, 26 January 2012).  
 
The ADB in cooperation with the Australian Aid programme (AusAID) have held up 
their rehabilitation of the railways as a model from which other stakeholders, 
including the RCG can learn. Local urban NGO, STT conducted a detailed survey and 
published a report in 2011 into the resettlement of residents affected under the 
rehabilitation of the railway, titled Rehabilitation of the Railways: A Comparison of 
Field Data. This report was the first to directly challenge the government‟s 
compensation calculations through technical surveying and the accumulation of data 
relating to structures, materials and costs. In their report STT provided evidence to 
suggest systematic downgrading of housing structures in 90 per cent of structures 
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surveyed, thus lowering compensation calculations. Compensation was calculated by 
floor space m
2
 yet STT found in all multi-floor buildings, only one floor had been 
used in compensation calculations. Were multiple families occupied a building, 12 per 
cent of residences had received only a single compensation entitlement. Not only 
were miscalculations and omission fife in compensation calculations, but STT 
identified 36 per cent more households than had been identified by the Inter-
Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC): 60 households affected by the 
rehabilitation of the railway in one particular area, as opposed to the 28 identified by 
the IRC (STT, 2011).
63
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has responded to the first research question of who the urban poor are 
and upon what resources, mechanisms and networks they rely upon. The chapter 
began with an introductory investigation into urban poverty and the urban poor, 
outlining preliminary findings from the household survey. Following this 
introduction, a deeper, more nuanced understanding of urban poverty and urban poor 
livelihoods was revealed through academic debate and evidence from the household 
survey. This chapter has argued for an increased recognition of the importance of 
livelihood generating practices (and alternative supporting practices) specific to the 
urban context. This necessitated a distinct and separate terminology to that of the 
informal economy, to which this thesis offered the term „urban poor economy‟. To 
further support the term urban poor economy, the author drew attention to the process 
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 As discussed in section… Following the publication of the 2011 report STT were 
suspended from operations, their staff intimidated and threatened. 
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of peer-to-peer regulation undertaken by many operating within the urban poor 
economy, identified by the author as horizontal regulation. 
 
With a more nuanced understanding of the urban poor economy, evidenced through 
the household survey and interviews with tuktuk drivers, the author turned to the 
housing conditions and needs of the urban poor. This research argues that housing and 
livelihood are inseparable in terms of understanding urban poverty and urban poor 
lives. The author supported the argument presented by Payne and Khmero for an 
increased understanding of tenure status, rather than a focus on the homogenous and 
misrepresentative term, „slum‟, for understanding urban poor housing. Data relating to 
housing, size and structure as well as location, flooding, water and electricity was 
presented.  
 
Following this discussion, debates within DIDR were considered and the work of 
Hammar highlighted as offering a potential way forward in re-conceptualising DIDR 
as forward facing rather than backwards and therefore focusing attention not on what 
has been destroyed but on what can be constructively formed and forged for the 
future. Experiences of resettlement were offered in the last section in which the 
largely negative impact of resettlement, the loss of household income, inadequate 
compensation and abandonment of resettlement sites was examined.  
 
It was shown that the RGC had failed to meet its obligations of providing adequate 
compensation and adequate housing, nor respected the principle of free consent in 
relation to DIDR. However evidence from site R_ME3 suggested that this does not 
have to be the case. Site R_ME3 was resettled from a near by area along the Boeung 
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Tra Bek sewage canal to land within the main urban sprawl of Phnom Penh, 
purchased by City Hall. What is distinctive about R_ME3 when compared to the other 
three relocation sites is the proximity to the city. Their homes are connected to state 
water and electricity supplies, which keeps their household bills manageable. Due to 
their location residents were able to keep their jobs or find work at the garment 
factory that was built less than 100m away. Residents received housing plots and 
monetary compensation, and had a new access road built. Whereas their 
compensation ranged from $100 to $4,000, the vast majority were living in brick 
houses with concrete floors. This resettlement experience throws into stark relief the 
experience of residents in sites R_ME1 and R_ME2 who have been resettled 25-50km 
away from the city, to converted rice paddies with no roads, water or electricity. 
 
The following chapter takes forward the lived experiences of the urban poor to 
examine if and how development policy has been used to address their needs. An 
initial theoretical discussion relating to development and urban development will take 
place before specific development policies of the RGC and the Municipality of 
Phnom Penh are addressed. 
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5. Does existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor issues? 
If not, why not and how can this be addressed? 
 
 
Chhet: Phnom Penh is developing fast, which is good for rich people. The poor 
people do not receive benefit much. There are more buildings, more roads, but the 
quality of those buildings and roads are not so good. There is new technology but the 
development is low quality, without good standards. 
 
Tim: You know. Don‘t show my face… but I can tell you about Cambodia. I am happy 
to have the building, but it depends where you build. Like the riverbank, it destroy the 
riverbank. All the pollution, all the sewage from the bathroom destroy the river. But 
its good for tourist looking! But not good for Cambodians. Good for tourist looking. 
But got to find the right place. Factory along the Mekong river, is not good, a lot of 
pollution, kill the fish. Advantage and disadvantage go together. 
 
Above are two quotes taken from interviews with tuktuk drivers, Chhet and Tim, in 
response to the question, what do you think about the development of Phnom Penh? 
Their responses reveal an awareness that the city is developing not to address the 
needs of the poor or even for the residents of the capital, but for tourism purposes and 
industry. Chhet suggests that despite new development and construction technology, 
the quality of the new buildings and roads are poor. Tim refers to the detrimental 
effects of development has had for the environment. From these interviews and the 
household survey, it was evident that residents see the need for development in the 
capital, but that it was not being conducted in an appropriate or equitable way. This 
speaks to the process of „beautification‟ discussed in Chapter Two and will be 
examined again in the following chapter. 
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This chapter will begin to answer the question of whether existing development 
policy responds appropriately to urban poor issues by unpicking debate about 
development: neoliberal development in Cambodia, the relationship between 
violence, security and development, and a more focused section on urban 
development. Existing Cambodian development policy, despite being little more than 
donor consumption material, will be outlined with particular attention paid to urban 
poor issues of livelihoods and housing. To extend this examination into issues facing 
the urban poor, jurisdiction relating to land and labour will be scrutinised. The chapter 
will identify where policy and law have been misguided, make inappropriate 
assumptions and therefore inappropriate recommendations, and how development as a 
whole has fallen short of offering meaningful, realistic development objectives aimed 
at alleviating urban poverty. 
 
 
5.1 Development  
Development is fundamentally about change, which is categorised by Beall and Fox 
(2009) as two things, progress and differentiation: why some places experience 
change and increased wealth (progress) whereas others have not (differentiation) 
(2009, p. 4). How a country that has not experienced increased progress and wealth 
can be encouraged to do so is the object of international development policy and 
ideology. The hegemonic development ideology established during the 1980s and 
1990s is known as the Washington Consensus (Weeks and Stein, 2006, p. 676). The 
Washington Consensus arose amidst fears of the international community and 
multilateral financial institutions that low-income countries would default on debt 
payments. As a result a „package‟ of economic reforms, measures and conditions 
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were drawn up for low-income countries or those requiring assistance, upon which 
further loans and assistance would depend. These conditions were based around three 
„big ideas‟: macroeconomic discipline, a market economy and openness to the world 
(Weeks and Stein, p. 677). These conditions were expanded by the World Bank and 
IMF to include exposure to the international free market, the removal of government 
intervention in domestic markets, the elimination of export taxes and import tariffs, 
promotion of competitive economic self-sufficiency, the sale of public assets and the 
reduction of public expenditure. However the correlation between GDP and 
development is an inaccurate one (Kumar and Ny, 2014; McGillivray & White, 2006) 
and the Washing Consensus was generally recognised as having failed to manage the 
debt and debt repayments through structural reform by the mid 1990s. Despite this the 
economic ideology underpinning the reforms known as neoliberalism, continues 
today. After the Copenhagen School Summit in 1995 conditional reforms orchestrated 
externally by the World Bank and IMF were replaced by „country led‟ and „nationally 
owned‟ development partnerships between states (Weeks and Stein, p. 679). 
 
David Harvey‟s article, „The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession‟ 
(2004) describes how neoliberalism is promoted by the international community and 
normatively accepted as a progressive development process. However it does not 
produce a harmonious, equitable society but deep social inequality and instability 
(2004, pp. 11-12). He shifts the focus from the established theory of primitive 
accumulation, historically rooted in the privatisation of land and the creation of a 
landless proletariat in medieval England, to reconceptualise the process of 
accumulation since the 1970s as accumulation by dispossession. This may involve the 
privatisation of previously communal or public goods or land such as rivers or forests, 
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financialization and the dispossession of assets, creation and management of crises 
and state redistribution (Harvey, 2004). Harvey‟s examples of accumulation by 
dispossession range from intellectual property rights, to the depletion of water 
supplies, to the exploitation of subcultures by the music and entertainment industries 
(2004, pp. 12-13). Harvey describes accumulation by dispossession as „the new 
imperialism‟ whereby hegemonic countries such as the USA and the UK use 
international influence and market orientated pressure to extract profit from low-
income countries by exploiting their cheap labour and untapped resources. 
Accumulation by dispossession can also be used to understand the domestic state-
society relationships. In the case of Cambodia the government has claimed large 
portions of national forest and waterways as state owned. Therefore limiting the 
access of local Cambodian communities to previously public resources that were used 
by communities for foraging, hunting and fishing (Springer, 2010, pp. 2-3; (CDRI, 
2015, Management of Economic Land Concession, Policy Brief No. 1). The RGC has 
since claimed these lands and leased large territories out as economic land 
concessions thereby either destroying the landscapes through deforestation in favour 
of rubber tree and cashew nut plantations (CDRI, 2015).
64
 Accumulation by 
dispossession is particularly relevant for this research and fieldwork as the RGC uses 
compulsory purchase and reclassification of tenure to remove residents from lucrative 
parts of the city through development induced displacement. 
 
To further examine neoliberalism in Cambodia, Simon Springer argues for a more 
nuanced understanding of economic ideology, arguing for the recognition of both the 
                                                 
64
 See Open Development Cambodia for up to date maps, policies and critiques of 
economic land concessions in Cambodia: 
http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefing/economic-land-concessions-elcs/ 
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internal and external dimensions of neoliberalism, but more so that neoliberalism is 
not a singular „end-state‟ but takes the line of Brenner and Theodore to argue for 
„actually existing neoliberalisms‟ (Springer, 2010, p. 2). These „actually existing 
neoliberalisms‟ are fluid processes that are influenced by policy, practices, political 
struggle, market forces, regulatory practices and socio-spatial transformations. In 
arguing for a lived experience of context specific outplaying of neoliberal ideology, 
Springer removes the term from the abstract international development vocabulary 
and embeds these processes in the local, national and regional processes which define 
its existence. 
 
However, whereas the pursuit of neoliberalism in Cambodia may have externally 
been seen as a remedy to years of isolationism under the KR and civil conflict 
thereafter, the reality of such early exposure of a fledgling economy to international 
market forces and privatisation, has been the castration of democracy, the exploitation 
of the poor as a cheap, mobile work force and the purging of Cambodia‟s forests, 
plains, rivers and coastline (Springer, 2010). Springer sums up the „actually existing 
neoliberalisms‟ in Cambodia in his 2011 article „Articulated neoliberalism: the 
specificity of patronage, kleptocracy, and violence in Cambodia‟s neoliberalisation‟: 
What constitutes ‗actually existing neoliberalisms‘ in Cambodia as distinctly 
Cambodian is the ways in which the patronage system has allowed local elites to co-
opt, transform, and (re)articulate neoliberal reforms through a framework which 
asset strips public resources, thereby increasing people‘s exposure to corruption, 
coercion, and violence. (p. 2554) 
 
The presence of violence, corruption and coercion is neither new to Cambodia nor 
limited to neoliberalism. Recent work by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) 
conceptualising human history offers a framework for understanding why and how 
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different societies have changed, emphasising the utility of violence throughout 
history. North et al. integrate theories of economic and political development to 
analyse and account for how violence is used, shaped and contained by institutions. 
Created by societies, institutions and their functions are identified as social orders, 
which in turn attribute positions of control to groups and individuals, thus limiting 
and shaping the use of violence and incentives. North et al. identify three types of 
social order. The first is a foraging order, which is hunter-gatherer in character. The 
second, limited-access order (natural state), takes the form of elite personal 
relationships governing and limiting access to organisations, privileges, resources and 
activities to the external population. Finally, open-access orders are associated with 
political and economic development, a set of impersonal characteristics and the ability 
to form impersonal organisations within a larger society, where the state does not 
limit access to resources, privileges and activities. Summarily, the authors consider 
poorer developing countries as limited-access orders, and wealthier developed 
countries as open-access orders.  
 
Whereas violence is viewed as an institution that regulates relations, violence may 
also been conceptualised as a commodity. Violence may be a commodity when one 
can purchase protection or direct violence toward an individual or group, therefore 
elevating and empowering those with the ability to manipulate and purchase violence 
within a society. As personal relationships of the elite dominate limited access orders, 
violence is a relational between elites, used in the pursuit of power and mobilised for 
protection, rent collection and enforcing the law (North et. al, 2009: p. 35). Whereas 
in an open access orders goals are achieved through collective actions via 
organisations, democratic avenues and respect for the rule of law (North et. al, 2009: 
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pp. 112-117). Understanding the role of power and violence in society and how it is 
managed is an essential feature of the limited and open access orders conceptual 
framework. The authors provide a conceptual framework to explain why poor 
countries stay poor, detailing long-term fluctuations between negative and positive 
growth rates, essentially linking the experience of poor states‟ longer, more rapid 
periods of negative growth, with being limited-access orders and their management of 
violence. Democracy, the rule of law, free press, free markets and freedom of 
movement are products of the transition from limited to open-access orders, which 
can be brought about only with suitable conditions for the limited-access order elites 
to create impersonal relationships, thus turning away from the personal obligations 
and contracts used to manipulate violence and rent collection. 
 
However an assumption of the open-access order is that violence as an institution or 
commodity is redundant as democracy replaces violence as a conflict resolution 
mechanism. However many believe that violence is a central component to society 
and will never be eradicated. Hobbes‟ leviathan contract details the relationship 
between state and society and the necessity for a legitimate central authority. Weber 
builds upon this in his essay Politics as a Vocation (1919) to describe how any 
government over a territory must hold the legitimate monopoly of violence within the 
given space to rule effectively. The state‟s ability to exert a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence has a consolidating and unifying effect on the citizens of 
the state (Parkin, 2002: p. 71). It is through the legitimate exercise of violence that a 
state is able to control and direct society toward achieving a desired aim (Whimster, 
2004: p.119). Weber emphasizes the territorial interests of the state, which for the 
Cambodian state have been the root of conflict between Cambodia and its neighbours 
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for decades. However, despite the RGC holding office and power, their legitimacy has 
been questioned, as elections are criticised as mere theatre, stages for bribery, 
corruption, fraud and violence towards the opposition and their supporters. An 
essential feature of Weber‟s theory of power is the positive choice of the subordinate 
to obey the authority (Parkin, 2004: p. 74), which brings into question the legitimacy 
of the present RGC. 
 
North et al.‟s framework is useful for understanding Cambodian society whereby 
one‟s ability to buy or sell violence permits financial gain at the cost of the poor. 
However this commodification of violence alone is not sufficient to understand the 
contemporary Cambodian state-society relationship. This research draws upon 
literature traditionally associated with the resource dependent states that the author 
argues is relevant in the case of Cambodia: the rentier state. The rentier state is a state 
reliant upon unearned income (Moore, 2007; Di John, 2002). Unearned income 
traditionally comes from minerals, oil and natural resources rents.
65
 Through a 
monopolisation of the market and state revenue, states are relieved of their usual 
financial base: taxation (Di John, 2002). Without governmental dependence on tax 
revenues and therefore a need to maintain good state-societal relationships, the bond 
between state and society is broken. In the case of Cambodia, due to its recent history, 
this relationship was never established as the state was funded not through taxation or 
dependence on natural resource exports, but by international assistance (Ear, 2012). 
Cambodia relies heavily upon aid and foreign assistance, which accounted for 60-70 
per cent of public expenditure in the 1990s (Smoke & Taliercio, 2007). Without the 
                                                 
65
 Rents „are incomes that are higher than the next best income that an individual or 
group could earn given their assets‟ (Khan, 2006, p. 511). 
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relationship established between the state and society, there is little motivation for the 
state to be perceived as legitimate holder of violence in the eyes of the electorate. 
Instead, the state was financed by foreign investment and international aid, and 
experiences no repercussions when violence is used to coerce the population into 
compliance. 
 
The presence of violence and rent seeking as a form of governance in a developing 
state runs contrary to the security development nexus. Security was traditionally the 
concern of the state and the military relating to conflict, or the potential for conflict, 
between states (Christie, 2010; Duffield, 2007; King & Murray, 2002; Human 
Development Report, 1994). With the end of the Cold War, the scope of what security 
entailed changed (Christie, 2010; Duffield, 2007). The 1990s saw a shift in focus 
away from national security to individual human security (Christie, 2010; Duffield, 
2007; King & Murray, 2002; Human Development Report, 1994), human security 
being loosely defined as a life of dignity, free from fear and want (Human 
Development Report, 1994). Seven dimensions of human security were outlined: 
economic security, health security, personal security, political security, food security, 
environment security and community security (Human Development Report, 1994, 
pp. 24-25). The security development nexus emerged alongside the human security 
discourse claiming that security was required to achieve development, whilst without 
development, security could not be achieved (Hettne, 2010; Duffield, 2007).  
 
Security and development are both contested, general terms widening and expanding 
in scope depending on the context (Hettne, 2010, p.33). The security development 
nexus however has become a factoid as a result of the proliferation of the nexus 
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amongst policy makers and development practitioners including the UN and DFID 
(Duffield, 2007). For example DFID argue that insecurity, lawlessness, crime and 
violence are obstacles to development and breeding grounds for international crime 
and terrorism (DFID report, „Fighting poverty to build a safe world‟, 2004). Poverty 
in a foreign country therefore, constitutes is a security threat to the UK. However the 
pursuit of security through development and development through security is not a 
clear-cut path. Cambodian development, contrary to the security development nexus, 
has not been fostered in an environment of increased security, national or human. This 
research argues that insecurity, rather than security, is the „golden thread‟ (Cameron, 
2012; Overseas Development Institute, 2012; United Nations Post 2015 High Level 
Panel, 2012) that has stitched together Cambodian development, through the use of 
violence to scare and coerce a population, whilst the elite benefit from the continued 
influx of development assistance and international aid.  
 
To evidence and reinforce this argument, the theme of insecurity emerges in Chapter 
Four through discussion of labour, particularly in relation to the informal economy, of 
which insecurity is a defining feature. Insecurity emerges again in Chapter Four 
through the discussion of tenure, which renders millions of urban residents vulnerable 
to eviction and undermines the value of their shelter as an asset. (Beall & Fox, 2009, 
p. 104). An understanding of the rentier state, the perpetuation of insecurity and the 
„actually existing neoliberalisms‟ argued for by Springer may offer an approach for 
understanding exactly how and why Cambodian development policy has been so 
ineffective in achieving its goals. 
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5.2 Does existing Cambodian development policy address urban poor issues? 
This section examines Cambodian Development policies since the 1990s to present to 
determine if and how urban poor issues have been recognised and addressed by state 
led development initiatives. The effectiveness of policy and the Cambodian judiciary 
will be addressed in reference to the issues of urban poor livelihoods and housing. 
 
5.2.i Cambodia‘s National Strategic Development Plan 
In 1993 the Paris Peace Accords were signed and Cambodia embarked upon the 
neoliberal pursuit of good governance, democracy, rule of law and free market 
capitalism. The National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (NPRD) 
was established in 1994 with the assistance of the international community and 
published the first Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP), 1996-2000, and 
Public Investment Programme (PIP), 1996-98. The 1996 SEDP set out five-year 
medium-term goals based around two principles and six objectives. The first principle 
was that the government was responsible for the strategy and management of 
Cambodian development. The second was that the government was a partner of the 
Cambodian private sector, in line with the shift from the Washington Consensus, to a 
neoliberal partnership approach to development. The six objectives based on these 
two principles were: 
i). To establish Cambodia as a ―State of Law‖ in which the rule of law prevails 
ii). To achieve economic stability and structural adjustment with the goal of doubling 
GDP by 2004 
iii). To improve education and healthcare in order to build up human resources and 
to improve people‘s living standards. 
iv) To rehabilitate and develop the physical infrastructure and public facilities 
v) To reintegrate the Cambodian economy into regional and international economies 
 264 
vi). To give priority to rural development and to manage the environment and natural 
resources in a sustainable manner. (SEDP, 1996) 
 
Cambodia has been lauded as a success in returning to peace and stability, however as 
highlighted in the historical background and raised through this thesis, a full transition 
to a functioning free market, law abiding democracy had not been achieved in 
Cambodia. During the period of the first SEDP Cambodia witnessed assassinations of 
political leaders, judicial impunity, land grabbing and forced evictions, deforestation, 
and a political coup. 
 
Whilst improvements were made in terms of ending conflict, increasing life 
expectancy and primary school education levels and attracting investment, these have 
been attributed to the fact that little data existed on Cambodia post 1975 and after the 
Khmer Rouge fell in 1979, Cambodia‟s statistics started at zero. This is not to say that 
Cambodian development started from scratch, far from it, but that baseline data for 
comparison does not exist for many of the development objectives outlined. However 
whereas labour issues and jobs are excluded from development efforts, there are calls 
to improve education, healthcare and improve people‟s living standards. Despite the 
statements being made, little detail as to how the state might go about improving 
living standards emerges. Land issues are included in Cambodia‟s national 
development policies from a rural perspective relating to natural resources and the 
environment. Objective six of the SEDP 1996-2000, states: 
vi). To give priority to rural development and to manage the environment and natural 
resources in a sustainable manner. 
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This prioritisation of the rural perspective fails to acknowledge or remedy the land 
and housing issues facing those in urban areas. In recognising only rural areas as 
requiring sustainable development, space for sustainable, equitable urban 
development is denied from the very conception. 
 
The prioritisation of rural land issues and neglect of urban matters extended into the 
SEDP II 2001-2005, in which developing agriculture was identified as the most 
important poverty alleviation method. Growth of urban areas is predicted in SEDP II 
however this is used as an argument against supporting urban development as it 
assumes urban residents are more well off and that the rural population are more 
disadvantaged (SEPD II, 2001, p.15). This bias towards the rural sector in 
development policy continues in contemporary development plans. 
 
SEDP II focused on a „Triangle Strategy‟ focusing on building peace and security for 
the people, re-integrating Cambodia into the region after the period of Khmer Rouge 
orchestrated isolation, and promoting economic and social development. Successive 
PIPs, a National Poverty Reduction Strategy adopted in 2002 and the UN Millennium 
Development Goals followed the SEDP II. This uncoordinated development effort 
was addressed by the RGC in 2004 after the CPP‟s electoral win, bringing all 
development efforts under one comprehensive programme, the National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP), 2006-2010. At the core of the NSDP was the Rectangular 
Strategy, which outlined priorities for addressing governance and socio-economic 
development issues and efforts (Figure 50). 
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The NSDP 2006-10 outlines what it calls Major Highlights from 1996-2006 including 
the restoration of, and vast improvements in, internal peace and security. These 
include democracy taking root across the country, increased personal freedoms and 
freedom of expression, major advancements in law, „spectacular‟ macro-economic 
growth and a sharp reduction in poverty. From Figure 51, the NSDP‟s Rectangular 
Strategy, we can see that agriculture and the private sector were major areas of 
concern for the NSDP 2006-10. Urban development and the informal economy do not 
feature.  
Fig. 51 National Strategic Development Plan: ‘Rectangular Strategy’ 
 
 
Figure 52 shows the increase in Cambodian GDP per capita, which has more than 
tripled. Yet NSDP 2006-10 concedes poverty is still prevalent at 24 per cent 
nationally and while economic growth looks „spectacular‟, it cannot be attributed to 
an increased focus of the government, but rather the country‟s investment portfolio 
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having begun at virtually zero. The rise in GDP tells us nothing about the wealth 
distribution of the country and the NSDP 2006-10 discloses that governance reform 
had not progressed at the pace required.  
 
Fig. 52 Cambodian GDP per capita $USD, 1993-2013 
 
 
However a background paper for the 2014 Cambodia Human Development Report 
raises the point that increasing economic growth does not represent equitable growth 
and can actually foster inequalities (Kumar and Ny, 2014). Factors identified by 
Kumar and Ny that contribute to inequality include the under-provision of basic 
public social and economic services and a dominant elite who overtly and covertly 
manipulate, reinforce and expand their economic and political influences (2014, pp. 
1-2). Kumar and Ny acknowledge inequality is decreasing in Cambodia, a fact 
celebrated in the 2013 World Bank Country Study „Where Have All the Poor Gone? 
Cambodia Poverty Assessment‟, yet the extent of inequality remains high and a 
challenge to Cambodian policymakers. Therefore the RGC cannot assume that 
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promoting economic growth will consequentially lead to a reduction in inequality and 
regional disparity (Kumar and Ny, 2014). 
 
The updated NSDP 2009-13 begins by outlining major achievements in the previous 
period. These included improved respect for human rights, judicial capacity, good 
governance and the creation of a peaceful, stable social order. For anyone who 
follows Cambodian current affairs, these claims may come as a shock as Cambodia in 
this period saw an unparalleled increase in fierce oppression of peaceful protest, the 
imprisonment of activists, the selling off of national forests for development and 
brutally violent forced evictions (Amnesty, 2008, 2009, 2012; COHRE, 2009; STT 
2011, 2012). In regards to judicial capacity building, the United Nations Assistance to 
the Khmer Rouge Trials has faced unprecedented criticism for the level of 
government interference and corruption within the hybrid tribunal, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Set up to try those responsible for the most 
serious of crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge, the tribunal has faced 
condemnation from the international community and the Cambodian population for 
the length of time and cost of the tribunal. 
 
The NSDP 2009-13 identified important issues with the implementation of 
development reform in Cambodia, namely who is responsible for what, what the 
action points are for specific priorities and how much they will cost. Yet in not 
modifying the Rectangular Strategy, the RGC have continued to neglect the urban 
specific issues facing Cambodians living in cities. For example, whilst numbers are 
calculated for rural access to sanitation and improved drinking water, no figures are 
offered for an urban equivalent, as it is taken for granted that urban residents have 
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access to these facilities. The only mention of urban labour markets comes in brackets 
on page 101 stating that efforts will be made to integrate small and medium sized 
enterprises into the formal economy, which, as discussed above, is not necessarily a 
priority of informal economy workers who actively chose to be a part of the informal 
economy. 
 
The Rectangular Strategy places land reform is connection with mine clearance and 
comes under the broader title of agricultural reform. The 2002 Strategy of Land 
Policy Framework published by the RGC also focuses exclusively on agriculture and 
rural land management. In 1999 UN-HABITAT with the MPP recognised the 
problem of applying rural land policy to urban areas and developed an Urban Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (UPRS). The UPRS was designed to improve access of the urban 
poor to basic social and physical infrastructure, therefore enhancing economic 
opportunities and strengthening participatory governance mechanisms. In 2002, as a 
result of the UPRS, a pledge was made by Hun Sen to upgrade 100 slums per year 
over 5 years. This strategy however lacked guidelines and guidance for 
implementation. The slum upgrade promised by Hun Sen never materialised (STT, 
2012). 
 
In 2011 a new national development strategy aimed at reducing poverty was 
announced, the National Social Protection Strategy for the Poor and Vulnerable 
(NSPS). The NSPS defined the poor and vulnerable as: 
People living below the national poverty line; and People who cannot cope with 
shocks and/or have a high level of exposure to shocks (of  these, people living under 
or near the poverty line tend to be most vulnerable) (p. 19, NSPS, 2011) 
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The NSPS identifies women and children, the elderly, ethnic minorities and the 
chronically ill and disabled as particularly vulnerable groups. The main scope of the 
NSPS relates to the provision of social protection for the poorest Cambodians through 
three channels: Social insurance, social safety nets and social welfare services. The 
social insurance mechanism is for the working poor who would contribute to a social 
security scheme in partnership with the government. In doing so they would have 
access to unemployment support, health insurance, maternity cover, sick leave etc. As 
Duffield might say, they become „insured‟ rather than „uninsured‟ (Duffield, 2007). 
The social safety net includes conditional or non-conditional cash or in-kind transfers, 
public work programmes in exchange for cash or food and social subsidies to 
facilitate access to public utilities, health care and education.  
Fig. 53 Scope of the National Social Protection Strategy 
 
 
Finally the complementary social welfare services comprise of basic provisions for 
basic needs and services such as food, sanitation, water and shelter given to those who 
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need them most. The mechanisms for identifying who needs what most is vague in the 
report, relying upon the 2008 census and a new programme, IDPoor, used to target 
households and areas known to be suffering from poverty. 
 
Labour opportunities, formal and informal, as a mechanism for poverty reduction 
does not come under the scope of the NSPS despite its acknowledgement of the role 
labour markets can play in their social protection diagram (see Figure 53). The 
provision of social security is restricted to formal economy workers. In fact the only 
mention of the informal economy is in a chart related to occupational health. Further 
the NSPS only acknowledge that land insecurity may indirectly contribute to poverty 
and food insecurity. However the NSPS follows the same format as much of 
Cambodian policy by being openly biased towards the rural landscape, thus failing to 
identify land management and land rights as a key factor in addressing poverty for 
both the rural and urban population. 
 
From these National Development policies dating back to 1994 we can see that 
development for urban Cambodians has not been identified on a national level as a 
key priority. One might have expected that urban poverty would be highlighted in the 
NSPS for poor and vulnerable people along with other minority groups, but it was 
not. 
 
Despite the presence of multiple development initiatives and their regular revision, 
these plans poorly reflect what is actually happening on the ground across Cambodia 
and serve little more than to „paper over‟ obstacles to development by the government 
who favour short term windfalls for rich tycoons through exploitation of natural 
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resources and forests, at the cost of the communities both rural and urban. Instead 
these policies are used to justify accumulation by dispossession thereby increasing the 
wealth of powerful individuals and strengthening the existing government and power 
structures (Louth, 2015). These consumption-only policies facilitate the influx of 
donor funding to Cambodia, detaching the government from society and from their 
responsibility to address deepening poverty and inequality. 
 
5.2.ii Phnom Penh Development Strategy 2005-2015 
We now turn to Phnom Penh specific development policy in the form of the 2005-
2015 Development Strategy (PPDS). Written in 2004 at a time when Phnom Penh had 
an estimated population of 1million, a landmass of 375km
2
, 4 urban khans and 3 rural 
khans  (PPDS, 2004). The population is now estimated to be more than 2million and 
the number of Khans has risen to 12 in 2016 The PPDS indicates three main aims: 
1. Improve good governance.  
2. Promote local economic development.  
3. Strengthen the system of urban poverty reduction program in a sustainable way. 
 
These aims are supported by five vision statements and supporting strategies: 
Vision 1. Land use and housing 
Vision 2. Environment and natural resources.  
Vision 3. Infrastructure and transportation 
Vision 4. Social service 
Vision 5. Economic development 
 
All the visions are crucial for understanding the direction of development in Phnom 
Penh. The language used to describe the city illustrates the desire for Phnom Penh to 
be known as the Charming City; an epithet already displayed around the city‟s 
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Independence Monument and boulevards. Its „splendid beauty‟, modern yet 
unequivocally Khmer style, represents the spiritual, economic and political heart of 
the country. 
 
Vision one on land and vision five on economic development relate specifically to the 
themes of livelihoods and housing addressed in this thesis. Interestingly the strategy 
for vision 1 focuses on advocacy to increase the awareness of land law, to promote 
private investment for housing developments and to upgrade 100 poor communities 
per year. In fact causes of land conflict can be identified in this vision as two of the 
most controversial forced evictions, Boeung Kak and Borei Keila, were at the hands 
of private corporations who did not respect contracts, law or human rights in relation 
to their developments. In these instances, the increased awareness of land law did 
little to ease the conflict, as the law was bypassed in favour of investment. Continued 
lack of awareness of land law and channels of dispute resolution, the threats and 
obstacles put in the way of judicial process and the absence of the 100 poor 
community upgrades per year support the argument that there was little intention of 
this or the other visions being realised. Therefore advocacy alone is futile if the 
processes being advocated for are toothless. 
 
The third aim, Strengthen the system of urban  poverty reduction program in a 
sustainable way is supported by vision five on Economic development, recognises 
Phnom Penh as the tourism, industrial, political and economic hub of the country. The 
strategy offered to tackle urban poverty reduction is an increased promotion and 
organisation of handicrafts. Whilst the production of handicrafts is one of many 
labour market choices for the urban poor, they are by no means the most popular, 
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accessible, profitable or feasible. This response cannot be taken seriously as a strategy 
for urban poverty reduction. It is more useful as an insight into the MPP‟s 
misunderstanding of urban poverty and urban poor livelihoods and the actual utility of 
the PPDS, which is a document for circulation amongst donors and supporters but 
never meant for meaningful implementation. 
 
Hughes (2003) and Springer (2011) have argued that Phnom Penh‟s development 
agenda is in reality non-existent regardless of the production of reports and agendas, 
routinely updated in time for funding deadlines. The reality of development in Phnom 
Penh is that of a chaotic changeable agenda set by a secretive political and economic 
network of the RGC, the MPP, the military, FDI and property developers. Springer 
details how the Cambodian conglomerate Sokimex, described as the financial pillar of 
the CPP by opposition leader Sam Rainsy who claimed there was little to distinguish 
between the CPP, Sokimex and the State, is a vehicle of CPP influence, corruption 
and exploitation. The business portfolio of Sokimex includes garment factories, 
service stations, an airline, property development, construction, rubber tree 
plantations, hotels and until recently, the management of ticket sales to Angkor Wat
66
 
(2011, p. 2558). Tim Winter (2010) expands on neoliberalism within the tourism 
industry in his work „Heritage Tourism: A dawn of a new era‟. Winter describes how 
foreign investment into tourism infrastructure, particularly surrounding the UNESCO 
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 Phnom Penh Post reported on the 5
th
 January that Sokimex who have controlled 
ticket sales since 1999 ceased to do so from 1st January 2016 after which the RGC‟s 
Ministry of Economy and Finance took over. Speculation as to Sokimex losing this 
lucrative contract suggests it may be due to irregularities in ticket revenue or recent 
low-ticket sales. Article available here: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/government-takes-over-reins-angkor-
ticket-sales?utm_content=buffer39073&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook. 
com&utm_campaign=buffer 
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World Heritage sites of Angkor and Preah Vihear in Cambodia, has opened 
alternative channels for Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean influence in Cambodia. 
These channels of influence undermine agreements, conventions and the relationship 
between the RCG and the UN, World Bank and the IMF as money is readily available 
from alternative sources without the same equitable development-centric strings 
attached. 
 
A policy agenda perused more openly, although no less coherently, in Phnom Penh is 
that of beautification. Introduced in Chapter Two, the process of beautification 
emerged in 1996, the strategy of Chea Sophara Mayor of Phnom Penh at the time. 
The plan aimed to present a façade of calm and tranquillity in Phnom Penh by thinly 
veiling over poverty, homelessness and inequality. During times of particular 
international attention such as when Phnom Penh hosts an ASEAN conference or 
international delegates, streets are quite literally swept of the homeless who are 
incarcerated for an indeterminate amount of time, street sellers and other individuals 
who do not fit the aesthetic vision are removed, fined and told to leave the area, fresh 
trees and flowers are planted, grass trimmed and all number of other measures taken 
to ensure a clean, tranquil and ultimately skewed vision of beauty be presented for the 
desired audience (Next City, 2014; Phnom Penh Post, 2012, 2002; Straingo, 2010; 
Cambodia Daily, 2009; Hughes, IIAS, 2003). Hughes pairs the 1996 Beautification 
Plan with corruption to reflect the two faces of Phnom Penh (2003, IIAS). In her short 
article, Hughes illustrates how the process of beautification is facilitated and 
perpetuated by corruption and violence, itself contributing to the plight of the urban 
poor through displacement, exclusion and denial of space, both in physical terms and 
in terms of political negotiation (IIAS, 2003). This contradictory process of 
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beautification and displacement is played out in Phnom Penh in more real terms than 
any of the donor-orientated „visions‟ of the PPDS. 
 
5.2.iii Cambodian Labour Law 
The urban poor economy covers the different aspects of urban poor livelihood 
generating practices, some of which fall under the ILO definition of working in the 
informal sector or informal employment. Other work covered by the term are more 
formalised such as the employment of soldiers, hotel workers, factory workers etc. 
Therefore taking into account the formal and informal components of the urban poor 
economy, an understanding of Cambodian labour law is important to see if, how and 
in what ways labour law accommodates income-generating practices of the urban 
poor economy.  
 
Like Cambodia‟s SEPD I, Cambodia‟s first labour law was written in 1992 with the 
assistance of the international community. The 1992 legislation incorporated elements 
from historic Cambodian labour law and French labour law. In fact much of 
Cambodia‟s judicial system reflects the French system and law students (economics 
and medical students) study in French for French university accredited degrees. This 
relationship can be identified as a legacy from former French Indochina where 
Cambodia was a French Protectorate. 
 
Alongside setting rules for contracting and terminating employment, the most 
prevailing provision in the 1992 law was the prohibition of forced labour. Despite the 
involvement of the international community in the drafting process, the 1992 labour 
law was inherently flawed as it failed to specify procedures for administering the law, 
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resolving disputes, penalties for breaking the law or the establishment of trade unions 
(CLEC, 2005). 
 
To address these serious deficits the law was revised in 1997, again based on a French 
draft. The new 1997 labour law addressed the aforementioned deficits and expanded 
definitions of contracted worker to include industrial workers, domestic or household 
servants, artisans, service employees, agricultural workers and transportation workers. 
Artisans are clarified in art. 7 as: 
 …persons who practice a manual trade personally on their own account, working at 
home or outside… either alone or with the help of their spouse or family members 
who work without pay, or with the help of workers or apprentices…The number of 
non-family workers, who work regularly for an artisan cannot exceed seven. If this 
number is exceeded, the employer loses the status of artisan (Article 7, 1997 Labour 
Law). 
 
This definition would encapsulate many of the different labour practices indicated by 
the household survey, were it not for the necessary contractual nature. Verbal 
contracts are not provided for under the 1997 law, all contracts must be signed 
(Article 3, 1997 Labour Law). 
 
The law addresses what it calls the „stability‟ of employment by dividing the 
workforce into two groups, regular workers and casual workers (article 9, 1997 
Labour Law). Regular workers are permanently contracted whereas casual workers 
are contracted to perform a specific task usually completed in a short period of time, 
to work seasonally or to work intermittently. 
 
 278 
The Arbitration Council (AC) was established under the 1997 law, but only came into 
practice in 2003 with the assistance of the ILO. An independent institution, the AC is 
responsible for the resolution of collective labour disputes. A tripartite structure, the 
30 arbitrators of the AC are nominated in equal numbers by the Ministry of Labour, 
employers‟ associations and unions. However the AC‟s mandate is limited to hearing 
labour disputes of ten or more employees. The vast majority of disputes brought 
before the AC are from garment factory workers but recently there has been an 
increase in disputes raised from the tourism industry and the NGO sector (interview 
with AC Manager, 2012). The AC is held as an example of a working, independent 
dispute resolution mechanism. However it‟s limited mandate prevents the AC form 
being useful to small enterprise workers or workers in the informal economy faced 
with a labour dispute. 
 
Cambodia has ratified the key international treaties and recognised the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations Charter in its constitution. 
However, it remains unclear if this is merely in principle or has direct implications for 
Cambodian law. For example, provisions of the ILO‟s conventions are incorporated 
into Article 31 of the 1997 law while technical provisions are not (CLEC, 2005). 
 
The 2010 Labour and Social Trends report from the ILO states, in line with the luxury 
of unemployment hypothesis raised in the introduction and section 4.2.iv, that 
unemployment is a luxury that the majority of Cambodians cannot afford and 
therefore states the unemployment figures at an estimated 1.6 per cent or 1.1 per cent 
in adults and 3.3 per cent among youth (p. 23, ILO, 2010). Another ILO reports 
estimates the informal economy at 85 per cent of the Cambodian workforce (p.3 ILO, 
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2006). We can then deduce that the 1997 labour law therefore applies to only 15 per 
cent of the Cambodian workforce. This fact reinforces the importance of 
understanding the informal economy, the largest economy in Cambodia.  
 
5.2.iv Cambodian Land Law 
Land disputes in urban areas have distinct characteristics to those in rural areas 
(Adler, 2008). In rural areas land conflicts concern farming areas, private and 
communal, access to resources such as forests, rivers and lakes. Land in urban areas 
such as Phnom Penh has a higher value; space is a premium and location is of vital 
importance. The concentration of powerful individuals coming into dispute with each 
other and the poor had led to power imbalances and power struggles, played out in 
part in public, in part behind closed doors. 
 
During the KR private property rights were scrapped, replaced by communal 
ownership and farming practices. Following their displacement from power in 1979, 
the Vietnamese ideology executed through the People‟s Republic of Kampuchea 
reshaped Cambodian collectives and communes, continuing practices of communal 
ownership and farming. However the communal policies of the People‟s Republic of 
Kampuchea in the 1980s failed to be implemented appropriately as power was 
commonly delegated to regional authorities who were often less stringently 
communist, and who began to informally divide up and allocate land and property 
(Khemro & Payne, 2004; Williams, 2008). By the mid 1980s, the agricultural sector 
was de facto privatised and urban real estate was allocated on a basis whereby 
authorities took the best quality housing and buildings, leaving the poor to squat and 
share housing wherever it remained (Khemro & Payne, 2004; Williams, 2008; Frings, 
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1994). Competition for property in the capital Phnom Penh and other urban centres 
was chaotic with the prospect of peace, business, and international investment on the 
horizon and has been described as „a war of houses and a war of land‟ (Williams, 
2008: p.39). Corrupt officials sold houses and properties to multiple buyers and the 
military seized land. Land grabbing also plagued rural Cambodia, as multiple people 
laid multiple claims to disputed land, further complicated by false documentation, 
false names, and nepotism. The lack of legal clarity in the 1989 land reform had 
become a major factor in fuelling the criminalised peace economy through 
reinvigorating corruption and reinforcing a structure of state aggression. Whilst the 
rich and influential minority were able to consolidate their status with land titles, the 
majority peasant population continued to rely on informal economic practices to 
survive in both urban and rural areas, occupying whatever land was available to them 
(Frings, 1994; Williams, 2008: p.38). 
 
Since the 1989 reform there have been two significant changes in Cambodian land 
law: the first in 1992 a consequence of the presence of UNTAC and a third land 
reform in 2001. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people, including 
estimates of over 350,000 refugees returning from the Thai border, found themselves 
homeless, without food and unemployed throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Peou, 
2000, p. 239). Cambodia‟s urban population swelled as people flooded into to the 
market towns and cities in search of loved ones, food and employment. In conjunction 
with the Paris Peace Agreements, a land law aimed to alleviate peasant grievances 
through the privatisation of land, by awarding land titles to those who had peacefully 
occupied land for five years, was created in 1992. During the 1990s there was a 
dramatic increase in squatter communities in Phnom Penh, which had begun to form 
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after the collapse of the KR as Cambodians returned to their hometowns in search of 
missing family members, and employment. The 1992 land law attempted to address 
the grievances of the peasant population by giving land titles to peaceful occupations 
of land after five years. However lack of awareness and procedures put in place to 
provision these titles meant that the Land Law failed to make an impact (Williams, 
2008; Hughes, 2003; Frings, 1994). The 2001 land law was an attempt to reform and 
improve the implementation of the 1992 land law. The 2001 law recognised land 
possession and occupation prior to its passage, protected public property such as 
lakes, rivers and forests, recognised the rights of indigenous groups to their traditional 
residential and agricultural lands and encouraged a more organised approach to land 
titling rather than the „free for all‟ that had been taking place (Williams, 2008: pp. 47-
48; World Bank, 2009). However, despite many promises made by the international 
community and the RGC, there was meagre progression in land titling in parts of rural 
Cambodia, whilst the issuance of titles in urban areas has was, and continues to be, 
inadequate due to political and economic interests of the government (LICADHO, 
2009; Williams, 2008; Hughes, 2003; Mgbako et al., 2010; Frings, 1994; Bretton 
Woods, 2011). 
 
The ineffectiveness of the 2001 Land Law has resulted in land grabbing and 
exploitation as the demand for land and housing has grown dramatically due to 
international interest and foreign investment in Phnom Penh and Cambodia‟s natural 
resources (World Bank, 2009; Williams, 2008; Hughes, 2003; Mgbako et al., 2010).  
The Cambodian government has actively prevented the issuing of land titles to 
residents in areas marked for development due to what has been described as 
„rampant corruption at every stage of the development process‟ (Mgbako et al., 2010: 
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p.64). The government has been benefitting from high land prices in Phnom Penh by 
unlawfully granting title to private developers in exchange for private compensation 
(Transparency International, 2014; Williams, 2008; Mgbako et al., 2010). Once the 
titles have been granted, eviction orders are set for forcing the existing residents off 
the land. This happens frequently without following the appropriate procedures such 
as giving notice or allowing for appeal. Moreover, evictions have been violent and 
often take place at night or in the early hours of the morning, catching the residents 
off guard while they sleep. Those who are notified in advance and oppose the eviction 
are frequently arrested or beaten (Williams, 2008; Mgbako et al., 2010; Amnesty 
International, 2009; LICADHO, 2009; COHRE, 2009). Cambodia has been described 
as „up for sale‟ in the media (BBC News, 13 January 2011). 
 
In an attempt to address the inadequate law and policy relating to urban land 
management, the government in 2010 released „Circular 3: Resolution on temporary 
settlements on state land illegally occupied in the capital, municipal and urban areas‟. 
The title of this report expresses the homogeneous perspective of urban poverty that 
this thesis has been challenging. Data so far has shown that the houses and settlements 
that are facing eviction or have been evicted are not necessarily temporary structures, 
but homes that in some cases have stood since before the KR in the 1970s (HRTF, 
2011). The statement that these settlements are illegally occupying land labels all the 
urban poor as criminal, when in fact this is hardly the case as demonstrated through 
the tenure typology offered by Khmero and Payne.
67
 As a result of the failed land 
titling process mandated under the 1992 and 2001 land laws, residents who have 
peacefully occupied their homes for more than five years have not been offered the 
                                                 
67
 For the Khmero and Payne more nuanced tenure security typology see section 4.3 
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land titles they are entitled to. In fact that the absence of land titles is desirable to the 
government as this enables them to claim land as state own, or lowers the level of 
compensation required following an eviction. Circular 3 was largely discredited by 
NGOs working with residents facing eviction as being nothing other than the 
formalisation of corruption and land grabbing that has plagued the city‟s residents 
since the 1980s. 
 
However to avoid lumping together the RGC, MPP and local government structures, 
investigations into local authorities and the different levels of governance in 
Cambodia have revealed that whilst there are certain conflicts and demonstrations of 
power and influence at the highest levels of Cambodian society, the relationships 
between local authorities and community members can also be influential in the 
issuance of land titles and receipts. Hughes‟ (2003) IIAS article gives an example of 
nepotism in compensation allocation from the infamous 2001 Tonle Bassac fire:  
One squatter family commented: ‗A group of villagers whose houses were burned... 
haven‘t got a house yet because they don‘t know anyone working in the government. 
So they‘ve got no land yet... But those who have relatives working in the government 
have no difficulty getting land.‘ Another villager went further: ‗Those who have 
relatives working in the government got two or three plots of land, so they could sell 
some and make money.‘  
Hughes‟ interview later reveals similarities with the household respondents contacted 
for this research as respondents were too scared to challenge the authorities or 
complain about unfair treatment, for fear of being labelled trouble makers and being 
denied any meagre compensation all together. Adler in his 2008 working paper 
identified these three main factors contributing to urban land conflict: 
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 Land disputes are caused in major part by a history of weak land management 
 Dealings with state land depend largely on the concrete interests of higher-
level officials and those with power. 
 All parties continue to rely upon traditional practices to some extent, for land 
acquisition, negotiation and dispute resolution (2008, p.5)  
 
In relation to Adler‟s second and third bullet points, an insightful investigation into 
local authority state operations is offered in a chapter from the CDRI Annual Review 
2013-14 authored by Somatra and Navy titled „Democracy from a Political 
Geographer‟s Perspective: A Case Study if the Tonle Sap Demarcation Project‟. Here 
Somatra and Navy examine the democratic (or otherwise) processes used by local 
authorities regarding the demarcation of flooded forests surrounding the Tonle Sap 
Lake. Whilst their study relates to the land issues within a rural context, the processes 
of responsibility, decision making and accountability within the local authority shed 
light on similar processes concerning land issues in the urban landscape. Their case 
study concerns the call for demarcation made by Prime Minister Hun Sen regarding 
the Tonle Sap Lake, as no clear boundary existed between the lake and surrounding 
farms and forests. As a result of frequent floods, farmers were increasingly clearing 
flooded forests for planting rice, which was threatening the sustainability of the Lake. 
Somatra and Navy‟s study revealed that local people for whom the lake, farms and 
forests are of the utmost importance were excluded from the creation of the new 
boundary. As a result their knowledge, lived-experience of the lake and its seasonal 
change, which would have been crucial in creating the lake boundary, were left out. 
Not only this but the locals who were to be affected by this boundary creation were 
not notified at all of what was occurring and were unaware of the presence of state 
agents. Nor did locally elected representatives have any contribution to the data 
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collection or production of the boundary, and many were unaware of the changes in 
the governance policy regarding the Tonle Sap (Somatra and Navy, 2014, p.148). As 
a result of the absence of local knowledge and customary practices which had hitherto 
been used to establish property rights, in one commune an estimated 80 per cent of 
the floating rice farmed area was registered as protected forest (Somatra and Navy, 
2014, p.148).  
 
It emerged that an upward line of accountability existed between cartographers and 
the minister responsible, who had pre-set the size of the area to be designated as 
protected forest at 645,000 hectares. Pre-setting the size of the area and excluding 
local representatives and locals from involvement in the creation of the map 
undermined any legitimate attempts to determine the actual size of the forest and 
denied the locals any space within which to challenge the demarcation process. 
Somatra and Navy conclude that the agenda of higher state apparatus served to side-
line local authorities, suggesting that central state agents were not required to engage 
with local authorities, inform or them of their actions or decisions, or justify them. 
However, that the local authorities were complicit in this as well as despite being 
aware of their presence, they did not enquire as to why the central state officials were 
present, did not make efforts to keep up to date with policy changes relevant to their 
community and did not make efforts to contribute to the project. The relationship 
between locally elected authorities and central state agents was summarised as:  
Local authorities …are expected to follow the central agents, provide logistics 
support and do as they are told. This working arrangement inhibits local 
accountability, and means that local authorities have no meaningful roles or 
responsibilities in the demarcation process (2014, p. 151). 
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Central state agents are upwardly accountable to their ministers but not downwardly 
as they are not elected and have no obligation to respond to local people. However the 
upward accountability of central state agents is neither purely linear nor firm. The 
agents, in this instance the cartographers on the ground, were most accountable to 
their immediate superiors and not directly Hun Sen as demonstrated by the fact that 
they follow the first part of their orders, to demarcate the pre-set boundary, but not the 
second part ordered by Hun Sen which was to respect existing farmland. Somatra and 
Navy also draw attention to the fact that the central state agents used approximation 
of sites for the boundary when floodwaters prevented their access to the given GPS 
coordinates, actively navigated the land of important government officials and upon 
the opportunities to revaluate the boundaries to respect farmland, used this as an 
opportunity to extract rents from farmers. Therefore central agents were not purely 
implementing their orders mechanically, but had the agency to influence and be 
influenced. Somatra and Navy identify the tension between reforms aimed at 
structurally decentralising governance to local authorities and the overlap and 
seniority of centralized neo-patrimonial power (2014, p. 155). 
 
Examination of the relationships between local people, their representatives and the 
central authority is important for this research as these relationships are the actual 
means by which the law is implemented in Cambodia. In the case of urban 
development, livelihood and housing, an individuals familial relations, the political 
connections of their commune and district representatives and the overarching higher 
central powers all have varying consequences for each household facing eviction.  
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5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a theoretical debate regarding development, violence and 
neoliberalism to inform the following discussion of national and Phnom Penh specific 
development policy. To speak to urban poor issues raised in Chapter Four, 
Cambodian labour law and land law were also examined to see how they 
accommodate or respond to urban poverty. It was determined that the urban context 
was unilaterally left out of development policy through an explicit bias towards the 
rural environment. This has further repercussions as any meaningful attempts at 
addressing urban poverty were rooted in inappropriate rural poverty models that do 
not speak to the specific challenges of poverty in the urban context. Beautification 
was argued to be one the few policies that was actually implemented, at the cost of the 
poor and most vulnerable. It has demonstrated how not only has development policy 
not been effective in addressing urban poverty, but was never intended to, as the 
policies were scarcely made for implementation but for donor consumption. In doing 
so policies that expressed a desire to assist the poor and remedy the countries 
entrenched poverty and inequality instead became vehicles of corruption, perpetuating 
exploitation and abuse of the most vulnerable. Finally the last section returned to the 
theme of governance raised earlier in Chapter Two and Chapter Four by scrutinising 
governance structures. The disconnect between locally elected representatives and the 
central government, the overarching neo-patrimonial power structure and the 
localised influence of familial relationships and rent seeking serve to undermine local 
governance and development implementation by reinforcing and reproducing the 
„actually existing neoliberalisms‟ discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
 
 288 
What can be done to stop violent forced evictions? Cambodian civil society and 
challenges to their the ability organise were raised in Chapter Two section 2.2. These 
challenges included the use of violence, threat and underhanded tactics by the local 
authorities, the individualisation of dispute and variation in compensation, and the 
personal networks of an effective or ineffective local authority. Discussion of how 
Cambodians might increase their tenure security from Chapter Four section 4.3 is also 
relevant to this section. Tenure security is deconstructed to offer a more nuanced 
typology that better reflects the range of tenure statuses of the urban poor. An 
example is given of a pilot project where the MPP, NGOs and communities worked 
together to upgrade three urban poor settlement sites, however for reasons unclear, the 
authorities refuse to implement the lessons learned from this pilot scheme instead 
shelving the initiative. Recommendations for how tenure security might be improved 
acknowledge that political change is required albeit unlikely and instead advocates for 
international support from donors, countries, agencies and developers. The 2007 UN-
Habitat Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements 
calls on the government to adhere to its international human rights obligations to 
provide adequate housing and suggests raising awareness, information collection and 
sharing and the coordination of efforts by residents and NGOs as steps towards 
mitigating the effects of forced eviction (2007, p. 313). 
 
Drawing on challenges facing the urban poor and in the context of development, the 
following three recommendations for urban development researchers, policy makers 
and practitioners are presented:  
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1. A thorough investigation into the main sources of income for residents prior to 
eviction. This would establish what labour opportunities are engaged with and 
therefore can be used inform future resettlement plans. 
 
2. Conduct a forum to discuss desirable future labour opportunities. Perhaps there 
are skilled workers within the settlement who are not exposed to opportunities to use 
those skills. On the other hand, perhaps there are labour opportunities that require a 
willing or skilled work force that may be able to employ and/or train residents. 
 
3. More diverse compensation options. It is not enough to offer land compensation if 
land is not required and if this land is far from income earning and labour market 
opportunities. Money in the form of lump sums or instalments 
 
Rather than demand actions from the RGC or MPP that will likely never take place, 
these recommendations are informed by actions currently undertaken during the 
DIDR process and therefore may be more easily adopted. The first two points 
emphasises the importance of livelihoods and their sustainability. The reason many 
residents abandon resettlement sites is because there is simply no work there. If the 
MPP is able to match a skilled workforce (or a workforce willing to be trained) with a 
relocate site close to employment opportunities, it would be of mutual benefit and 
create a desirable resettlement site less likely to be abandoned. The third point 
responds to compensation. Respondents stated that rather than receiving a land plot, 
they would have preferred a lump sum of money. This money could be used to pay 
off debt, invest in a moto or be used to rent or buy a property close to an existing or 
alternative labour opportunity. It is prescriptive and naively ideological to assume that 
land is the primary concern for those being evicted, as land titles in resettlement sites 
are not issued and subject to the same five-year occupation principle, regardless of the 
previous time spent in former sites. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has made a contribution to academic scholarship by responding to the 
challenge of understanding urban poverty and the participation of poor urban dwellers 
in labour markets through a multifaceted approach. In joining together labour and 
land literature from a political economy perspective and using quantitative and 
qualitative research methods, the author has sought to provide space for the „voice‟ of 
urban poor people to express what is important to their lives and livelihoods in their 
city. Their voices have been historically, politically and economically contextualised 
to question the pursuit and costs, material and otherwise, of development in Phnom 
Penh. This final chapter offers a research summary outlining the findings of this thesis 
in response to the research questions. To conclude, policy recommendations will be 
presented and areas for further research indicated. 
 
6.1 Summary of findings 
Research questions: 
1. Who are the urban poor and what resources, networks and mechanisms do 
they rely upon? 
2. Does existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor issues? 
If not, why not and how can this be improved? 
 
1. Who are the urban poor and what resources, networks and mechanisms do they rely 
upon? 
In 2013 it was announced that Cambodia was approaching „lower middle income 
status‟ (UNDP, 2013; Cambodia Daily, 2013; Open Development Cambodia, 2013). 
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Indicators of development relying chiefly on GDP estimates may, therefore, have 
been used to argue that Cambodia has successfully raised itself out of poverty. 
However, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that this is far from the case. 
Chapter Two, reviewing the historical background, demonstrates the failure of 
Cambodia to bring about a clear shift from conflict to peace, the failure of its 
supposed transition to a democracy and the failure of equitable distribution of wealth.  
Since 1979 until recently, Cambodia was a one party state. Only in the last 12 months, 
since the 2013 general election, has there been a viable opposition to the CPP for 
control of government with the return of Sam Rainsy and the formation of the 
Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), a merger of the Sam Rainsy Party and the 
Human Rights Party. But this has had fatal consequences for many CNRP supporters 
as many have been beaten, abused and shot (Cambodia Daily, 2013). The recorded 
inaccuracies at the 2013 polling stations compound accusations of electoral fraud and 
of a government unwilling to yield power after more than three decades. The second 
part Chapter Two tracked the history of Phnom Penh and its continuing expansion 
into the surrounding provinces. The gentrification of Phnom Penh through the process 
of street sweeping and „beautification‟ policy were outlined and the ability of civil 
society to organise discussed. 
 
Cambodia may be approaching middle-income status in terms of aggregate GDP 
figures, but its development has been neither equitable nor democratic. Instead of 
benefitting the poor, urban development projects have reinforced lower incomes and 
poor housing by instilling insecurity into almost every aspect of urban poor lives. The 
absence of due process, lack of respect for the law and use of violence by law 
enforcement agents, including local authorities, the police, and private security firms, 
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has resulted in the poor being condemned for being poor. When it is beneficial for the 
government to label them illegal, such as in regard to land occupation, it does so. 
When the government wants the city to appear clean and beautiful, such as when the 
ASEAN conference came to Phnom Penh, the poor and homeless are collected and 
moved to an infamous and highly secretive „rehabilitation unit‟, Prey Sor, for 
unspecified periods of time. When the government requires cheap labour, they are 
able to create a cheap workforce without contracts and therefore without job security 
or contractual benefits. 
 
The household survey indicated that the majority of respondents - 85 per cent - were 
migrants. Whilst this cannot be used to argue that the majority of all urban poor are 
migrants, it does support labour and migration literature emphasising the movement 
of workers from rural areas to urban centres. Urban poor households rely upon a 
variety of income generating opportunities and mechanisms. Unlike other urban areas 
in developing countries, household members usually had only one main income-
generating job each. These jobs were performed everyday whenever possible, for as 
long as possible, and so left little time for other employment opportunities. However 
residents were innovative and opportunistic in taking advantage of alternative income 
generating opportunities such as renting out their mobile phones, bicycles or 
motorbikes, growing small crops or keeping small livestock. 
 
This research has proposed a more context-specific definition for urban poor income 
generating opportunities, coping mechanisms and networks: the urban poor economy. 
The urban poor economy was formulated to challenge the traditional characterisation 
of the informal economy, in particular relating emphasise the different challenges an 
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urban context presents as well as to acknowledge the essential non-monetary 
contributions of household members. The urban poor economy can be defined as: The 
livelihood generating and coping practices of individual residents and households in 
urban areas, living close to a city-specific poverty line. Whilst this definition is not 
yet perfected, it is hoped that this is a step forward in seeing urban poor livelihoods 
for the diverse and wide-ranging practices that contribute to household incomes. The 
urban poor category is important as issues faced by those living in poverty differ 
greatly across rural and urban landscapes. This definition shifts focus from state 
regulation to emphasize the innovative plurality of different livelihood generating. 
practices, both monetary and non-monetary and therefore is more reflective of the  
variety of means of supporting a household in Phnom Penh. For example, non-
monetary duties are essential for understanding urban poor livelihoods. Household 
income is regularly supported by household networks, usually family elders or eldest 
children, who look after children, clean, cook and complete domestic duties, look 
after small crops and care for animals. In doing so these people free up other 
household members to capitalise on increased labour opportunities. Occasionally 
these members would also help support household members increase productivity by, 
for example, peeling pineapples before they were cut and packaged for sale, or using 
their spare time to cut loose threads off garments. 
 
The concept of horizontal regulation, the regulation of commodity and service prices 
and selling locations by those in a particular part of the urban poor economy or the 
same physical space, was offered to accompany the urban poor economy definition. 
Horizontal regulation is created and reinforced by people of the same economic or 
social level, as opposed to vertical regulation or „top down regulation‟ which is taken 
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to characterise the contractual relationship between an employer and employee or 
state regulated industry. For example, a group of snail sellers buy their product 
collectively and agree upon a price for sale. If one seller undersells another, this 
person is then excluded from the collective purchasing power and will pay higher 
individual purchase costs. Another example is that tuktuk drivers have defined plots 
and spaces in which they pick up customers. These plots are typically outside hotels, 
offices or along the riverside. Another driver cannot simply park their tuktuk and 
collect a customer from someone else‟s plot. The other drivers must agree upon the 
presence of each tuktuk. Whilst not formal in a strict contractual sense, there are 
punishments for breaking horizontal regulations, such as exclusion or even the 
destruction of property. 
 
Opportunities for household borrowing and saving were examined. As many urban 
poor were denied access to banks and formal borrowing and lending schemes, 
alternative means of borrowing and saving emerged. Purchasing gold, saving money 
at home, and community saving schemes were common, as was borrowing from 
private moneylenders at extremely high interest rates. However, respondents who 
were capable of managing their money and debt when living in Phnom Penh struggled 
to manage their debts in the resettlement sites due to the increased amounts borrowed 
and extortionate interest rates. 
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2. Does existing development policy respond appropriately to urban poor issues? If 
not, why not and how can this be improved? 
 
Cambodian development policy beginning with objectives set out by UNTAC and 
moving through the various national policies including SEDP I and II, PIP, NSDP 
2006-10, NSDP 2009-13 and the NSPS as well as Phnom Penh specific plans laid out 
by the MPP were consulted. It was identified that all national strategic development 
plans neglected the context specific nature of development, namely the different 
requirements of urban and rural labour markets. In doing so, development policy 
continued to treat the „informal economy‟ as a homogeneous block of self-employed 
workers. This research however has demonstrated that Cambodian policy lags being 
scholarship and practice that has moved on from this false dichotomy. 
 
Cambodia‟s unique history of extreme communist rule under the KR and collective 
land ownership under the Vietnamese meant that land reform in the country, adapting 
back to private property, was a monumental task. Despite international assistance, 
however, land grabbing and exploitation ensued and continue today. It has been 
presupposed that the poor require private property rights, in particular land rights, to 
enable them to lift themselves out of poverty, enabling the urban poor to access credit. 
However, evidence from this research indicates that land rights are not the one stop 
solution to urban poverty for the following eight reasons. 
 
1. The provision and allocation of private property rights necessitate an 
accountable and transparent government with a functioning civil 
administration. However this is precisely what is lacking in many developing 
countries. 
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2. Evidence for private property rights increasing rents and property costs has 
been offered, having the opposite effect of pushing the poor deeper into 
poverty rather than lifting them out of poverty (Gilbert & Varley, 1991; 
Gilbert & Ward, 1985; Davis, 2006). 
 
3. The provision and allocation of private property rights has served to 
individualize struggle and split communities by invoking economic 
competition amongst communities. 
 
4. The argument that private property rights will alleviate poverty fails to 
recognize a situation in which a property is undesirable and does not sell 
(Gilbert, 2002) 
 
5. The land titling process undertaken in Cambodia has served to be a vehicle 
for corruption and exploitation as it has legitimized land grabbing and led to 
the violation of human rights across the country.  
 
6. People live in and move to the city to earn money. Proximity to livelihood 
opportunities and large crowds are essential to their presence and survival 
and arguably as important as, perhaps more important than, private property 
rights. 
 
7. Many of the urban poor are migrants and do not see themselves staying long 
term in Phnom Penh. Their objective is to earn money or learn skills to enable 
them to send remittances and eventually return back to their home province. 
 
8. Despite being offered land in resettlement sites, plots are abandoned and 
rejected. Even when the plots are more than double the size of their homes in 
the city, cleaner and safer, they are still abandoned. This is because there are 
no labour opportunities in resettlement sites. To offer land without due 
attention paid to livelihoods fails to see the fundamental reality of urban 
poverty.  
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Private property rights are not unimportant. But the interview evidence presented in 
this thesis shows that money is what matters most.  The thesis calls for a deeper and 
more versatile understanding of urban livelihoods, coping mechanisms, networks and 
relationships than has been pursued in most of the existing literature on Cambodia. 
An increased understanding of the distinct nature of the urban poor economy, 
alongside private property rights, would be an effective method of identifying the 
reality of urban poor development issues, which is the first step towards remedying 
them.  
 
National development plans in Cambodia since the early 1990s have stated an explicit 
bias towards rural areas. This is compounded by national land titling and reform 
initiatives repeatedly falling under the remit of agricultural reform. This classification 
therefore continues to result in national strategic development plans failing to 
acknowledge the different conditions and challenges that urban areas present to 
development. This failure to identify context specific challenges in the urban 
environment coupled with mismanaged land policy has resulted in development 
policy having adverse affects for urban poor residents. Household income has been 
shown to fall dramatically in some cases. However, it has also been shown that this is 
not an inherent or inevitable outcome of DIDR (see section 4.3). One resettlement site 
surveyed displayed a significant improvement in household income and resident 
wellbeing. This site was located within an easily commutable distance to the city of 
8km, within 100m of a garment factory, had good roads, access to healthcare, schools 
and markets with state provided electricity and water. 
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Based on these findings the following recommendations were made to urban 
development researchers, policy makers and practitioners:  
1. A thorough investigation into the main sources of income for residents prior to 
eviction. This would establish what labour opportunities are engaged with and 
therefore can be used inform future resettlement plans. 
 
2. Conduct a forum to discuss desirable future labour opportunities. Perhaps there 
are skilled workers within the settlement who are not exposed to opportunities to use 
those skills. On the other hand, perhaps there are labour opportunities that require a 
willing or skilled work force that may be able to employ and/or train residents. 
 
3. More diverse compensation options. It is not enough to offer land compensation if 
land is not required and if this land is far from income earning and labour market 
opportunities. Money in the form of lump sums or instalments 
 
6.2 Insecurity, ‘The Golden Thread’ 
The theme of insecurity has emerged throughout this thesis in the forms of job 
insecurity and tenure insecurity. Whilst this was not originally part of the research 
methodology or analytical framework, its importance became evident whilst 
conducting fieldwork. International relations, military theorists and strategists have 
traditionally dominated the field of security. Security as a public policy and 
development concern advanced alongside the expansion of security into human 
security after the cold war. The security-development nexus can be seen as an 
example of this expansion. The notion that development and security go hand in hand 
is now taken as fact. Security has been described as the „Golden Thread‟ (Cameron, 
2012) tying together conditions that lead to peace and prosperity: the rule of law, 
robust institutions, the absence of conflict and corruption and respect for private 
property rights. 
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This research proposes, however, that the golden thread tying together the pursuit of 
development objectives in Phnom Penh is not one of security, but of insecurity. 
Development has come at the cost of security for the poor. However this insecurity is 
not an inherent bi-product development but a manipulation of the urban poor by the 
government and elites. The benefits of a cheap, mobile work force outweigh the cost 
of poverty alleviation and fulfilling obligations made to international bodies and 
conventions. It is not the poor who benefit from development but the elite who benefit 
from the poor‟s insecurity. This is evident from the FDI and aid fuelled rentier state, 
which characterises Cambodian government. The elite attract aid and investment due 
to the mass poverty in the country, only to redirect the money into their own 
enterprises and bank accounts. In the mean time the poor are marginalised and 
expelled from the centre of Phnom Penh, as a result of a policy of beautification and 
accumulation by dispossession. The poor are therefore pushed deeper into poverty, 
vulnerability and insecurity. The poor are kept perpetually mobile through a corrupt 
land titling process, facilitated by the international community. The poor therefore are 
free to be used as a cheap, movable work force, that enables the state and industry to 
benefit from their insecurity, by keeping labour costs low and attracting investment. 
 
 
6.3 Future research 
This thesis has focused on the urban poor. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
identification of the urban poor indicates an urban middle class and urban elite. 
Whilst this research has not been able to pursue these suggested categories, 
identifying the different characteristics of urban and rural middle classes and elite 
would be an interesting extension of this research. Particularly as the urban 
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environment continues to expand and challenge pre-existing assumption of poverty, 
what it means to be part of the middle class or an elite. Development research must 
continue to investigate how urbanisation is affecting the lives of people in both rural 
and urban areas, so as to tackle challenges as and when they emerge. With the 
explosion of urbanisation being felt across the globe, regional comparative studies 
into urban life, urban poverty and urban labour markets as well as cross continental 
studies, could produce interesting results and reveal unforeseen trends in urban 
development. 
 
Along these lines, an extension of this research in scope and duration could be 
conducted to create a more robust and statistically significant data set. Urban poor 
settlements are appearing and disappearing week by week in Phnom Penh, some 
perhaps without a trace. This research is in a unique position of having surveyed sites 
prior to their eviction. This research could be extended to accompany respondents 
through the entire process of eviction and resettlement, following the progress of how 
their lives, livelihoods and opportunities change through the their experiences of 
DIDR. This research could also be expanded in scope to incorporate new squatter 
sites in Phnom Penh. Of particular interest to the author are the emergences of roof 
top urban poor dwellings that have been created in response to the increasing 
difficulty of finding vacant land in Phnom Penh. A more in depth study to determine 
the causes of variation within compensation would also be relevant. This might 
perhaps investigate whether what was being developed on the site was of importance, 
a resident‟s political association, bribery or other factors were influential in 
determining what compensation was received. 
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Further work to define the term urban poor economy is required, to see if this term 
can be useful outside of Phnom Penh and Cambodia. This would require a 
significantly larger theoretical assessment than a doctoral thesis, require further 
analysis as well as detailed knowledge of urban poor labour markets across the world. 
Hopefully the urban poor economy is a step in the right direction, acknowledging the 
crucial non-monetary contributions of household members and the specific challenges 
facing the urban poor. 
 
Finally, work begun by Hammar (2014) in her edited edition addressing the paradoxes 
of displacement and the deficit in theoretical frameworks for understanding 
displacement economies, opens up exciting new avenues for possible research. Her 
re-characterisation of displacement as a process of production speaks to Cernea‟s 
(1999) call for a focus on the aftermath of displacement and resettlement. However 
whereas Cernea envisions this as an opportunity for a positive process of recovery, 
Hammar‟s work allows space for both the negative and positive products of 
displacement to emerge. This may be combined with the more nuanced tenure status 
typology offered by Khmero and Payne to provide a truly progressive attitude towards 
the urban poor that could be adopted by NGOs and policy makers so that the real 
needs of the urban poor are incorporated into development and DIDR in particular.  
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Appendix 1. The Household Survey  
 
1.1 Name:         Date:   
1.2 Age:         Number:   
1.3 Marital 
Status: 
 Married Single Divorce                         Widow      
1.4 Position in 
Household? 
         
1.5 From which 
Province? 
    1.8 Recloation Site Name: 
  
  
1.7 Education level: illiterate primary School   
High 
School 
  University 
RELOCATION SITE 
      CURRENT EMPLOYMENT         
Job 
Type:  
1. Driver: 
Motodop 
2. Driver: 
Tuktuk 
3. Driver: 
Cyclo 
4. Driver: 
Taxi / car 
5. 
Business 
owner 
6. 
Restaurant 
owner 
7. 
Shop 
owner 
8. Shop 
worker 
9. Collector 
[recycables
] 
 10. 
Construct. 
11. Skilled 
trade: 
plumber 
12. 
Skilled 
trade: 
electric 
13. 
Skilled 
trade: 
carp. 
14. Crafts 
e.g. tailor  
15. Farmer 16. 
Fish 
17. 
Agricultu
ral 
worker 
18. Security 
guard 
 17. 
Waitress 
18. Hotel 
worker 
19. 
Cleaner 
20. 
Laundry 
21. 
Nanny 
22. teacher 23. 
Hair 
dresser 
24. 
barber 
25. factory  
worker 
 26. 
Secretary / 
Admin 
Assistant 
27. Street 
seller: food 
28. 
Street 
seller: 
drink 
29. 
Street 
seller: 
cake 
30. Street 
seller: 
toy 
31. Street 
seller: fuel 
32. 
Street 
seller: 
Other 
33. 
Market 
seller: 
food 
34. Market 
seller: 
drink 
 35. Market 
seller: cake 
36. Market 
seller: toy 
37. 
Market 
seller: 
38. 
Market 
seller: 
39. Stay 
at home 
40. Other [please describe]: 
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fuel other 
 2.1 Job 
Type No. 
2.2 
Hours 
worked 
per day 
2.3 No. 
Days 
worked 
per 
week? 
2.4 Months 
per year? 
2.5 Distance 
to work? km 
2.6 Mode of 
transport? 
2.7 Income  
1st Job:             
2nd Job:             
2.8 Are you a member of a Trade 
Union? 
 Yes / No  2.9 Name of Trade Union: 
    CURRENT HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION     
3.1  No. of people living in in House Hold?       
3.2 Name 3.3 
Age 
3.4 
Relationship 
to person 
filling in 
survey 
3.5 Primary 
Education 
3.6 High School 
Education 
3.7 
University 
Education 
3.8 
Married 
3.9 
Job 
no. 
3.10 
Incom
e per 
week: 
     
 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
     Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
Number of other people contributing money to the House Hold income       
3.11 Name 3.12 
Age 
3.13 Rel.to 
Respond. 
3.14 
Primary 
3.15 High 
School 
3.16 
University 
3.17 
Married 
3.18 
Job 
no. 
3.19 
Income 
given to HH 
per week: 
      Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
      Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
      Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No     
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4.1 TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
PER WEEK: 
        
Amount of money spent per week 
on: 
      
 4.2 Food:   4.5 Rent:   4.7 Transport:   4.9 
Alcohol: 
 
 4.3 
Water: 
  4.6 Education   4.8 Phone:   4.10 
Medicine: 
 
 4.4 
Electricit
y: 
      4.11 
Other:  
 
4.12 Do you save 
money? 
 Yes / No      
4.13 If yes, where do you 
save money? 
 1. Bank   4. Play Dong 
Tin 
  
 2. At home   5. Community Saving Scheme 
  
   3. Buy gold.   6. Other   
4.14 Do you borrow 
money? 
 Yes / No   4.15 How much money do you 
borrow?  
  
  
4.16 What did / do you use the 
borrowed money for? 
  4.17 Where do you 
borrow money from? 
1. Individual 
money lender 
3. 
Family 
           2. Bank 4. 
Other 
4.18 Do you 
have: 
1. Car   2. Moto   
3. Bike 
  4. TV  
 5. Radio   6. Chickens   
7. Ducks 
  8. Pigs  
 9. Cows   10. Mobile Phone   
11. Grow crops 
  12. Toilet  
         
4.19 Do you ever experience violence or intimidation at work?  yes 
/ No 
4.20 If yes, please give detail: 
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      RELOCATION SITE INFORMATION     
5.1 Water Yes / No  State / 
Private 
  5.4 Health  Yes / No under 1 km over 1 
km 
5.2 
Electricity 
Yes / No  State / 
Private 
  5.5 School Yes / No under 1 km over 1 
km 
5.3 Road Yes / No  Good / 
Bad 
  5.6 Market Yes / No under 1 km over 1 
km 
5.7 Flood in Rainy 
Season? 
Yes / No      
5.8 Land 
size? 
       
5.9 House 
structure? 
Wood Plastic Metal Brick Concrete Bamboo Palm 
FORMER LOCATION SITE 
6.1 Date of 
Eviction: 
 6.2 Former site name and location:     
      FORMER EMPLOYMENT & HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION 
 6.3 Job 
Type No. 
6.4 Hours 
worked per 
day 
6.5 No. Days 
worked per 
week? 
6.6 Months 
per year? 
6.7 
Distance to 
work? km 
6.8  Mode of 
transport? 
6.9  Income  
1st Job:           
2nd Job:           
6.10  No. of people living in in House 
Hold? 
      
6.11 Name 6.12 
Age 
6.13 
Relationship 
to person 
filling in 
survey 
6.14 Married 6.15 Job no. 6.16 Income per 
week: 
 
      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
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      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
      Yes / No      
6.17 TOTAL FORMER HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER WEEK:       
7.1 Did you rent or own your former 
house? 
 Rent / Own  
7.2 Did you save money?  Yes / No     
7.3 If yes, where did you 
save money? 
 1. Bank   
4. Play Dong Tin 
 2. At home   
  
5. Community Saving Scheme 
   3. Buy gold.   
6. Other 
7.4 Did you borrow 
money? 
 Yes / No  7.5 How much money did you 
borrow?  
  
  
7.6 What did / do you use the 
borrowed money for? 
   7.7 Where did you 
borrow money from? 
1. Individual 
money lender 
3. Family 
           2. Bank 4. Other 
7.8 Did you 
have: 
1. Car   2. Moto   3. Bike 4. TV  
 5. Radio   6. Chickens   7. Ducks 8. Pigs  
 9. Cows   10. Mobile 
Phone 
  11. Grow 
crops 
12. Toilet  
7.9 Did you ever experience violence or intimidation at work? yes / No 7.10 If yes, please give detail: 
FORMER SITE INFORMATION 
7.11 Water Yes / No  State / 
Private 
 7.14 Health  Yes / No under 1 km over 1 km 
7.12 
Electricity 
Yes / No  State / 
Private 
 7.15 School Yes / No under 1 km over 1 km 
7.13 Road Yes / No  Good / 
Bad 
 7.16 Market Yes / No under 1 km over 1 km 
7.17 Flood in Rainy Yes / No      
 335 
Season? 
7.18 Land 
size? 
       
7.19 House structure? Wood Plastic Metal Brick Concrete Bamboo Palm 
THE EVICTION PROCESS 
Do you 
have: 
 8.1 
Family 
book 
  
8.2 ID card 
  
8.3 Voting 
card 
  
 
  8.5 Land 
title 
8.4 Birth certificate     
8.6 Did you receive official notification of eviction?  Yes / No 
8.7 Compensation 
offered: 
1. 
Money: 
     
  2. Land: Undefined empty land  Defined Empty land Defined land & 
building materials 
Defined land 
& house 
  3. NOTHING       
8.8 Compensation 
Accepted: 
1. Money:       
  2. Land: Undefined empty 
plot 
Defined Empty Plot Defined Plot & 
building materials 
Defined Plot 
& house 
  3. NOTHING      
8.9 Did you submit a complaint to the government?   Yes / No 
8.10 Did you protest before you were relocated?   Yes / No 
8.11 Did you experience intimidation or violence at any time?   Yes / No 
8.12 Please write any details of the relocation process here: 
 
 
8.13 How do you feel your living conditions have changed since your relocation?    
Much 
worse 
Worse The same  Better Much Better 
  
  
8.14 Please explain your 
answer: 
      
 
